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Foreword
Academic theology is of immense importance to Africa, and especially to 
South Africa, where many forms of popular Christianity reside. Academic 
theology engages these manifestations of Christianity, and although 
academic research seldom reaches down to grassroots level, it provides 
important criteria against which religious behaviour can be profiled.
The year 2015 provided an important opportunity for academic 
theology to investigate the interface between academia, practice and 
context in the figure of Albert Schweitzer. Schweitzer was born on 14 
January 1875 and died on 4 September 1965. The year 2015 therefore 
celebrates his 140th birthday; it also commemorates 50 years after his 
death. This presented a good opportunity to promote academic theology 
and to showcase some of the theological research that is being done not 
only at the University of South Africa where the editors reside, but on the 
whole of the African continent.
Albert Schweitzer was an outstanding New Testament scholar, an 
accomplished organist, a medical doctor and a philosopher on the nature of 
the web of life of which human beings were but a part. He received the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1952 for his medical work at Lambaréné in the north of the 
Congo (now Gabon) in West Africa, for his philosophy on the ‘Reverence for 
Life’ and for taking a stance against the development of nuclear weapons.
Which of the legacies, or parts thereof, are still relevant to Africa today? 
And which need to be reconsidered? What of his thinking and activities 
were enhancing to Africa and what was un-African and even harmful? 
Can his contributions to the fields of theology, musicology, education 
and philosophy simply be ignored as colonialist? Do they need to be 
reconsidered?
How to cite: Spangenberg, I. & Landman, C., 2016, ‘Foreword’, in I.J.J. Spangenberg & C. Landman (eds.), The legacies of 




With these questions in mind, scholars were invited to submit abstracts 
for a seminar to be held on 15 and 16 October 2015 at the University of 
South Africa. Here, about 20 scholars from all over Africa read papers on 
Schweitzer and the quality of his contribution to Africa.
The chapters in this publication are a selection from the papers which 
were read at the seminar. The chapters that succeeded in being published 
had been subjected to a double blind peer reviewed process, first by Studia 
Historiae Ecclesiasticae, and second by AOSIS. The aim of the publication is, 
of course, to engage readers and fellow researchers in reconsidering and 
reappraising Schweitzer’s work. Secondary aims are to stimulate research 
in the different fields in which Schweitzer excelled, and to centralise 
academic theology in contemporary discussions both in South Africa and 
in the rest of Africa on relevance and post-colonial discourse.
The publication is divided into four parts. Part 1 reconsiders Albert 
Schweitzer’s contribution to Africa from a post-colonial perspective. Here, 
Cornel du Toit introduces the topic by analysing Schweitzer’s ‘moral 
imperialism’ as expressed in his reverence for life philosophy, claiming 
that Schweitzer subjected all knowledge to morality in a way reminiscent 
of the German Idealists. In the next essay, Pieter Botha comes to an 
opposite conclusion on Schweitzer’s work. He highlights the criticism in 
Schweitzer’s reverence for life philosophy on colonialism, pointing to 
Schweitzer’s ‘ethical mysticism’ that is grounded in compassion, love for 
peace and non-violence. Idealistically, the fight against oppression and 
exploitation is that of the individual against political systems that have no 
reverence for life. In the last essay Menard Musendekwa takes an in-
between position in acknowledging Schweitzer’s criticism against 
colonialism, simultaneously subjecting Schweitzer to the same criticism 
for being racist in his evaluation and observation of locality.
Whilst the essayists in the first part deal with Schweitzer’s reverence 
for life in ways that are either critical or supportive of (post-) colonialism, 
the two essayists in Part 2 give their full attention to the analysis of 
reverence for life. Amadi Ahiamadu, relying on his doctoral thesis, 
combines Schweitzer’s concept of the reverence for life, the Biblical notion 
Foreword
xxii
of imago Dei and the African humanist values of the preservation and 
protection of life to criticise the exploitation of the environment by 
warring factions and large companies, especially in oil-producing Nigeria. 
Garth Mason authored the second essay in this section. He indicates 
Schweitzer’s concept of reverence for life was influenced by the war, his 
sentiments against nuclear weapons and his resistance to the Enlightenment 
view of ‘civilisation’. All of these factors, according to Schweitzer, led to a 
massive disregard of life even, and perhaps especially, at the political level.
Part 3 of this publication explores Albert Schweitzer as New Testament 
scholar. Three essayists reconsidered the well-known claim that Schweitzer 
remained stuck in the hermeneutical gap between the world of Jesus and 
the modern world. Lovemore Togarasei, whilst appreciating that 
Schweitzer has identified this gap, indicates how African Biblical 
Interpretation has taken over the values Schweitzer himself used to re-
clothe Jesus’ message within a modern world view. Togarasei argues that 
ABI has taken over from Schweitzer the notion that Jesus’ moral authority 
resides in his display of love and his interaction with the poor and 
marginalised. This spirit lives on in ABI bringing Jesus to contemporary 
communities. Eben Scheffler, too, identifies with the Jesus of Schweitzer 
who went to Jerusalem to sacrifice his own life to bring the Kingdom of 
God to realisation in this world. It is in this realised eschatology of 
Schweitzer that Scheffler appreciates the work Schweitzer has done in 
Africa, and is still needed to be realised in today’s communities. Andries 
van Aarde commends Schweitzer’s insight that we know Jesus through his 
toils on the one hand, and through our own experiences on the other. It is 
in a mixture between the two that the hermeneutical gap between then 
and now is bridged. Van Aarde’s interpretation that it is precisely in 
bridging this gap that Schweitzer sees himself as an instrument of God’s 
healing, announces the theme of the final part of this publication.
In Part 4, three legacies of Albert Schweitzer are reconsidered, that is, 
Schweitzer as healer, as educationalist and as a herald of the greening of 
Christianity. Through an innovative reading of Schweitzer, Izak 
Spangenberg finds that Schweitzer’s philosophy on the reverence for life 
was preparing a foundation for Christians to think ‘green’ about human 
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life within a greater environment. He suggests that religious vocabularies 
should shift from God-centred to life-centred, and traces this insight back 
to scholars who built on Schweitzer’s reverence for life. Johan Booyse 
presents a fascinating essay on the educational insights in Schweitzer’s 
philosophy on the reverence for life. He finds that:
without employing the modern nomenclature of educationalists, he advocates aspects of 
education such as lifelong learning, a focus on both pedagogy and andragogy, holistic education 
and a problem-based approach to education. (n.p.)
Finally, Christina Landman looks both critically and appreciatively at the 
contribution of Schweitzer towards the concepts of healing that he found in 
Africa, and concepts of religious healing prevalent in African Christianity today.
A bust of Albert Schweitzer has stood for many decades at the entrance 
to the library on the main campus of the University of South Africa in 
Pretoria. It is a work by an Afrikaans sculptor, Laurika Postma, with an 
Afrikaans inscription underneath which can be translated as ‘Dr Albert 
Schweitzer, famous philosopher, theologian, musician, doctor. Born Elsas 
1875, died Lambarene 1965’. In later years, this bust was removed – 
probably because of its connotation with Afrikaans and whiteness – and 
placed in the archives. This book, written by scholars from different 
universities in Africa, aims to reconsider Schweitzer’s contribution to 
Africa from a post-colonial point of view. The authors are of the opinion 
that this is where he indeed deserves to be honoured and remembered.
Izak Spangenberg & Christina Landman
Professors and Research Project Leaders attached to the Research Institute for 
Theology and Religion and Biblical Studies at the University of South Africa, under the 
auspices of the Church
History Society of Southern Africa
Research Institute for Theology and Religion









Post-colonialism and the 
deconstruction of moral 
imperialism: The case of 
Albert Schweitzer and his 
ethics of reverence for life
Cornel du Toit
Research Institute for Theology and Religion
University of South Africa
South Africa
Introduction: colonialism, post-colonialism and 
new-imperialisms
To revisit the life and work of a historical figure such as Albert 
Schweitzer is not possible without being influenced by the 
outcome of two world wars, the history of Germany’s 
colonisation of Namibia,1 the history of post-colonialism, the 
response to modernism and the influence of post-modernism, 
1. The Namas revolted against the Germans in 1903. The Hereros joined them in 1904. 
The Germans turned the revolt into a war that killed 54 000 of the 70 000 Hereros. In 
today’s terms, that would constitute genocide. Today (2015) the Hereros in Namibia are 
accusing the Germans of genocide and demanding compensation (see Nolden 1998:132).
How to cite: Du Toit, C., 2016, ‘Post-colonialism and the deconstruction of moral imperialism: The case of Albert Schweitzer 
and his ethics of reverence for life’, in I.J.J. Spangenberg & C. Landman (eds.), The legacies of Albert Schweitzer reconsidered 
(Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae Book Series 1), pp. 03-41, AOSIS, Cape Town. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/aosis.2016.tlasr11.01
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present-day ecological theology as well as the continued history 
of historical Jesus research. Similar to the way in which memory 
changes as time passes in the life of an individual, so too is 
the way we remember figures from the past as influenced by 
subsequent history.
There can be no ‘neutral’ Schweitzer interpretation. 
Schweitzer’s thoughts changed over the years, as is the case with 
most human beings. He was too considered to make one-sided 
statements. Those that may, at first sight, seem so are qualified 
by context. He contextualised and balanced such statements 
with self-critique and an appeal to our conscience.
African countries started to gain their independence in the 
1960s. Political independence, however, does not necessarily 
mean economic, religious and cultural independence. It is not 
easy to explain the extent to which the African mind has been 
colonised and alienated from its ‘true’ self. The post-colonial 
challenge was the reinterpretation of identity, society 
and tradition. It took on the form of the refurbishment 
of indigenous knowledge systems essential to tradition and self-
identification.
On the pervasive influence of colonialism Said (in Nolden 
1998) stresses: 
… that colonialism must be seen as an ideological complex that 
comprises the very idea of Western culture and its esteem of a certain 
kind of knowledge that is complicit with dominion. (p. 126)
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With reference to the United States, Bush (2006:195) avers that 
‘Cultural imperialism still operates at the level of popular culture, 
but also intellectual culture, in the control of scientific and 
academic knowledge and the definition of dominant academic 
discourses’. Language imperialism determines English as the 
language of education. American money – along with other 
currencies, all taking the form of aid programmes – has penetrated 
educational systems and contributed towards the shaping of elites 
(2006:195). Aid comes in packages that advertise a specific 
view of societies, individuals and the world. Globalism has to 
discriminate in reducing plurality to workable uniformity as it 
manifests in, for example, liberal market forces. But is any 
reduction of plurality to uniformity imperialist per se? The 
question is whether we should, conspiracy-wise, look for the 
imperialist protagonists behind all development and initiatives or 
whether we must consider such development as the way in which 
world culture is emerging. Bush (2006:189) considers globalism 
as a new stage in Western imperialism. In similar vein, subtle 
forms of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism remain active.2
The issue is more complex than it appears on the surface. 
The flip side of the coin is that all minority groups, all minority 
points of view, all representation of minority religions, all 
2. To what extent can Schweitzer be considered part of the history of colonialism and 
imperialism? Should his memory not be erased like the recent removal of the statue of 
Rhodes (on 09 April 2015) from the campus of the University of Cape Town?
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minority languages and all minority cultures can accuse the 
majority of imperialism. Bush (2006:207) refers in this regard to 
First Nation struggles for recognition in Australia, South Africa, 
Siberia, Amazonia, South-East Asia, North and South America – 
the list continues. Such struggles relate to the discourse of 
universal human rights, multiculturalism and identity politics.
New-imperialism is linked to economic power. Economists 
forecast that, by 2018, China will be the leading global economic 
force. Will China, then, become the new imperialists? We are 
witnessing the increasing involvement of China in countries all 
over the world, especially in Africa. Bush (2006:215) believes 
that the West is gradually losing control and that the centre of 
the world system will revert back to East Asia (see Du Toit 2015 
on Chinese impact in Africa).
Knowledge (truth) imperialism?
We are not blank slates. We are colonised by ‘truths’ instilled in 
us by our upbringing and that we identify with as part of the 
self. It is not an easy matter to ‘colonise’ someone’s mind. Human 
freedom comes to the fore precisely when we are coerced into 
believing something we do not want to believe. Religion is a 
good example. You cannot be forced to be converted into belief. 
To colonise someone’s mind is to ‘reprogramme’ it with new 
ideas. In an open society, various ideas may compete for 
acceptance. In the light of strong competition, the success of a 
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specific product may depend on the most convincing idea that 
eventually becomes the leading meme. Once again, this process 
is not necessarily bad. It all depends on what you measure it 
against. In an imperialist context, ideas are forced upon 
inhabitants (via language, education, the labour market, law, 
etc.). ‘Indigenous peoples are still faced with the dilemma of 
incorporating elements of modernity that they need to prosper 
whilst retaining their culture and identity’ (Bush 2006:208).
We are usually unaware of the ideas, beliefs, customs and 
habits we have acquired over the years as part of our identity. 
These may also be influenced and change abruptly. We make 
important shifts in our thinking, adopt a new ‘paradigm’, and 
make mind shifts.3 The growth process involved in learning 
new things is a normal part of life. The process of change does 
not always happen voluntarily or without conflict. Freeing 
ourselves from bad influences that handicap us is often not 
possible without violent confrontation.
Imperialism encompasses all sectors of life. It is also a mindset. 
Colonialism must be considered much broader than the invasion 
of a specific geographical area. It concerns the culture, identity, 
rationality, understanding, ethics and politics of the imperial 
subject. Economic and political imperialism is usually the most 
3. A good example is Karl Marx who refers to the influence that the thinking of Feuerbach 
had on their group, how excited they were about his ideas and how, overnight, they all 
became Feuerbachians (Engels 1975:265ff).
Post-colonialism and the deconstruction of moral imperialism
8
conspicuous, but religious, academic, and scientific imperialism 
may function with the same fervour, exclusivity and hegemony. 
The Abrahamic religions are imperialistically minded. There 
can be only one God, one truth, one religion. Truth is imperialist 
per se and, as an idea, is founded on the notion of truth as one 
which stands in binary opposition to non-truth, fallaciousness 
and the lie. In the natural sciences, truth is provisional and can 
be overturned when falsified. Conversely, in fundamentalist 
religions, truth is absolutist, transcendental, revealed and eternal.
Postcolonial theorists have indicated that the divide between 
colonial and post-colonial may not be as clear as one may think. 
Neither does imperialism end with the disintegration of formal 
empires. Bush (2006:40) indicates that strategies employed during 
colonisation were designed to establish and maintain Western 
power and influence over the non-Western world. Many 
influences of the coloniser are assimilated and retained by the 
colonised in the post-colonial phase. Petras and Veltmeyer 
(2013:185) refer to the fact that, in spite of a long history of 
imperialist ‘anti-imperialism’, officially sponsored condemnation, 
exposés and moral indignation directed exclusively against rival 
imperialists, and so on, that the protesters often follow in the 
footsteps of the imperial powers.
It is not always clear what is bad about colonial institutions 
and administrative structures, especially if they seem to work 
well. Neither is it easy to adapt institutions and organisations to 
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traditional systems. Is medicine, engineering or agriculture 
colonial? Are they imperialist? The economic realm forms 
another example. Market principles determine success and 
ideological, political and cultural interventions are considered 
bad news for economic growth.
Western civilisation was built on Classicism and Christianity. 
Civilisation and religion were two of the main reasons justifying 
colonialism and both were pitted against the barbarism and 
paganism of the colonised (see Bush 2006:24, 28). Colonialism 
and modernism go hand in hand. Bush (2006:87) says that 
colonialism was ‘universalising in its assumptions about culture 
and modernity’. In Australia and Canada, the assimilation of 
indigenous peoples into white culture was seen as the modern 
solution to the problem of ‘weak’ culture.
The concept of knowledge imperialism, or academic 
imperialism, relates to modernism. In this regard, much has 
been written on Western power-ontology, based on a 
metaphysics of substantiality and unity. In this respect, Levinas 
tried to replace Western substantialist thought with relationality 
(relationship with the other). This is achieved by shifting the 
emphasis from totality (unity) to infinity (separation). Thought 
is governed by finitude and infinity. To Levinas, infinity is 
inherent in humanness (human life and human relations are 
‘open’ and thus infinite). Infinity manifests itself in alterity: ‘It is 
understood as the alterity of the Other and of the Most-High’. 
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Western ontological thought is regarded as a philosophy of 
power that dominates the other (see Du Toit 2011).
The imperialist side of truth relates to one version of truth 
that must be upheld, studied, confessed and practiced. This was 
typical of truth proclaimed by the Christian church in the 
Middle Ages. Post-modernism introduced perspectivism. In the 
humanities, truth has a narrative, contextual, historical and 
contingent character. Knowledge production in post-modern 
mode no longer belongs to any single decision-making body. 
Internet ‘truth’ has become available to everyone, but in its 
overwhelming infinity, this ‘truth’ is accessible by none. Human 
knowledge duplicates itself every few months; knowledge is 
continuously updated and, in this mode, acquires futuristic 
characteristics. Knowledge has become intercultural, 
interspersed and inter-textual. Truth is a ‘mystery’ because it 
keeps on changing its face. It has become intercultural, cannot 
identify any single author and is no longer fixed on any single 
outcome. Knowledge production has taken on a life of its own. 
The anonymous global community of researchers and scientists 
all contribute ‘mysteriously’ to its findings. Literally thousands 
of scientists all over the world are involved in the research 
related to the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN (European 
Organization for Nuclear Research). We can expect that, in the 
near future, computer intelligence will match and exceed the 
range and subtlety of human intelligence. Robotic intelligence 
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will surpass human intelligence, instantly share their knowledge, 
and control the imperium of knowledge with all the potential 
treats that may go along with this. In future, the face of 
knowledge or scientific imperialism will change and challenge 
all humanity. The question then will concern who commands 
access and control of future knowledge.
Schweitzer was against any form of knowledge imperialism 
and came up for the right of the individual to think for himself 
(1953:171–172). He joined Kant4 in lamenting the fact that 
knowledge had multiplied to such an extent that no-one could 
stay abreast anymore. He was critical of institutions that thought 
on behalf on the individual: 
By the spirit of the age, then, the man of today is forced into scepticism 
about his own thinking, in order to make him receptive to truth which 
comes to him from authority. (n.p.)
Schweitzer considered the ‘normal’ man as incompetent when it 
came to thinking. These statements were directed at Western 
man and not made applicable to Africans. Concerning the 
4. Kant has already indicated that knowledge is a result of colonisation. Colonisation of 
space and time is inevitable where knowledge is produced (Goetschel 1998:322). The 
colonisation model is applicable even when knowledge is self-critical of its own actions. 
His own Critique implies that the production of knowledge can only operate within the 
limits of an epistemic model that takes as its model the colonisation of the world (of 
experience) (see Goetschel 1998:329). In the piece ‘the island of knowledge’ Kant 
elaborated on the island of truth and the false belief that other continents of truth can be 
found outside this island. The island of truth represents knowledge acquired through the 
senses. The sea surrounding the island with the promise of other continents symbolises 
the possibility of metaphysical or a-sensual knowledge.   
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attainment of a living mysticism which underlies reason he 
says (1947): 
Doubts whether the mass of men can ever attain to that level of 
reflection about themselves and the world which is demanded by a 
reflective theory of the universe, are quite justifiable if the man of today 
is taken as an example of the race. But he, with his diminished thought, 
is a pathological phenomenon. (p. 92)
Schweitzer in context
What drove Albert Schweitzer to Africa?
‘Saint’ Schweitzer had been awarded the British Empire’s Order 
of Merit, election to the French Academy, the Nobel Peace Prize 
and elevation to sainthood by Life magazine. Opinion polls 
revealed that Americans believed him to be the greatest non-
American who had ever lived, and dozens of articles about him 
were published in America with titles such as, ‘God’s Own Man’, 
‘The Greatest Christian’, ‘Man of God’, ‘Man of Our Century’, 
‘The Greatest Man in the World’, ‘The Great Men’s Greatest 
Man’ and ‘The Thirteenth Disciple’ (Davenport 1974:116).
Having decided in 1904 to become a doctor and to serve in 
Africa, Schweitzer dedicated 50 years of his life to treating Africans 
at his hospital in Lambaréné. The decision was prompted by his 
reading of an article on the needs of the Congo mission, published 
in a magazine of the Paris Missionary Society. He decided on 
equatorial Africa as his place of service and began planning to 
enter medical college. In his autobiography he writes (1953):
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… I would consider myself justified in living till I was thirty for science 
and art, in order to devote myself from that time forward to the direct 
service of humanity. (p. 70)
He did indeed give up a lot: his position as professor at the 
University of Strasbourg, his organ playing, theological standing 
and the opportunity to follow a brilliant career in philosophy. 
With reference to his decision to go to Africa, and in a somewhat 
self-conscious tone, he writes (1953): 
Only a person who feels a preference to be a matter of course, not 
something out of the ordinary, and who has no thought of heroism, but 
just recognises a duty undertaken with sober enthusiasm, is capable of 
becoming a spiritual adventurer such as the world needs. (p. 75)
According to Davenport, Schweitzer said that he was sacrificing 
nothing, and his actions were not motivated by traditional 
Christian beliefs, liberal or conservative. Indeed, Schweitzer 
claimed that, before going to Africa, he had destroyed ‘the 
portrait of Christ on which liberal Christianity based its appeal’, 
whilst at the same time he had denied the divinity and infallibility 
attributed to Jesus by the conservatives. More than this, he 
clearly condemned traditional Christianity for its ‘shallowness’ 
and predicted it would not survive unless it abandoned ‘the 
crooked and fragile thinking of Christian apologetics’ and 
adopted as a philosophical base his own ethic of Reverence for 
Life (Davenport 1974:116–117).5
5. Oscar Kraus saw Schweitzer as an ‘agnostic’ and Jackson Lee said that Schweitzer 
stressed man and life, and not God or Christ, as important. This is disputed by Barsam 
(see 2008:2). 
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The question of race in colonial and post-colonial 
politics: the German example
To understand Schweitzer’s significance in Africa, the German 
experience of, and response to, issues relating to Africans is 
important. Germany was a latecomer in the ‘scramble for Africa’, 
which was dominated by the French and the English. By 1893, 
the world had already been divided up amongst the European 
nations.6 In 1926, Hans Grimm published his monumental 
novel Volk ohne Raum, which refers to Germany’s absence from 
Africa. World War I precipitated the decolonisation of the 
German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires (Germany 
lost Namibia) (Bush 2006:21; Nolden 1998:128).
The European colonial powers had different approaches to 
their colonies. This related to the way in which the imperial 
imagination constructed the colonial subjects. Reality imitates 
imagination. The mental image formed collectively of the ‘other’ 
determines our sentiment, politics and conduct. In this regard 
(see Campt, Grosse & Lemke-Muniz de Faria 1998:206) the 
social construction of blacks imbued them with symbolic 
significance. To put this in context, the work of Marianna 
Torgovnick (quoted in Michel 1998:143) may be instructive. 
6. Some of the most important German colonies in Africa (1884–1920) were: Tanzania 
(previously Tanganyika); Rwanda and Burundi; Wituland since 1890 in Kenya; Namibia 
(including the Caprivi); Cameroon (1884–1914) – after World War I, separated into a 
British part, Cameroons, and a French Cameroun, which became present-day Cameroon; 
Togoland (1884–1914) – after World War I it separated into two parts: a British part 
which joined Ghana, and a French one, which became Togo.
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She has shown that the West depends for its self-understanding 
upon a ‘generalised notion of the primitive’. This is a good 
exposition of what is meant by the ‘colonised mind’. She 
traced the notion of ‘the primitive’ to academic and popular 
constructions of the non-European others. The following quote 
(Michel 1998) captures her impression:
To study the primitive is … to enter an exotic world which is also a 
familiar world. That world is structured by sets of images and ideas 
that have slipped from their original metaphoric status to control 
perceptions of primitives―images and ideas I shall call tropes. 
Primitives are like children, the tropes say. Primitives are our 
untamed selves, our id forces―libidinous, irrational, violent, 
dangerous. Primitives are mystics, in tune with nature, part of its 
harmonies. Primitives are free. Primitives exist at the ‘lowest 
cultural levels’; we occupy the ‘highest’, in the metaphors of 
stratification and hierarchy commonly used by Malinowski and 
others like him. (p. 143)
The British (Bush 2006:88) glorified the primitive and 
administered ‘indirect’ rule through traditional authorities, 
whilst the French favoured the civilised assimilé [assimilated] 
who could, in theory, acquire equality through French 
citizenship (the ideology of universal republicanism). The 
British stance induced separation (apartheid), whilst the French 
model proposed integration and assimilation, although this 
remained an ideal. The German approach varied according to 
the four main phases of German history: (1) colonialism up to 
World War I, (2) the Weimar Republic, (3) The Third Reich 
and (4) the Post-war Federal Republic.
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Schweitzer was both French and German as his hometown, 
Günsbach in Alsace, was, during his lifetime, both French and 
German territory.7
The German colonial history and its aftermath illustrate the 
subtlety of the forms taken on by imperialism. The Germans lost 
their colonies after World War I. African migrants arrived in 
Germany between 1885 and 1918 from Togo and Cameron as a 
symbol of Germany’s imperial greatness. They became stateless 
foreigners when Germany lost its colonies after World War I. 
The Nazis considered expelling them from Germany (up to 1935) 
but decided against it because they believed that the recovery of 
African colonial possessions was imminent (Campt et al. 1998:215).
Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles (1919) in the 
immediate aftermath of World War I, Allied forces occupied 
the Rhineland. The number of black soldiers amongst the 
French occupational forces was between 14 000 and 25 000 (up 
to 40 000 according to the Germans). These troops were drawn 
from France’s colonial holdings. The presence of the black 
troops lasted until the end of 1924.
The Germans defaulted on timber and coal deliveries, and 
French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr coalfields in 
7. Alsace, a French province fell into German hands in 1871 (The Franco-Prussian war 
causes French cession of Alsace to the German Empire, 1871–1918). After World War I, 
the Treaty of Versailles effected German cession of Alsace to France (1919–1940). Nazi 




January 1923. The Germans, unable to resist militarily, 
responded with acts of civil disobedience, strikes and riots. 
Approximately 130 German civilians were killed by the black 
African troops during these events and this gave rise to 
passionate protest (see Campt et al. 1998:209, 213ff).
The Leipziger Tageszeitung reported (quoted in Campt et al. 1998):
What offends European sensibility in the use of black troops, is not 
their blackness, but rather the fact that savages are being used to oversee 
a cultured people … with the degradation of Germany in the eyes of the 
colored, they degrade the race and with this, endanger their own 
reputation. (p. 210)
This introduced a media smear campaign against blacks that 
lasted until 1923.
Apart from this, some 600 to 800 Afro-German children were 
born during the French occupation. Miscegenation and bi-racial 
children were perceived to be a threat to the purity of the German 
race (Campt et al. 1998:208, 212, 222). The Germans had to be 
tactful in discrediting French black troops because they could 
not afford to alienate the German blacks. The Nazi’s introduced 
sterilisation programmes in the early phase of National Socialism 
to deal with the offspring of the black French troops. Africans 
from the German colonies were explicitly excluded to maintain 
good relations with the former colonies, with an eye on re-
colonisation. There were other factors as well. Africans in 
Germany served to convince the international community that 
they were treated well. This was necessary against the backdrop 
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of Germany having lost its colonies because of, inter alia, Allied 
charges that they had failed to treat their colonial population in 
a civilised manner (see Campt et al. 1998:215–217).
During The Third Reich rule, blacks were treated ‘cautiously’ 
in anticipation of the German colonial programme.8 In 1939 the 
Racial Policy Office stated (Campt et al. 1998:221): ‘We refuse to 
uproot the Native by educating him in European forms of 
civilisation … [We] refuse … to snatch the Native from his home 
and bring him to Europe.’
The third ‘wave’ came during the invasion of the Allied forces. 
An estimated 68 000 illegitimate children were born between 
1945 and 1955 of Allied occupational soldiers (4800 were 
children of Afro-American soldiers). On the advice of the 
German missionaries from North-Africa,9 the Bundestag 
decided not to hand these children over to the Americans 
(Campt et al. 1998:222–223).
8. In this regard it is instructive to note Schweitzer’s fulmination against nationalism and 
patriotism. He sees patriotism as barbarism, and motivates: ‘… it does, indeed, announce 
itself to be such by the purposeless wars which it necessarily brings in its train’ (1947a:49). 
His remarks sounded a prophetic warning against the rising nationalism that preceded 
World War II in Germany. On nationalism he remarks: ‘What is nationalism? It is an 
ignoble patriotism, exaggerated till it has lost all meaning, which bears the same relation 
to the noble and healthy kind as the fixed idea of an imbecile does to normal conviction’ 
(1947a:48). Nationalism has distorted the idea of civilisation by claiming it in the idea of 
national civilisation, which Schweitzer regarded as unhealthy (1947a:53). It was a matter 
of propaganda and export (1947a:55).
9. The missionaries stated that the ‘the half-castes were despised by both Europeans and 
blacks’ (Campt et al. 1998:223).
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The German experience encapsulates many of the possible 
race-related stances: colonialism and imperialism; the ‘usage’ of 
black French troops to humiliate the Germans; race as category of 
cultural identification; Mischlingsfrage [mixed marriages] and 
bi-racial children; German nationalism and Afro-German 
citizenship; fictions created around blacks (e.g. their numbers and 
influence) and the reality of their presence (Campt et al. 1998:208); 
the fiction that blacks would soon outnumber German whites 
(Mulattisierung) (Campt et al. 1998:213); the ‘use’ of black children 
to show that Germany had overcome her Nazi past (Campt et al. 
1998:207); the issue of apartheid (arteigene Entwicklung der Rassen 
[development of breeds]) (Campt et al. 1998:221); and Africans 
being moved from the social realm to the symbolic (Campt et al. 
1998:221).
The various German responses to their experience of Africans 
are important for understanding and evaluating Schweitzer’s 
stance.
Schweitzer’s relationship with Africans
Schweitzer was not a typical missionary, if he was a missionary 
at all. He did not pick up any of the local languages, nor did he 
try to understand locals through anthropological or ethnological 
studies. The lack of any in-depth African studies10 stands out 
10. His 1950 book Afrikanische Geschichten includes anecdotes about his experiences and 
not an in-depth anthropological study.
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against the great work he did relating to the Indians11 and the 
Chinese.12 In Paget’s opinion (2012:279) he failed to gain the 
attention of Africans.
The 1994 film Le grand blanc de Lambaréné (The ‘great white’ 
of Lambaréné13) deals with ‘whiteness’ through a decolonised 
lens. It depicts Schweitzer as paternalistic, racist and insensitive 
to African culture. Paternalism is singled out in most Schweitzer 
critique. In Africa, as already alluded to, he did not pick up the 
indigenous language; he ran his hospital in an unconventional 
manner, refused to teach medicine to his assistants and treated 
his patients like children.
Schweitzer may not have had bad intentions, but his attitude 
did not sit well with Africans. Sithole (1962) comments:
The African interpretation of Schweitzer’s regarding the African as a 
child is correct – namely, that Schweitzer deliberately reduces an adult 
African to a child so that he can justify the superimposition of European 
authority on the African. It is an insult for one man to regard another 
as a child. This attitude of Schweitzer is even more clearly shown in his 
‘elder brother’ theory. (p. 107)
Schweitzer’s reference to the African as his ‘elder brother’ was 
interpreted by many as arrogant and paternalistic. In this regard 
he says (Schweitzer 2006):
11. Indian thought and its development.
12. Geschichte des chinesischen Denkens.
13. In French Equatorial Africa, today Gabon. 
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A word about the relations of the whites and the blacks. What must be 
the general character of the intercourse between them? Am I to treat 
the black man as my equal or my inferior? I must show him that I can 
respect the dignity of human personality in everyone, and this attitude 
in me he must be able to see for himself; but the essential thing is that 
there shall be real brotherliness. How far this is to find complete 
expression in the sayings, and doings of daily life must be settled by 
circumstances. The Negro is a child, and with children nothing can be 
done without the use of authority. We must, therefore, so arrange the 
circumstances of daily life that my natural authority can find expression. 
With regard to the Negroes, then, I have coined the formula: ‘I am your 
brother, it is true, but your elder brother’. (p. 85)
One could also interpret the ‘younger brother’ phrase as one of 
endearment of an elder brother who believes in and wants to 
help the younger brother to reach his full potential.
Sartre, who was Schweitzer’s second cousin, picked on the 
notorious ‘elder brother’ sentence to brand Schweitzer as a 
paternalist and imperialist. Sartre wanted Africans to shake off 
Western imperialism by violent revolution, as he expressed in 
Franz Fannon’s The wretched of the earth (1961) (Tody & Read 
1998:109–110).
Schweitzer defended the right of Africans to education 
(2005b:335ff), but was sceptical (like the Nazis) of a Western 
education. He saw the wealth of the locals as lying in agriculture 
and handicraft. This did not mean that education could follow at 
a later stage. He simply saw agriculture and handicraft as the 
foundation of culture and not writing and reading (2005b:335). 
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A ‘Western’ type of schooling would benefit only a small number 
of pupils. If education had to be done, it must be accompanied by 
the ‘acquisition of every kind of manual skill’ (1953:150, 2005b:335).
Was Schweitzer’s motive racist? He testified from his 
experiences in Africa that black people were no less intelligent 
than white people, nor less capable of hard work, nor less 
sensitive and that they were as deep thinking as human beings 
as were white people. Augustiny (1956) narrates the following:
… Schweitzer … began to occupy his mind with the mental capacities of 
the natives. He had seen that the Negro missionaries were in no way 
inferior in intelligence to their white counterparts. The black 
missionaries to whom he spoke frequently were not less learned, nor 
were they less persuasive, than their white associates. He knew that, in 
America, Negroes had been distinguished as craftsmen, lawyers, 
doctors. Even here he had met natives with a high ethical personality. 
One of them, named Ojembo, has been immortalised for us in 
Schweitzer’s African history. But a truly spiritual and ethical 
development among the Africans could take place only after they had 
been liberated from their present conditioning. (p. 103)
We must remember that Schweitzer was critical of colonialism 
and imperialism. Yet, his way of caring for and helping Africans 
implied ‘parenting’ the locals. This comes ironically to the fore 
in the same section where he defended their human rights.14 
14. He discussed the right to habitation; freedom of movement ( freie Wahl des 
Aufenhaltsortes); right to soil (Das Recht auf Grund und Boden) and subsoil freedom of 
labour and commerce; the right to justice (Der Anspruch der Eingeborenen auf Rechtsshutz); 
the right to live in a national setup and the right to education (2005b:328–338).
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He discusses human rights15 in the essay on the relation between 
white and coloured races (2005b:325–338). He was strongly 
against any forced labour (1953:149) and justified controlled 
labour only when done in the interest of the public well-being 
(1953:150).
Schweitzer simply referred to the situation of the people he 
came to know at that time. He writes (Schweitzer 1953):
Have we white people the right to impose our rule on primitive and 
semi primitive peoples – my experience has been gathered among such 
only? No, if we only want to rule over them and draw material advantage 
from their country. Yes, if we seriously desire to educate them and help 
them to attain a condition of well-being. (p. 147)
What Schweitzer had in mind with ‘a condition of well-being’ 
was not arrived at through discussions with the locals – they 
were simply ideas based on his views and experience. As we 
have seen, he was not serious about educating local people.
The situation, however, was complex and different 
perspectives came to the fore. World trade had infiltrated 
communities and taken away their freedom. Locals slaved to 
make a few select people rich. Schweitzer’s response was an 
appeal to morality: ‘Our only possible course is to exercise for 
the benefit of the locals the power we actually possess, and 
thus provide a moral justification for it’ (Schweitzer 1953:147). 
15. Schweitzer’s view on ‘animal rights’ was well ahead of his time (see his Philosophie und 
Tierschutzbewegung 1988:92–98). 
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This ‘justification’ prompted him to recognise the ‘good’ that 
came from prevailing imperialism:
It has put an end to the slave trade; it has stopped perpetual wars which 
the primitive peoples used to wage … it endeavors in many ways to 
produce in the colonies conditions which shall render more difficult 
the exploitation of the population by world trade. (n.p.)
This is a very general remark and difficult to evaluate as the 
subject is simply ‘prevailing imperialism’. The point, however, 
to take is that morals and the ensuing ethical spirit are, in his 
opinion, the only solution (1953): 
Colonial problems, as they exist today, cannot be solved by political 
measures alone. A new element must be introduced; white and colored 
must meet in an atmosphere of the ethical spirit. Then only will natural 
understanding be possible. (p. 152)
Schweitzer (1953) strongly criticised colonialism:
But the most important thing of all is that we cry ‘Halt!’ to the dying out 
of the primitive and semiprimitive peoples. Their existence is threatened 
by alcohol, with which commerce supplies them, by disease which we 
have taken to them, and by diseases which already existed among them, 
but which, like sleeping sickness, were first enabled to spread by the 
intercourse which colonisation brought with it. (p. 151)
He ends his comment on the colonies even more strongly 
(1953): 
Finally, let me urge that whatever benefit we confer upon the peoples 
of our colonies is not beneficence but atonement for the terrible 
sufferings which we white people have been bringing upon them ever 




Davenport (1974:120), who met Schweitzer at Lambaréné in 
1960, discovered that Schweitzer’s views on colonialism were 
much influenced by his experiences in Africa and that they 
slowly, but perceptibly, changed according to the nature of these 
experiences. Concerning paternalism, Schweitzer referred 
Davenport to his work On the edge of the primeval forest. In this 
publication, he wrote that moral colonialists are men recognised 
by their subjects as attempting to be as ethical as possible given 
existing circumstances, who always recognise and atone for 
their unethical actions, and who possess the knowledge and 
ability to bring about material progress. Schweitzer believed 
that paternalism would be respected and followed by Africans, 
who possessed an ‘unerring intuition’ in that regard. This was 
Schweitzer’s view during his 1913–1927 stay at Lambaréné. 
It was during his 1928–1938 stay, whilst grappling with the 
question of ‘reverence for life’, that Schweitzer, for the first 
time, began to view Africans as human beings rather than as 
patients (Davenport 1974: 120–121).16 During the period 1951–
1963 the actual political trends in equatorial Africa grew further 
away from Schweitzer’s view with each passing year. The 
Africans were rejecting his political philosophy whilst the rest 
of the world began to see him as a spiritual hero (Davenport 
1974:123).
16. He wrote (Schweitzer 1950:91): Um den Schwartzen wirklich zu verstehen, muss man mit 
ihm in dem Verkehr von Mensch zu Mensch bekannt werden [To understand blacks one must 
come to know them in a person to person interaction].
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Reverence for life as ethical imperialism?
Factual knowledge is neutral. It is the moment at which we 
bring ethics and a value system into the equation that knowledge 
becomes more than neutral in the sense of good or bad. It is the 
way we claim and ‘colour’ knowledge for ourselves, integrate it 
into our value-systems, apply it socially and use it to motivate 
the exercise of power that tarnishes it. Knowledge was used in 
the colonisation process to distinguish whites as superior, 
cultivated, educated and civilised. Knowledge was the white 
man’s magic – symbolised by the book and demonstrated by the 
technology and weapons of the colonisers. Linked to all this 
were the desirable goods ready to be exchanged. It was not 
uncommon at the time to refer to Europeans as ‘children of 
civilisation’ and to Africans as ‘children of nature’, to give 
expression to the difference between educated and uneducated 
people.
Schweitzer’s ethical model as response to the 
philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries
Schweitzer idealised late Stoicism as well as the rationalism of 
the 18th century because both conceived world events as the 
expression of a rational ethical will. He idealised the value-based 
thinking of the Aufklärung and rationalism for the place it made 
for ethics. We must remember that Schweitzer’s ethical model 
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is a response to what he deemed the failure of the great 
philosophical models of the 18th and 19th centuries. Basic to his 
critique is his insistence that rationalism or idealism – or 
whatever model one adopts – must have an ethical impact on 
individuals and society and must present a meaningful world 
view that results in ethically matured human beings.
He viewed the Western philosophical systems developed 
during the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries (Kant, 
Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche) as the early fruit 
of the trees – not ripened perfectly and awaiting later 
development – and based his own system of respect for life on 
these (1947:89). One can infer that his philosophy was proposed 
as the ‘ripened fruit’.
A key element in Schweitzer’s thought is the distinction 
between optimism and pessimism. Optimism is a metaphor for 
activism, world-involvement, life-affirmation, ethics, teleology, 
progress and will to live. China and the West fit this description. 
Pessimism is a metaphor for detachment, self-denial and 
disinterest in life. Indian culture falls within this ambit 
(1946:177). Schweitzer takes his cue here from the work done 
by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (1946:163–178).
In this regard, Schweitzer’s work on the historical Jesus and 
early Christianity comes into play. An optimistic world view is 
dedicated to this world, to life, to fellow humans. It believes that 
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humans can make a difference by changing the world as well as 
themselves for the better. A pessimistic world view (of which 
the Indian one is an example) has a world-denying ethic and 
negates and flees the world. A pessimistic world view also goes 
along with dualism in which another world or reality is seen as 
the authentic reality.
Jesus had, says Schweitzer, a pessimistic world view. He 
expected the imminent end of the world. This outlook is 
paradoxically balanced by the ethics of Jesus urging brotherly 
love and self-devotion to others which also makes this world 
view activist and, therefore, optimistic as well (see 1946:65, 67). 
The early Christian conception of the Kingdom of God was 
pessimistic and, thanks to Augustine, prevailed through the 
Middle Ages (1946:63). This was the case until the advent of 
modernism (in the 16th century and coincidental with the 
science revolution) during which Christianity, without realising 
it, surrendered its original character. ‘The modern man, then, 
becomes optimistic, not because deepened thought has made 
him understand the world ... but because discovery and invention 
have given him power over the world’ (1946:63). Western 
philosophy struggled for an optimistic outlook on life (1946:12). 
Materialism shook the position of optimism (1946:13). 
Pessimism is depreciated will to live (1946:15).
We briefly reflect on Schweitzer’s evaluation of the great 
idealists and how he relativised their thoughts in preparation 
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for his ethical model. He finds their thinking ethically insufficient, 
and this prepares the way for his own model.
Kant lives in the optimistic-ethical world view of rationalism. 
The character of the moral can be preserved only if we make it 
an end in itself and not merely a means to an end. Schweitzer 
considers Kant’s great discovery to be the insight that ethics 
raises us above ourselves, frees us from the senses and attaches 
us to a higher world order. Kant fails to work this out, according 
to Schweitzer. He should have, in Schweitzer’s view, given the 
moral order a universal content, an absolutely binding principle 
of conduct – which is what Schweitzer’s own maxim of ‘respect 
for life’ would be (see 1946:105–106). To give the moral order a 
universal content, as envisaged by Schweitzer, makes ethics 
imperialist. Kant used ethics to raise to certainty those elements 
of the non-sensible world which are of value for the optimistic 
ethical world view: the ideas of God, ethical freedom of the will 
and immortality (1946:110). Kant’s ethical philosophy fails 
because he links his ethics to his epistemological idealism, which 
depreciates the reality of the empirical world (1946:112, 126). 
Remember that Schweitzer stresses the real world.
Fichte wanted to overcome the dualisms in Kant’s thought. 
The moral law and the material world meet in the life of the 
individual. The secret of the world lies in linking Kant’s 
epistemological idealism and categorical imperative. Ethical 
activity subjects the material world to reason (1946:126–127). 
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Fichte’s absolute ego is infinite will and creates an opposite 
(non-ego). The non-ego limits the ego which, in overcoming it, 
becomes aware of itself as will to activity. The world does not 
merely exist in my idea of it but is produced in me so that I may 
have something on which my will to the fulfilment of duty can 
exercise itself (1946:126, 130). It is as if the material world is 
merely a barrier for the infinite will to overcome through 
progress. This view obliterates, for Schweitzer, the difference 
between activity in itself (progress) and ethical happenings that 
render ethics meaningless (1946:131). The way he combines the 
categorical imperative and epistemological idealism destroys 
ethics (1946:131).
Hegel focused on truth before everything. The meaning of 
the world lies in the realm of the spirit which experiences 
itself increasingly in the development of man. The Absolute 
experiences itself with the world represented as thought 
(1946:142). Becoming one with the Absolute is an experience 
of the universal spirit of collective humanity when it has 
reached its loftiest height (1946:143). Much as Brahmanic 
thinking does, Hegel ascribes only an intellectual (and no 
ethical) meaning to thinking about the world and the Absolute 
(1946:144). The progress of spirit triumphs in Hegel’s 
thinking (1946):
He is the creator of that confident feeling for reality with which 
Europe staggered into the second half of the 19th century without 
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becoming aware that ethics have at some point been left behind. 
(p. 147)
Schweitzer relativises knowledge in favour of ethics. Knowledge 
comes to fruition in ethics. Knowledge must not be confused 
with thought. Thought is the product of rationalism. He sees 
rationalism as ‘… a necessary phenomenon in all normal spiritual 
life. All real progress in the world is in the last analysis produced 
by rationalism’ (1947:88–89). Based on rationalism, he followed 
the principle of founding his views of the universe of thought 
and thought alone as valid for all time (1947:89). Thought has 
not reached its goal, which is to establish an attitude towards 
life that is in accordance with its knowledge (1953:170). 
Knowledge comes to fruition in ethics. Grand rational constructs 
are worthless if they lack a theory of the universe, i.e. an ethics 
that qualifies one’s life as meaningful.
Ethics is the foundation of all thinking and action for 
Schweitzer (1946):
Of all the forces which mould reality, morality is the first and foremost. 
It is the determining knowledge which we must wring from thought. 
Everything else is secondary … every age lives by the energies which 
have sprung from its thought about ethics …. (p. 22)
Imperialist ethics?
Reverence, or profound respect, for life and imperialism, 
are direct opposites. How can Schweitzer be accused of 
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ethical imperialism? It fits the infinite-Ego of Fichte. With 
reference to the work of Alfred Fouillée, Schweitzer (1946) 
says:
Self-devotion is, not a surrender of the self, but a manifestation of its 
expansion. The man who analyses himself more deeply learns by 
experience that the highest life-affirmation comes about, not by the 
natural will-to-live simply rising into will-to-power, but by its 
‘expanding’. Act towards others as if you become conscious of them at 
the same time as you become conscious of yourself. (p. 185)
‘Will to live’ is will to power and exerting this power over other 
lives may become imperialist! ‘Will to live’ is not by nature 
altruistic, and often excludes the will to live of the other. Will to 
live equates into respect for my life but not into respect for all life.
Once again Schweitzer was influenced by the thinkers of his 
time. His ideas are his response to the ethical systems of the 
German idealists. He wanted to change the world in a way 
similar to the way in which Marx wanted to change Hegel’s 
‘standing-on-its-head ethics’ by turning it back on its feet. 
Schweitzer (1946) said:
Our world will not get upon its feet again till it lets the truth come 
home to it that salvation is not to be found in active measures but in 
new ways of thinking. (p. 202)
He provided that thinking which was materialised by his work 
at Lambaréné.
Schweitzer was an idealist. He wanted to change civilisation. 
To Schweitzer, ethics had collapsed in his day because people 
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did not think (1946:22). If people did think they would ask basic 
questions about world view. World view determines your 
civilisation. To think about world view is basically the 
philosophical (and religious) question about life’s meaning. 
Why we are here, how we must live and so on. Schweitzer 
frames these questions to fit the answer he has ready, namely 
that reality-based ethics determines thought and can answer the 
question of the meaning of life. The content of this ethic, which 
can be found inside each individual, is the will to live. An ethics 
of respect for life can be the only answer out of the deadlock of 
thinking or philosophy.
The title of his book Decline and restoration of civilisation is 
telling. Decline refers to the decadence of his world and 
restoration depends upon the acceptance of his ethical model. 
He says (1947:102) in The decay of civilisation that reflection on 
the meaning of life (i.e. his interpretation of it) would change 
the way people live (1947):
If such reflection should again come into being amongst us, the ideals, 
born of vanity and passion, which now flowers in rank profusion like 
evil weeds among the convictions of the generality of people, would 
infallibly wither and die. (p. 102)
Civilisation has collapsed and it is not only because of the war 
(World War I). Progress and technical achievements (including 
materialism and scientific materialism) contributed to this 
(1947:4–5). He subjugated material progress to moral ethical 
progress (see Davenport 1974:126). He considered his age as no 
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longer possessing a world view and ‘from this deficiency comes 
our lack of civilisation’ (Davenport 1974:9). He sees progress as 
the great inhibiter of moral advance which caused the inwardness 
of the individual to come to a standstill (Davenport 1974:12). 
Since the secret of the universe, namely the will to live, can be 
discovered only by individuals inside themselves, this will not 
be possible if their ‘inwardness’ – their life of inner thought – 
does not exist.
Ethics represented for Schweitzer the foundation of 
civilisation (1947:vii). He is not shy to claim that he will be the 
one to develop a new theory of the universe on which a new 
civilisation can be built: ‘I proclaim myself the champion’ 
(1947:viii). He elaborated under the heading ‘Civilisation and 
theories of the universe’ (p. 80ff) what he understands by a 
theory of the universe. It is clear that it refers to some master 
narrative that encapsulates the meaning of life. He says: ‘The 
future of civilisation depends on our overcoming of 
the meaninglessness and hopelessness which characterise the 
thoughts and convictions of men today …’ (1947:xi). A theory of 
the universe can act as foundation for a civilisation if it is the 
product of thought. This product of thought must be a spiritual 
power that affects all of mankind (1947:86). This spiritual power 
must be related to the basic ethical character of civilisation 
connected to the theory of the universe (1947:x–xi). He 
considers his system as having universal validity (and in this 
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sense it is imperialist). Schweitzer dismissed the Weltanschaung 
[world view] of his day as superficial and wanted to develop an 
authentic world view (he talks of a theory of the universe) based 
on ethics.
It is the individual (read Schweitzer) that will ‘save’ civilisation 
from its lamentable state (1947): 
… that is why it is the duty of individuals to rise to a higher conception 
of their capabilities and undertake again the function which only the 
individual can perform, that of producing new spiritual-ethical ideas. 
(p. 74)
Schweitzer considered his ethics to be optimistic. From this 
originates ‘… activity directed at the improvement of the living 
conditions of individuals, of society, of nations and of humanity, 
and from it spring the external achievements of civilisation …’ 
(1947:94).
Ethical hegemony surpasses other forms of control because it 
occupies the moral higher ground. This has been, in many 
respects, one of the secrets of religious domination over the 
ages. It is difficult to oppose ethical hegemony because it appeals 
to human conscience, makes us feel guilty and seemingly 
represents the good. The ethical maxim that Schweitzer used as 
basis for civilisation and as the ultimate meaning of life is the 
will to live and respect for life. But spelled out, this maxim 
would result in Schweitzer’s style of living and not that of the 
general populace. Ethical hegemony, however, dominates by 
‘justifying’ other injustices such as paternalism. It is the parent, 
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the priest, the white man who fill this parental incumbency by 
representing ‘what is right’ and ‘taking responsibility’ to maintain 
the correct order of things. If we let go of the basic order of 
right and good, the backbone of society collapses.
The ruling class usually represents the good. This can be seen 
in the importance for the white man in Africa to be a good man. 
The good man brings the development, consumer goods, 
medicine, the gospel; all based on what is good. When we follow 
what is good we shall also prosper. The Nazis had such ‘good’ 
reasons why black people should not be given a Western education. 
Schweitzer preferred handicraft and agriculture for the locals 
instead of Western training because that was also in their ‘best 
interest’. The moral justification of paternalism is always ‘it is in 
your best interest’. If we dissect this carefully, it is often in the 
best interest of the one who makes these rules and appeals to 
these ethics. It is one thing to say that we all have the will to live. 
What this living entails, what the definition of the right style of 
living entails and who determines that is crucial but not 
answered, at least not directly. Schweitzer tried to link his ethics 
of reverence for life to everyday practical economic realities. He 
says: ‘Only through reverence for life can we attain the standards 
of economic justice, about which we have to come to an 
understanding with each other’ (Schweitzer 1946:273). Human 
greed usually proves to be a major obstacle in this regard. That 
is why Schweitzer needed to add spirituality to the equation in 
the hope that it would open our eyes (Schweitzer 1946):
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In no sort of struggle is it possible to avoid becoming ruinous to one 
another by economic or physical power. At best the result is that the 
oppressor and the oppressed exchange roles. The only thing that can 
help is that we renounce the power which is given us over one another. 
But that is an act of spirituality. (p. 273)
‘The philosophy of Reverence for Life follows from taking the 
world as it is’. The world as it is, however, depends on how we 
interpret and understand it, and this understanding is fraught 
with paradoxes. He claims (1953): 
Reverence of Life brings us into a spiritual relation with the world 
which is independent of all knowledge of the world. We are no longer 
obliged to derive our life view from knowledge of the world... It is not 
through knowledge, but through experience of the world that we are 
brought into relation with it. (p. 157)
He talks about Reverence for Life as ethical mysticism which 
brings rationalism to its conclusion! (1953:158). Knowledge is 
subjugated to ethics. In the same way world view is subjugated 
to life view. Life view overrides world view and all profound 
world view is mysticism (1946:xvi, xvii). This is because life 
view relates to the will to live. Will to live is an inner reality, a 
more reliable form of knowledge than knowledge affirmed by 
the empirical world and makes us, through intuition, aware 
of the thing in itself (as will to live) (Barsam 2008:7). It is 
interesting that the ethics based on the will to live is, in 
Schweitzer’s mind, something natural that we must discover or 
rather simply recognise, experience and implement. It is not a 
‘higher’ level of morality that you advance to, and it has nothing 
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to do with evolutionary development. Applied to civilisation, 
he said (1946): 
Civilisation, then, is not a phenomenon of any world-evolution, but an 
experience of the will-to-live within, which it is neither possible nor 
necessary to bring into relation with the course of nature as we know it 
from the outside. (p. 266)
Evaluation
Schweitzer can be typified as condescending but he is 
compassionate as well. He is paternalist and caring. He cannot 
be accused of misusing the locals and he was critical of all who 
did. He was ahead of contemporaries in criticising any form of 
abuse and he promoted human rights.
As is the case with great men, opinions differ. Marshall 
(1966) expresses it as follows: 
Schweitzer may be tyrannical, arbitrary and a fuss-pot, but his 
accomplishment has elements of the titanic. No one can take away 
several aspects of his greatness as a ‘universal man’. (p. 44)
Schweitzer did for the humanities what Einstein did for physics. 
He drew media attention and interested colleagues from all over 
the world to his Lambaréné.
In paying Dankesgabe [homage] to Schweitzer, Karl Barth 
relativised, to some extent, the work German theologians 
were busying themselves with (demythologisation; the 
historical Jesus quest; discussions of Baptism; Eucharist and 
Kerugma and Mythos; the legacy of Bonhoeffer) in the light of 
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Schweitzer’s work that focussed on the sick, hungry and needy 
(Barth 1967:51).
Schweitzer relativised knowledge and elevated ethics. This 
makes sense only if one has already acquired this knowledge. 
Applying this to Africans meant that Schweitzer saw no need 
for education and training, but he maintained the importance 
of ethics. In romantic tone he notes (Schweitzer 1987):
Hence the difference between learned and unlearned is entirely 
relative. The unlearned man who, at the sight of a tree in flower, is 
overpowered by the mystery of the will-to-live which is stirring all 
round him, knows more than the scientist who studies under the 
microscope or in physical and chemical activity a thousand forms of 
the will-to-live, but, with all his knowledge of the life-course of these 
manifestations of the will-to-live, is unmoved by the mystery that 
everything which exists is will-to-live while he is puffed up with vanity 
at being able to describe exactly a fragment of the course of life. (n.p.)
To experience so much suffering amongst people totally 
dependent on others for help and to become involved in 
relieving this suffering must significantly influence one’s way of 
looking at the world. To have experienced the two greatest wars 
in the history of humankind cannot but influence one’s thinking. 
Schweitzer was a child of his time.
He has insight in his own makeup (Schweitzer 1953):
Two perceptions cast their shadow over my existence. One consists in 
my realisation that the world is inexplicably mysterious and full of 
suffering; the other in the fact that I have been born into a period of 
spiritual decadence in mankind. (p. 170)
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These realities inevitably led him to formulate his Reverence 
for Life ethics.
The final irony of Schweitzer’s life Davenport (1974:127) 
finds in the fact that, from 1961 until 1965 when he died, most 
African leaders were evolving political philosophies similar to 
Schweitzer’s moral paternalism. He mentions Touré’s Democratic 
Centralism and Senghor’s African Socialism as examples of rule by 
a morally responsible elite who wanted to postpone political 
freedom until a firm economic base, and a sense of unity with 
other Africans had been established.
One could overlook his paternalism and focus on his spirit of 
compassion as Cousins (1961) does:
The point about Schweitzer is that he brought the kind of spirit to 
Africa that the dark man hardly knew existed in the white man. Before 
Schweitzer, white skin meant beatings and gunpoint rule and the 
imposition of slavery on human flesh. If Schweitzer had done nothing 
else in his life than to accept the pain of these people as his own, he 
would have achieved eminence. (p. 154–155)
There are those who scavenge on the plight of the poor to draw 
attention to themselves as liberators. They must be exposed for 
what they are: self-seeking egoists, ‘duplicating the ego in the 
non-ego to overcome it’. The aim is not to make all aid work 
suspect. The underlying motive remains respect for life. ‘Respect 
for life’, especially when directed at les misérables, means to aid in 
a whisper and not to proclaim your good deeds from the rooftops. 




Albert Schweitzer’s ethics of ‘reverence for life’ can be interpreted 
as an example of knowledge imperialism that was developed 
into a moral imperialism. Schweitzer subjugated knowledge to 
ethics. In his view, civilisation can only be founded upon ethics. 
He wove a mysticism related to the will to live and respect for 
life into his ethics of reverence for life, and it was these ethics 
that came to be the basis of a new civilisation he championed 
and which he saw as the final destination (goal) of humankind. 
The author revisits German policies regarding Africans to 
contextualise the ideas of Schweitzer. He discusses Schweitzer’s 
paternalism and how it impacted on Africans, and the way his 
ethics depend on the thought of the German idealists. His ethics, 
typified as imperialist, are tacitly proposed as the basis of real 
civilisation and acquire, in this sense, Universalist traits.
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Introduction
Although he has been described as ‘Christ’s thirteenth apostle’ 
(Freyer 1982:216; Schütz 1966:57), ‘one of the greatest Christians 
of the early twentieth century’ (Davies 2005:134) and as one with 
almost incomparable moral influence (by none less than Albert 
Einstein – Hermann 1994:359), Albert Schweitzer’s legacy has 
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journalists and African critics who never really engage with his 
work (e.g. Cameron 1978:152–174; Randal 1963).
The term ‘colonialism’ is mainly used to describe the process 
of European settlement and political control over the rest of 
the world, including the Americas, Australia, and parts of 
Africa and Asia. There is a difference between colonialism 
and imperialism, but given the difficulty of consistently 
distinguishing between the two terms – in that both terms 
refer to the practice of the subjugation of people – I will use 
colonialism as a broad concept for the project of European 
political domination from the 16th to the twentieth centuries 
that ended with the national liberation movements of the 1960s 
(Kohn 2014:3).
Colonialism is a relationship between an indigenous (or 
forcibly imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders: 
the imposition of political control by one country over another 
separate territory. The fundamental decisions affecting the 
lives of the colonised people are made and implemented by 
the colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often defined 
in a distant metropolis. Rejecting cultural compromises with 
the colonised population, the colonisers are convinced of 
their own superiority and their ordained mandate to rule 
(Osterhammel 2005:16). Colonialism involves political and 
economic control, following from and maintained by violent 
conquest.
Albert Schweitzer was never interested in setting up a political 
system and he never supported any forms of political conquest, 
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so in this discussion, only aspects of Schweitzer’s heritage (his 
philosophy) relating to violence, exploitation, subordination 
and social hierarchy will be touched on.
Schweitzer the colonialist?
It is unsettling to learn about any accusation of Schweitzer 
being colonialist and racist. Schweitzer is a harsh critic of 
colonialism (Schweitzer 2005a:76–80; a sermon delivered on 
06 January 1905):
Oh, this ‘noble’ culture of ours! It speaks so piously of human dignity 
and human rights and then disregards this dignity and these rights 
of countless millions and treads them underfoot, only because they 
live overseas or because their skins are of different color or because 
they cannot help themselves. This culture does not know how 
hollow and miserable and full of glib talk it is, how common it looks 
to those who follow it across the seas and see what it has done there, 
and this culture has no right to speak of personal dignity and human 
rights ... I will not enumerate all the crimes that have been committed 
under the pretext of justice. People robbed native inhabitants of 
their land, made slaves of them, let loose the scum of mankind upon 
them. Think of the atrocities that were perpetrated upon people 
made subservient to us, how systematically we have ruined them 
with our alcoholic ‘gifts’, and everything else we have done ... We 
decimate them, and then, by the stroke of a pen, we take their land 
so they have nothing left at all ... If all this oppression and all this sin 
and shame are perpetrated under the eye of the German God, or the 
American God, or the British God, and if our states do not feel 
obliged first to lay aside their claim to be ‘Christian’ – then the name 
of Jesus is blasphemed and made a mockery … And now, when you 
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speak about missions, let this be your message: We must make 
atonement for all the terrible crimes we read of in the newspapers. 
We must make atonement for the still worse ones, which we do not 
read about in the papers, crimes that are shrouded in the silence of 
the jungle beings. (n.p.)
Some of the sharpest denunciations of Schweitzer are done 
without any clear understanding (or even in ignorance) of his 
writings, both academic and popular. During his travels in 
Africa Fernandez also noticed this (Fernandez 1964):
Often this vituperation [of Schweitzer] was excessive and we were bound 
to defend the Doctor. Few of his detractors had read anything he has 
written or followed the awesome parabola of his life. Few had alleviated 
the suffering of a single one of their fellow beings. (p. 547)
However, Fernandez then continues his discussion of Schweitzer 
by arguing that, despite his fame and peace efforts, the great man 
was, at heart, a colonialist bigot. Although Fernandez at least 
read a couple of Schweitzer’s publications, it was during a brief 
stay at Lambarene (a few days, 1958) that Fernandez claims he 
perceived a discrepancy between Schweitzer’s talk of reverence 
for life and a negative view of African lives (Fernandez 1964):
The explanation we … assigned for this disparity was a colonial one: 
Schweitzer and his hospital were lingering remnants of an old colonial 
society in which the relationships with Africans were fixed in 
domination and subordination, greatly limited by strong feelings of 
superiority and inferiority, and supported by such categories as 
‘primitive’ and ‘civilized’. We, on the other hand, felt post-colonial 
and anxious to understand Africans by approaching them directly and 
with flexibility, without benefit of such categories of prejudgement. 
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What shocked us about Schweitzer was how colonial he seemed. It 
was summed up in his refusal to learn any African language, invite 
Africans to his table, make any more than casual if penetrating 
observations upon the life of the people he ministered to. One would 
have thought it was, if not an act of simple humanity, at least a doctor’s 
responsibility to know as much as possible of the life history of those 
he serves. (p. 549)
The critique is extended by Fernandez by claiming that 
Schweitzer’s ethical theory is inconsistent and impractical, and 
that Schweitzer never questions his own colonialist motives. 
Fernandez makes a great point about those who claim moral 
success (Fernandez 1964):
Moral acts in a pluralistic world frequently have unexpected 
consequences, not the least of which may be the immorality of those 
who embarked upon a moral course of action in the first place. Thus 
the situations in which well-intentioned men place themselves may 
yet separate them from their most serious convictions. By becoming 
aware of the contradictions involved in our own sincerities we can 
perhaps avoid being taken in by them. (p. 562)
Thus, for Fernandez, Schweitzer may have claimed good 
intentions, but as a result of a heavy dose of self-deception the 
intentions are in fact nothing but a disguise for disdain and 
arrogance, ‘like all true colonials’ (Fernandez 1964:553). In 
summary, it seems as if Fernandez points out three ‘colonialist’ 
issues with Schweitzer:
• Schweitzer deliberately maintained social distance between 
himself and African people.
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• Schweitzer’s hospital – and thus his presence and work – was 
imposed upon African people; it is therefore (Fernandez 
1964): 
the perfect paradigm of the colonial situation whose hypocrisy it was 
to justify itself because of the uplifting of the natives, yet which never 
hesitated to sacrifice the natives to the good order and efficient 
organization of the colonial system. (p. 557)
• Schweitzer claims not to discriminate between higher 
and lower life forms but, in Fernandez’s view he does, 
which to him reflects Schweitzer’s racist bias. After all, 
‘one cannot consistently respect life yet attempt to 
ameliorate its conditions … The hypocrisy of colonialism 
is that it lived on this illusion of benevolence’ (Fernandez 
1964:560).
When one discusses someone’s legacy it is obviously 
important to move beyond one’s personal perceptions 
(especially if based on a brief and indirect encounter). There 
are many (extensive) reports from Europeans and African 
people who talk about Schweitzer very positively, 
constructively (yet not uncritically) creating different 
pictures of Schweitzer. A number of historical corrections 
can briefly be mentioned. The Schweitzers (Albert and 
Helene) did attempt to learn Pahouin and Fang17; 
17. The two major languages of the area (Lambaréné) at the time. Schweitzer clearly 
avoided speaking in a language he was not skilled in. Despite his inherited bilingualism 
he was not a good linguist and never learned how to speak English. Helene emphasises 
lack of time as the main reason for not becoming proficient in these languages (cf. 
Mühlstein 1998:154).
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they (and later when Schweitzer led the hospital on his own) 
launched several attempts at training local people. However, 
Schweitzer’s life was not one in which everything he touched 
turned to gold; many of his projects that were quite important 
to him were never completed.18 What must be kept in mind 
is Schweitzer’s own principle that one can do only so much. 
Schweitzer was first and foremost a practical man (Oermann 
2009:55; Picht 1964:190)19:
The way to this heart of Schweitzer’s activity passes through a heroic 
landscape dotted as though with erratic boulders and splendidly 
conceived examples of spiritual architecture. Some of them have never 
been completed, others have been left to crumble, because the centre of 
that landscape, the jungle hospital at Lambaréné, took up progressively 
more of his strength and energy. (n.p.)
Like us, Schweitzer had to choose between options: addressing 
one problem (for instance, sharing a kitchen and meal tables) 
often led to other, unexpected ones (conflict, low morale). 
18. Despite his best efforts to complete Philosophy and civilisation in four volumes, the 
project remained incomplete; a source of considerable concern to him. He describes his 
philosophical work as ‘unvollendet’ and even chaotic because he cannot complete it 
(Schweitzer 2006:360; a letter dated 22 February 1959). His various attempts at training 
of local people never received the required time and effort from Schweitzer; eventually he 
gave up. Running a hospital in tropical Africa, and dealing with thousands of patients 
took up too much time. Before Africa, Schweitzer was also unsuccessful at starting an 
orphanage in Strasbourg. 
19. Consider that Schweitzer built his hospital (literally from scratch), basically three 
times over, whilst dealing with overwhelming numbers of patients. Also, money had to 
be found – towards the end of the 1950s Schweitzer was raising about $250 000 (about 
$10 million in today’s money) a year. He also donated his Noble Prize money to his 
hospital. All this took place despite the no small matter of two World Wars.
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Some of his decisions may appear problematic today but they 
served to facilitate his aim of establishing and maintaining a 
hospital which served seriously ill people.
Schweitzer clearly cannot be fitted into any colonial 
(political) programme. Colonialist critiques of him focus, 
almost without exception, on what Schweitzer did not do. In this 
contribution, the focus is not on what Schweitzer failed to do, 
but rather to turn to his writings (including his letters and 
sermons20) in order to contextualise and understand his legacy. 
His writings ‘form a whole quite astonishing in its compact 
homogeneity’ (Picht 1964:190), and also a remarkable guide to 
his life. In other words, this study is a brief exploration of what 
Schweitzer actually tried to do.
Contextualising
Schweitzer is famous for the phrase ‘reverence for life’. The 
meaning of the phrase is not self-evident, however, and 
Schweitzer was dismayed when it became a slogan rather than 
an invitation to explore his writings. The phrase ‘is related to a 
whole line of thought’, he insists, and it must be understood 
with regard to ‘the purpose and the meaning of my work as a 
whole’ (as reported by Cousins 1960:120).
20. Schweitzer was a prolific letter-writer and delivered sermons throughout his long 
career. In these writings, more often than not, we discover aspects of his thought that he 
really cared about. 
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To Schweitzer, philosophy matters
Notice the title he gives to the opening chapter of The 
Philosophy of Civilisation: ‘How Philosophy is Responsible 
for the Collapse of Civilisation’. Nowadays, such a title 
prompts only cynical dismissals as few believe that 
philosophy can have any such cultural importance.21 
Schweitzer believes it does. For him, the primary task of 
philosophy is to articulate values that give meaning to our 
lives and advance civilisation (Schweitzer 1959:xiv). He 
seeks to ‘throw the belief in a new humanity, like a torch, 
into our dark age’ (Schweitzer 1959:84). Ethics and morality 
need to be grounded in a particular world view, which is a 
philosophical issue: ‘I therefore want to work in this world 
to help people to think more deeply and more independently’ 
(Schweitzer 1998:223).
Schweitzer did not produce any political policies or a 
comprehensive programme for societal reform after 
colonisation. He was notoriously reticent when it came to 
explicit political designs, not least because he thought that 
involvement in potential controversy would distract attention 
from his ethical message (Paget 2011:119). However, later in his 
21. Consequently, one thing Schweitzer can be criticised for is the problematic assumption 
that philosophy determines ethics: his conviction that ethical opinions are a cause in 
culture and history. A real question to Schweitzer could be, whether the reason for our 




life, he sought in a variety of ways, particularly about nuclear 
armament, to influence political opinion. His philosophical 
ethics, as demonstrated below, can assist current attempts to 
reconcile life-oriented ethics with practices in social interaction. 
Our efforts at dealing with the effects and challenges of 
colonialism stand to benefit considerably from a better 
understanding of how Schweitzer sees connections between the 
formal and substantial aspects of morality.
Crisis
Schweitzer reasons that every civilisation, every culture, 
consists of the interaction between its material and spiritual 
aspects. Since the middle of the 19th century, the development 
of Western civilisation has tipped heavily towards the material 
element. This is, in part, the result of philosophy betraying its 
fundamental role and doing violence to reality. The vocation 
of philosophy is to be the guide and the guardian of general 
reason, but to Schweitzer it became clear that philosophy has 
abandoned this role and become engrossed in abstractions 
detached from life.
Colonialism has led to terrible events in Africa, but in 
Schweitzer’s thinking that is part of the problem, as the 
exploitation and violence are only symptoms of the collapse 
of culture. Schweitzer explains his thesis of the decay of 
civilisation by emphasising the dependent economic position 
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of modern humans, whose work consists more and more of 
being the helper of a machine, rather than the other way 
around (Schweitzer 1959:38–48, 85–93). This growing 
economic dependence also means the increase of 
superficiality and indifference with regard to the spread of 
violence and destruction, both in peaceful times and in 
times of war. According to Schweitzer, modern society is in 
danger of losing its humanity (Schweitzer 1946:3, 1998:148).
The claim of the Enlightenment and of rationalism was to 
put forward ethical ideals based on reason; these ideals 
concern the development of the individual to true humanity, 
one’s position in society, the material and spiritual problems 
that arise out of society, the relations of the different nations 
to one another, and the hope for a humanity that will be 
united in the pursuit of the highest moral and spiritual aims. 
Schweitzer never really gave up on these ideals. He began his 
academic career as a Kantian scholar and it is from Kant that 
Schweitzer adopted the basic presupposition that all ethical 
thought had to proceed from a reasonable principle. He lost 
faith in Kantian moral philosophy in the wake of World War 
I: ‘at best, [Kant’s ethic] can teach us a certain decency and 
justice … [yet] when the time came for our ethic to be tested, 
it fell away from us’ (Schweitzer 1986:9, 11). Schweitzer 
criticises Kant’s Zum ewigen Frieden (Kant 1868; cf. Kant 
2006) for, however ably the rules for treaties may be drawn 
up, they can ‘accomplish nothing. Only such thinking as 
53
Chapter 2
establishes the sway of the mental attitude of reverence for 
life can bring to humankind perpetual peace’ (Schweitzer 
1946:300). Any political issue is, first and foremost, an ethical 
challenge; Kant ‘fails to establish … a basic moral principle 
with a content, a principle that will compel acceptance 
from deep and yet elementary considerations’ (Schweitzer 
1959:184). Kant had helped create an atmosphere of optimism 
regarding the progressive development of culture, but left 
this culture stranded in a transcendent realm that does not 
‘participate sufficiently in the structures of practical 
engagement’ (Blanton 2007:143). Even well-intentioned (and 
slight) acts of violence lead to injustice and undermine 
righteousness (cf. Schweitzer 1949:9–10).
In summary, according to Schweitzer (cf. 1959:1–48) 
humanity faces an unprecedented crisis as contemporary Kultur 
[culture] relies on a world view which is no longer ethical; it has 
become unethical – or rather, a-ethical (without proper ethics 
as societies simply rationalise whatever needs to be justified22); 
it has become overly materialist, inhabiting a töte Geistigkeit 
[dead spirituality] (see Schweitzer 1959:274–276, 1974a:202–
204), and is violently destructive and exploitative (we have 
become ‘robber states’, Schweitzer 2005a:76).
22. Schweitzer repeatedly notes his disgust at so-called Realpolitik, the approbation of 
short-sighted nationalism and compromises with negative forces and reprehensible 
tendencies which will facilitate apparent progress, and limiting oneself to strive for what 
is ‘attainable’: see, among other references, Schweitzer 1998:146–147.
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This crisis is the direct result of philosophies which misplace 
the quest for real knowledge and do not solve the challenge of 
real ethics. A spreading contempt for thinking and the lack of 
ethical ideals are the direct cause of the 20th century emergency 
(cf. Botha 2015b:241–242; Cicovacki 2012:3–17; Schweitzer 
1965b:78). To solve the crisis, a sound basis for authentic 
knowledge must be found.
What is knowledge
The setting for Schweitzer’s question, ‘what is knowledge’ is 
related to his rootedness in Kantian philosophy. That is, 
Schweitzer aims at overcoming epistemological dualism: how 
does the knower reach objective reality ‘out there’. The context 
for this question is the 18th–19th centuries’ confrontation of 
European cultures with other (or ‘new’) worlds and the other 
realities inhabited by the people of these other worlds. Amongst 
the plethora of languages, ‘truths’ and cultures – all considered 
‘final’ by their respective adherents – how can one speak of real 
knowledge?
Schweitzer does not appeal to the authority of Scripture or 
divine commandments. Instead, he seeks a foundation for moral 
and religious claims in reason – within comprehensive and 
sound moral reasoning. And his solution is deceptively 
straightforward: knowledge is about life.
To explain Schweitzer’s view of knowledge, it is helpful to 
start with Descartes’s cogito, ergo sum [I think, therefore I am]. 
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‘Surely … that is the stupidest primary assumption in all 
philosophy’ Schweitzer (2009:156) notes. Furthermore, he 
states (1998):
Out of this act of thinking, which is without substance and artificial, 
nothing concerning the relation of [one] to oneself and to the universe 
can come. In reality, however, the most immediate act of consciousness 
has some content. To think means to think something. (p. 156)
The real starting point cannot be ‘I think’, but it must be ‘I live’: 
there is first of all a living, acting body which makes thinking 
possible. ‘I am life that wills to live in the midst of life that wills 
to live’ (Schweitzer 1998:156).23
For Schweitzer, it is futile to begin thinking about thinking 
by starting with the subject-object duality. He wants to avoid 
that particular cul-de-sac by emphasising that knowledge 
comes into being because there is life. The ‘real’ things we 
actually know are those which we experience. What we 
indubitably know is that with which we are confronted 
unmediated; that of which we are already part of, namely the 
presence of life. He quotes Goethe approvingly (Schweitzer 
1949):
‘In nature nothing is produced which is not in close relationship with 
the whole’ … Thus, to give meaning to one’s life and ethical activity, 
[one] does not need to understand the meaning of the universe. It 
is by inner necessity, because it is part of one’s being, that one 
must be moral. (p. 79)
23. ‘Ich bin Leben, das leben will, inmitten von Leben, das leben will’ (Schweitzer 1966:21). 
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The keyword Schweitzer employs to characterise his 
epistemology is ethische Mystik [ethical mysticism]. By nature, 
every human has a mystic component (Schweitzer 2000:380), 
the ‘life-affirming transcendence’ of the empiricist’s projection 
of the world of ‘facts’. He solves the epistemological divide by 
means of ‘ethical mysticism’, the sense that ethical action 
conducted in the world overcomes one’s inability to understand 
the world and permits one to be part of what Schweitzer would 
sometimes name a universal will-to-live and, sometimes, God 
(Schweitzer 1939:76). Being is a manifestation of ‘eternal being’, 
that is, of God and nature (Schweitzer 1949:76).
Consequently, knowledge can only be that which expresses 
life, serves life, enhances life, extends living for life, and when 
there is a conflict of world views and cultural values, the question 
to ask is not ‘who knows the truth’ but, ‘what will enhance life’ 
(Schweitzer 1959):
The ultimate knowledge that we strive to acquire is knowledge of life, 
which intellect looks at from without, will from within. Since life is the 
ultimate object of knowledge, our ultimate knowledge is necessarily 
our thinking encounter with life. (p. 55–56)
Schweitzer is quite adamant that in any political setting in which 
questions about practice or cultural preference are to be settled, 
we should be guided by ‘reverence for life’ (and not by majority 
vote or military might). This is the practical implication of 




What should one do (ethics)
Schweitzer (1936b) states:
All that is ethical goes back to a single principle of morality, namely 
the maintenance of life at its highest level, and the furtherance of life. 
The maintenance of one’s own life at the highest level by becoming 
more and more perfect in spirit, and the maintenance at the highest 
level of other life by sympathetic, helpful self-devotion to it – this is 
ethics. (p. 260)
Schweitzer summarises his ethics with the well-known phrase, 
reverence for life. For Schweitzer, life includes humans, animals 
and plants, taken as individuals but also as interconnected beings.
Reverence for life, however, is not a romantic preservation of 
nature. First of all, it is an expression of ethical mysticism (cf. 
Botha 2015a:319–329), and simply protecting life is not the 
same as respecting it. Ethical mysticism gives it a cosmic 
dimension (Schweitzer 1936b):
Only a complete ethic has mystical significance. An ethical system which 
is only concerned with the attitude of man to his fellow-man and to society 
cannot really be in harmony with a world-view. It has no relationship 
with the Universe … Only when ethics embrace the whole Universe is 
an ethical world-view really possible. And then only does it become 
apparent that the ethical worldview is ethical sacred …. (p. 259–260)
Reverence for life is a complete ethic. It is a universal principle, 
not to be watered down for particular contexts. It cannot be 
described in detail nor reduced to a simple formula, yet it can be 
enacted in everyday life. It is an ethic of creative force as opposed 
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to utilitarian compunction (Schweitzer 1961b:93). Schweitzer’s 
definition is a modest statement, ‘It is good to maintain and to 
encourage life, it is bad to destroy life or obstruct it’ (Schweitzer 
1959:309), and he illustrates it with some examples but 
deliberately refrains from circumscribing it with rules. He also 
avoids analysing cases in order to demonstrate which behaviours 
are to be preferred (Schweitzer 1962):
An absolute ethic calls for the creating of perfection in this life. It cannot 
be completely achieved; but that fact does not really matter. In this 
sense, reverence for life is an absolute ethic. It does not lay down specific 
rules for each possible situation. It simply tells us that we are responsible 
for the lives about us. It does not set either maximum or minimum 
limits to what we must do. (p. 187)
All forms of life surrounding one should be recognised; 
reverence for life may not be limited to human life: ‘Ethics are 
responsibility without limit towards all that lives’ (Schweitzer 
1959:311). And, (Schweitzer 1959):
[a] human is truly ethical only when one obeys the compulsion to help 
all life which one is able to assist, and shrinks from injuring anything 
that lives. One does not ask how far this or that life deserves one’s 
sympathy as being valuable, nor beyond that, whether and to what 
degree it is capable of feeling. Every life is sacred …. (p. 310)
True life-affirmation maintains the intrinsic value of all life 
(Schweitzer 1959:57); ‘the mystery of life is always too profound 
for us, and its value is beyond our capacity to estimate’ 
(Schweitzer 1962:188). Furthermore, he (Schweitzer 1965a) states:
The ethics of reverence for life makes no distinction between higher 
and lower, more precious and less precious lives. It has good reasons 
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for this omission. For what are we doing, when we establish hard and 
fast gradations in value between living organisms, but judging them in 
relation to ourselves, by whether they seem to stand closer to us or 
farther from us. This is a wholly subjective standard. How can we know 
the importance other living organisms have in themselves and in terms 
of the universe? (p. 47)
Reverence for life is logical (a ‘necessity of thought’), an inner 
necessity for anyone who understands that she or he is part of 
the will-to-life (Schweitzer 1998:153).
Although he emphasises unlimited respect for life, Schweitzer 
is not an adherent to the ideal of the inviolability of life. It is 
about reverence: not blind obedience to a law, but deep respect, 
appreciative esteem, Gesinnung [a mental attitude] (Schweitzer 
1959:344), ‘a new temper of mind’ (Schweitzer 1959:83) which 
guides and develops one’s emotions, attitudes and relations. 
‘Reverence’ is more than an ideal for one’s character, it should 
be a characteristic of human life, ‘being something which is ever 
present to thought, penetrates unceasingly and in all directions 
one’s observation, reflection, and resolutions’ (Schweitzer 
1959:316). Reverence for life is like an ethos: the formation of 
attitudes and dispositions underlying ethical decisions and 
moral behaviour.
Understanding reverence for life as a world 
view
Schweitzer often said that it was his contribution of reverence 
for life that he considered his primary contribution to the world 
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(Schweitzer 2003a:xix), and the reason for this was because he 
considered reverence for life as the foundation of an ethical 
world view. So, rather than a political theory or an activist 
programme, Schweitzer wants to think about the issues of 
exploitation, oppression and government from the point of 
view of the individual and how life can be respected and 
developed. Reasons for political systems or preferences for 
government styles should be, according to his philosophy, an 
individual’s argument in affirming reverence for life.
This is not to deny that perplexing dilemmas arise when the 
myriad demands of actual life situations come into conflict. 
Indeed, reverence for life adds complexity by elevating moral 
demands and widening the circle of moral concern to include 
all life (Schweitzer 1936b:261). In his work the phrase 
‘reverence for life’ has multiple meanings: it indicates a unifying 
moral aspiration which is a versatile ideal; it names a 
comprehensive character trait, a multifaceted virtue, but also a 
foundational principle of responsibility which is a many-sided 
obligation. Reverence for life is furthermore Schweitzer’s 
moral perspective in its entirety, an ethical theory with an 
impressive, wide-ranging applicability (cf. Bollnow 1988; 
Clark 1964:171–178; Musfeldt 1991; Polednak 1989; Rud 
2011; Wellman 1977:46–48).
Schweitzer’s insistence on the central principle of ethics as 
reverence for life is about restoring a sense of orientation in 
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a disoriented world, in the decay of contemporary culture. 
He wants to ‘re-enchant’ the world which we nowadays treat as 
if it were a machine. Reverence for life strives to embed ethics 
into the essential concerns of life itself; part of the broader and 
deeper concerns dealing with humanity which is not abstract, 
lifeless or superficial.
To further explore aspects of Schweitzer’s philosophy of 
ethics the following elements: compassion, peace and non-
violence, will be briefly analysed.
Compassion
Schweitzer (1998) states:
I have never tried to withdraw myself from this community of suffering. 
It seemed to me a matter of course that we should all take our share of 
the burden of pain that lies upon the world. (p. 242)
Suffering cast a shadow over Schweitzer’s life (Schweitzer 
1998:223). It shaped his life plan, especially his decision to 
become a physician in order to provide medical care for Africans 
who had only ‘witch doctors’ to help them (Schweitzer 1998:73). 
It also shaped his moral philosophy. Compassion, understood 
as active caring in response to suffering, lies at the heart of his 
ethical mysticism – the unity with all life experienced in helping 
even one life. Compassion manifests amongst persons in what 
Schweitzer calls ‘the fellowship of those who bear the mark of 
pain’, but it also characterises the ‘community of suffering’ 
which exists amongst both human and non-human lives 
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(Schweitzer 1998:242). When the phrase ‘reverence for life’ 
became clear in Schweitzer’s mind he thought not of Jesus or 
Goethe, both of whom had a profound influence on him, but of 
the Buddha, ‘the originator of the ethic of compassion’ 
(Schweitzer 1936b:102, 1961a:18).
Schweitzer’s life and thoughts have inspired compassionate 
service in many others. One can, and should, honour his legacy for 
this reason alone. Keep in mind that in the course of time more 
than one-third of the population of Gabon would have visited 
Schweitzer’s hospital either once, or several times (Munz & Munz 
2005:199).24 Schweitzer can be criticised for inadequate sanitary 
conditions and public health measures at his hospital, but he has 
also been praised, justly, for the innovative ‘appropriate medicine’ 
he developed by allowing families to stay with patients for support 
and to preserve tribal traditions (e.g. Berman 1986:9, 11, 86).
There is an obvious link between compassion and solidarity, 
but Schweitzer argues that the role of compassion in promoting 
human solidarity should be expressed as the fellowship of 
those who bear the mark of pain: ‘Those who have learnt by 
experience what physical pain and bodily anguish mean, belong 
24. Headrick (1994:270) notes the Gabonese population’s preference for Schweitzer’s 
hospital over government-provided institutions. Berman, a surgeon who worked with 
Schweitzer, judged that the hospital ‘did a tremendous, if not a complete service’ and 
noted that the surgical mortality and morbidity was very low, ‘comparable to many plush 
urban hospitals in the United States’ (Berman 1986:86, 87, 144). On Schweitzer’s 
effectiveness as a physician: Brabazon 2000:248; Karefa-Smart 1992:57–61.
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together all the world over; they are united by a secret bond’ 
(Schweitzer 1956:128). Suffering creates a bond of reciprocal 
compassion, together with gratitude for having been helped. 
In this way, the concept of solidarity through suffering reflects 
the two dominant ‘experiences’ from Schweitzer’s childhood, 
compassion and gratitude, which shaped his life and thought 
(Schweitzer 1924:73).25 Just as our good fortune is a product of 
the goodwill of others, so we should help in expressing goodwill 
(cf. Botha 2015a:335–338; Martin 1999). Schweitzer argues 
that Western societies have a duty to help people living in 
impoverished societies. One basis for that duty is atonement 
(Sühne) for the harm caused by colonialism – but this atonement, 
despite the spiritual association, entails secular compensatory 
justice for damages and injustices. It follows that, for 
Schweitzer, missionary work should be about helping, not 
conversion; mission is ‘a work of humanity rather than a 
religious one’ (Schweitzer 2001:889, 2003b:317–318).
The atonement requires the provision of necessary aid and 
participation in reciprocal giving. Schweitzer argues that 
isolation from others’ suffering prevents experiencing joy in 
their well-being (Schweitzer 1986:20). Joy and compassion are 
inseparable: to love is to be responsive to both the suffering and 
the happiness of others (Schweitzer 1986:20). As a virtue, 
25. His concept of solidarity was developed during Schweitzer’s severe illness while he 
was imprisoned by the French during the First World War as a (German) enemy 
(Brabazon 2000:301; cf. Schweitzer 1956:124–127).
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compassion is active helping that includes emotions, intelligence 
and affection. Compassionate persons do not merely wait until 
they are aware of suffering; they actively try to prevent it 
(Schweitzer 1986:30). Cruelty – the ubiquity of violence in 
human societies – and the unheeding, senseless destruction and 
killing in nature cannot be understood, but human beings can, 
and should, emphasise their need to lead meaningful lives by 
showing compassion whenever possible. In his sermons, 
Schweitzer uses traditional religious terms to teach that personal 
redemption requires compassionate involvement in the lives of 
others. With regard to ethical mysticism, Schweitzer claims 
that one experiences unity with all life through acts of compassion 
(Schweitzer 1936a:228, 2009:156).
Schweitzer calls for active caring, but warns that compassion 
easily degenerates into sentimentality. Active caring deepens 
appreciation of what is important in life by strengthening 
one’s sense of moral and spiritual community.
Of course, it is quite difficult to stay committed to the ideals of 
deep and active compassion. Schweitzer frequently comments on 
such difficulties and analyses several obstacles to compassionate 
caring, such as egoism, hopelessness and hypocrisy. His 
comments aim at improving moral motivation by interweaving 
self-realisation and service to others (Schweitzer 1959:107, 305).
According to Schweitzer, ‘ignorant egoism’ is the primary 
source of indifference to others’ suffering (Schweitzer 1986:16), 
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but hopelessness is a close second source of inaction, if not 
indifference. It must be acknowledged that suffering is inevitable 
and that in our own lives we too add to the ‘melody of pain and 
death’ (Schweitzer 1986:18), but Schweitzer prompts us to 
discipline egoism and indifference because character and self-
realisation are at stake. The alternative to compassion is 
callousness.
Hypocrisy is another source of indifference. One can deceive 
oneself into thinking that one is doing all that is achievable and 
then proceed with casual indifference to the suffering of others. 
But ‘the good conscience is an invention of the devil’ (Schweitzer 
1959:318). There is an actor within each one of us who relishes 
playing the role of the magnanimous helper, whilst doing far 
less than is possible in alleviating suffering (Schweitzer 1986:42).
Additional obstacles to compassion include social decorum, 
hatred, envy, ingratitude and hiding behind narrowly-defined 
responsibilities (Schweitzer 1959:316, 1986:40). Schweitzer’s 
calls for strengthening compassion are part of his reverence for 
life philosophy. His appeals are directed to individuals who 
want to adopt a proper ethics and want to grasp why we are in 
a crisis and how it can be dealt with. He assumes an audience 
already morally committed in significant degrees. He phrases 
his ethical theory as exhortations so that it can also be persuasive, 
and the strategy is straightforward. We should cultivate 
compassion and caring because doing so makes us the kinds of 
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persons who we aspire to be. Such a strategy will appeal to 
persons of goodwill, so reverence for life as a choice will elicit 
their natural tendencies of empathy, sympathy, compassion and 
self-realisation.
Schweitzer emphasises that compassion will only be 
strengthened by keeping ethical ideals elemental – simple, close 
to experience, rooted in natural desires, and responsive to needs 
for meaning. Reverence for life, as an ethics of virtue, highlights 
how we expand and enrich our identities by relating to others 
in caring ways (Schweitzer 1959:255). Schweitzer’s philosophy 
can increase moral motivation as ethics become personal 
projects of love and caring in relationships, and by pursuing 
ideals of service. Such projects define one and what one cares 
about deeply. Compassion implies personal identification with 
the causes and individuals one supports as well as ongoing aid 
to others: part of one’s good fortune resides in finding satisfaction 
in helping others (Schweitzer 1998:244).
Schweitzer urges us to find our own ways to serve, rather 
than emulating him directly: ‘You can have your Lambaréné 
anywhere’ (Brabazon 2000:200; cf. Schweitzer 1998:88). In 
Schweitzer’s thinking, a spiritual pilgrimage is to serve others; 
he described his small jungle hospital as no mere hospital but 
an outpost of God’s kingdom, Ausdruck seiner Lebens- und 






In our time, when violence clad in lies is sitting on the throne of the 
world, sinister as never before, I nevertheless remain convinced that 
truth, love, peaceableness, gentleness, and kindness are the powers 
above all powers. (p. 95)
That power, Schweitzer maintains, can be achieved only with a 
reverence for life philosophy. His The Philosophy of Civilisation 
ends with the claim that ‘only such thinking as establishes the 
sway of the mental attitude of reverence for life can bring 
humankind perpetual peace’ (Schweitzer 1959:344, cf. xii, 1, 
45). Even when protesting against nuclear armaments in old 
age, Schweitzer insisted on the need for widespread inner moral 
change in order to achieve social peace, whether amongst 
nations, groups or individuals (Schweitzer 1988:40). Peace and 
peace-loving are central to the ideals and virtues emphasised in 
reverence for life. The love of peace implies a very strong stand 
against violence, but it is a stand that must be integrated with 
other important ideals, especially compassion and justice. 
Schweitzer is not an absolute pacifist.
No doubt Schweitzer’s approach to peace – and by implication 
to colonialism – is highly individualistic. By claiming that a 
widespread change of attitude is what is most needed to achieve 
justice and peace, he avoids discussing the importance of group 
action and negotiated settlements, even when guided by general 
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moral principles (cf. Schweitzer 1959:344). He insists that 
widespread changes in attitude are needed to prepare the way 
for new social structures and laws, even for international laws 
(Schweitzer 1988:76). Reverence for life is the means for 
humanity to realise itself through the actions of the individual 
within everyday life (cf. Oermann 2009:116). One of the things 
that Jesus taught us, according to Schweitzer (1964), is that:
individual and social ethics blend in the great secret [of the kingdom]’; 
it is the ‘performance of the individual’ which leads to the community’s 
‘accomplishment of moral renewal [in preparation for the kingdom]. (p. 255)
It follows that reverence for life must be taught and promoted 
so that it can be implemented, nationally and internationally, 
through social structures based on justice and compassion. He 
calls for a ‘spiritual politics, to be pursued side by side with all 
political planning and acting. Such politics will create spiritual 
links among the nations’ (Schweitzer 1965a:54).
Schweitzer decries the ‘ignoble patriotism’ that elevates 
one’s country above all others (Schweitzer 1959:29), although 
he affirms the value of a ‘healthful nationalism’ within 
a broader framework of humanitarianism (Schweitzer 
1988:54).26 He emphatically rejects communism for perverting 
humanitarianism, just as he condemns fascism for perverting 
patriotism.
26. At the same time, he was not immune to the biases of nationalism. Edgar Berman 




The love of peace presupposes inner peace, and therefore 
reverence for life involves a fair bit of resignation.27 Resignation, 
in Schweitzer’s thinking, entails the acceptance of realities we 
cannot control, including our vulnerability to suffering and 
death. But some things are under our control, as the Stoics point 
out, such as our attitudes and values. Hence, resignation is a 
‘profound life-affirmation’ that deepens self-respect and 
prepares us to care more deeply for other lives (Schweitzer 
1959:313). Resignation will not remove all fear, but it frees us 
from incapacitating forms of despair, misery, anger and envy.
Resignation brings moral and spiritual serenity, the ‘sort of 
happiness’ which comes from knowing that spiritual values have 
genuine power, and from committing ourselves to their ultimate 
triumph (Schweitzer 1959:97). In contrast to the fluctuations and 
mutability of wealth, power and social status, knowing one is 
attuned to the good in the universe (part of life striving to affirm 
life) lessens one’s chance of being crushed by outward events 
(Schweitzer 1974b:97). Serene acceptance is not passivity, but the 
calm surrendering of one’s will to the beneficent forces in the world 
and feeling supported by those forces (Schweitzer 1974b:96). It is 
not a calm that serves violent ends, but the moral confidence that 
accompanies active commitment to social peace in pursuing the 
ideal of being peace-loving (Schweitzer 1936b:186).
27. About this, Schweitzer fully acknowledges the influence of Stoicism (e.g., Schweitzer 
1962:183–184). For the role of resignation in Schweitzer’s philosophy (Macquarrie 1971:146).
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Non-violence
Schweitzer thinks about peace in the same terms with which he 
describes love: ‘harmony of being, community of being’ 
(Schweitzer 1986:7–8). Peace is the absence of angry conflict, 
violence and the threat of violence. Thus, the virtue of 
peaceableness implies the removal or lessening of hatred and 
anger that leads to violence, precisely by means of a willingness 
to forgive rather than to seek revenge (Schweitzer 2003a:159). 
The mere absence of conflict, however, is not necessarily 
positive. Pursuing moral and other ideals of character and 
excellence inevitably provokes cases of conflict, often healthy 
ones. Peace pertains to how conflicts are resolved: whether they 
are dealt with in compassion without violence and in search of 
justice, not to the mere avoidance of conflict per se.
By saying that the sacredness of life renders all killing bad, 
Schweitzer affirms an aspiration. He is not attempting to 
establish an all-things-considered judgment that killing is never 
permissible in any context (Clark 1964:107). Reverence for life 
contains a multitude of specific ideals that must be balanced 
and integrated in practical situations. Non-violence is highly 
important amongst those ideals, but so is self-respect (which 
can justify self-defence), and also justice and compassion, which 
can warrant the defence of innocent third parties. Killing non-
human life is often necessary in order to eat, protect oneself, 
and save innocent human lives. Even killing humans, as an 
incredible last, desperate resort, can be necessary to protect 
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innocent persons (and oneself) against immoral aggression 
(Martin 2007).
Schweitzer is a pacifist in calling for active commitment to peace and 
non-violence, but he is not a pacifist in the sense of believing we should 
never defend ourselves and others by resorting to violence after 
seriously pursuing all other reasonable options. (p. 90)
Schweitzer’s calls for world peace are not aimed at abandoning 
justice by having innocent people sacrifice their lives. They are 
calls for peace through justice, and justice sometimes requires 
defence of the innocent. Violence is to be used only when 
‘necessary’ – to legitimately defend oneself or other innocent 
parties against immoral aggression. The principle is that force 
is justified only when ‘unavoidable’, as a ‘last expedient’, directed 
by ‘an ethical aim’, and ‘applied in a completely ethical 
disposition’ (Schweitzer 1936b:233–234).
The important thing (Schweitzer 1936b): 
is not that only non-violent force should be employed, but that all 
worldly purposive action should be undertaken with the greatest 
possible avoidance of violence, and that ethical considerations 
should so dominate ourselves as to influence also the hearts of our 
opponents. (p. 233–234)
Note that his pacifism is based on ethical ideals rather than rules 
of duty and permissibility. Reverence for life constrains one by 
the obligation to pay intense attention to non-violent solutions 
to problems, to cultivate ‘the strong desire to realise any plan 
that has to be carried out without causing any kind of injury’ 
(Schweitzer 1949:10).
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Schweitzer’s legacy: ethical mysticism, 
reverence for life and socio-political issues
After this brief review of what aspects of reverence for life 
actually involve, Schweitzer’s legacy can be discussed.
During July 1914, Schweitzer sought medical aid for himself, 
and he travelled with Helene to Cape Lopez (in the delta of the 
Ogooué River; today the seaport of Port-Gentil). After treatment 
by the military doctor and on the way back to Lambaréné he 
wrote a short essay, ‘Social problems of the forest’ (Schweitzer 
1956:82–99). It is from these pages that quotes are culled to 
indicate Schweitzer’s colonialism, but the essay itself deserves 
closer scrutiny. It is, actually, a concise and acute analysis of the 
colonial situation and an honest examination of the causes of 
racial conflict.
Schweitzer points out, as a fundamental starting point, that 
Africans, at the beginning of their interaction with Westerners 
were the masters, not the servants, of their economy. And it is 
because they were free that their labour was casual, unpredictable 
from the ‘white man’s’ point of view, as the white man was 
enslaved by the demands of productivity. So, in the colonial 
situation state and trade must unite to create need in the 
African to force the African into permanent work. The state will 
impose taxes and trade will ‘seduce’ the African with desirable 
objects (Schweitzer mentions safety razors, collars and ties, 
corsets, stockings, concertinas and music boxes, amongst others). 
Even more tragically, Schweitzer notes, Africans must be 
uprooted – they cannot be allowed to work near their villages – 
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in order to destroy their deep-rooted freedom. The African 
‘becomes a steady worker only so far as he ceases to be free and 
becomes unfree’ (Schweitzer 1956):
The tragic element in this question is that the interests of civilisation 
and of colonisation do not coincide, but are largely antagonistic to each 
other … Colonisation … demands that as much of the population as 
possible shall be made available in every possible way for utilising to the 
utmost the natural wealth of the country. Its watchword is ‘production’, 
so that the capital invested in the colonies may pay its interest, and that 
the motherland may get her needs supplied through her connection 
with them. (p. 85, 87)
The context for Schweitzer’s advice that Africans rather be left 
in their villages to train at their own pace and at their scale of 
things for various industries, is the battle for their freedom. 
This freedom should be built on industry and agriculture 
achieved by themselves, and will secure the economic conditions 
of höhere Kultur [high culture] (Schweitzer  1974c:428).28 The 
reason for the poor relationship between Africans and Europeans 
is, in Schweitzer’s analysis, their freedom from commitment to 
productivity (see also Schweitzer 2005b:371).
28. In the context it seems that Schweitzer means universities, schools for advanced 
learning and training centres, but it is worthwhile to cite him for what culture and/or 
civilisation is generally speaking: ‘The essential element in civilisation is the ethical 
perfecting of the individual as well as society. At the same time, every spiritual and every 
material step forward has significance for civilisation. The will to civilisation is, then, the 
universal will to progress that is conscious of the ethical as the highest value. In spite of 
the great importance we attach to the achievements of science and human prowess, it is 
obvious that only a humanity that is striving for ethical ends can benefit in full measure 
from material progress and can overcome the dangers that accompany it’ (Schweitzer 
1998:148).
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Yes, Schweitzer is somewhat sympathetic to the European 
industrialists, and he clearly reveals an authoritarian 
personality,29 but he does not hesitate to call the efforts at 
enforced industrialisation a ‘kind of slavery’ (Schweitzer 
1956:88).
To deal with this conflict and the ethical and epistemological 
(world view) problems generating the conflict (i.e. the battle 
for values, and whose decisions and preferences should prevail), 
Schweitzer proposes his reverence for life philosophy. It is not 
just an ethical model, but a comprehensive ‘new rationalism’ 
with which to do politics and constitute society. Schweitzer 
did not expect much of decolonisation if independence was 
not preceded by ethics education: he quickly perceived the 
danger that in the new states, power would be forfeited to the 
benefit of a well-connected group whose sole purpose would 
be to get rich.
In a detailed study of Schweitzer’s politics, Thomas Suermann 
(2012) contrasts the homo politicus with the homo economicus, the 
one only interested in his or her own welfare. Clearly, Suermann 
indicates, Schweitzer’s ethic of ‘reverence for life’ puts him 
dramatically opposite the homo economicus and, in that sense, 
Schweitzer is truly a political person. However, Schweitzer 
radically individualises political issues. It is as individuals with a 
29. Brabazon (2000:253–259) suggests that, rather than paternalism, Schweitzer carried 
an authoritarian attitude. 
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truer ethic that a society will become more just (cf. Oermann 
2009:162–163, Schweitzer 1959).
The collapse of civilisation [Kultur] has come about through ethics 
being left to society. A renewal of it is possible only if ethics become 
once more the concern of thinking human beings, and if individuals 
seek to assert themselves in society as ethical personalities. (p. 328)
Schweitzer invokes Goethe to remind us that society changes 
with the times, but humans will always be human. Thus, one 
must strive to be better, as one living an inner life, but also as 
one becoming a person of action, in a way corresponding to 
one’s own nature (Schweitzer 1949:48–49). The goal of ethics, 
in Schweitzer’s thinking, is fundamentally about the realisation 
(or perfecting) of humanity’s nature as an individual; strikingly 
he compares the ethics of the individual to a string quartet 
whilst the ethics of society is ‘military music’ (Schweitzer 
1981:234).
He was deeply suspicious of mass-action; Schweitzer 
approved Goethe’s judgement that ‘revolutionary activity was 
mass-will trying to subject individual wills to itself’ (Schweitzer 
1949:51). Goethe experienced the dark side of the Revolution, 
and Schweitzer is convinced that we should take certain lessons 
to heart (Schweitzer 1949):
In thousandfold ways man has let himself be led to renounce his natural 
relationship to reality and to seek his weal [ihr Heil] in the magic 
formulas of some economic or social system which only thrusts still 
further the possibility of escape from economic and social misery! And 
the terrible significance of these magic formulas, to whatever school of 
economic and social witchcraft they may belong, is always that the 
Considering Albert Schweitzer’s legacy
76
individual has to surrender his material and spiritual personal existence, 
and may continue to live only as belonging body and soul to a plurality 
which controls him absolutely. (p. 50)
Schweitzer is convinced that personal and societal development 
and growth (and even international peace) can only emerge 
from moral and spiritual change. Governments, profit-driven 
institutions or activist organisations can only achieve temporary 
or illusionary results if the individuals involved have not made 
a serious ethical commitment. Such an inner change follows 
from reverence for life as a world view, and involves accepting 
responsibility for justice, compassion, love of peace and non-
violence. The change will only be real if concrete acts of support 
and service are performed. This inner change, with its 
interconnected complexities, is the content of Schweitzer’s 
ethical mysticism.
Such a change should be embedded in practical realities – that 
is why Schweitzer emphasises ethical mysticism. Reasonable 
persons might disagree about how best to make decisions 
regarding difficult issues, but Schweitzer argues (and shows 
with his own life) that reverence for life calls on each of us to 
engage in moral reasoning, authentically and responsibly, whilst 
respecting others who do likewise, to find ways with which life 
can be affirmed. ‘Only through reverence for life can we attain 
the standards of economic justice, about which we have to come 
to an understanding with each other’ (Schweitzer 1959:337).
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Schweitzer developed an innovative, moral perspective 
centred on self-realization, life-centred (or even nature-centred) 
spirituality and ethical pragmatism. He responds to our current 
cultures of violence and alienation by arguing that ethics must 
be a deeply personal response to the need for meaning and self-
fulfilment. He makes ideals of character fundamental whilst 
celebrating individualism and wide tolerance in applying those 
ideals and affirming the sacredness of life in its diversity and 
unity.
Returning to the accusation of Schweitzer as a colonialist, it 
is clear that reverence for life does not lead to an ‘illusion of 
benevolence’. In the detail and application of Schweitzer’s ethics, 
he provides a means to transcend social distance and truly avoid 
any hypocrisy when championing non-discrimination. 
Reverence for life is an empowering ideal, transforming how 
we live in that it necessitates service to others.
Conclusion
Reverence for life provides no direct solution (or ‘guide’) to the 
struggle for African decolonisation and enhanced independence 
(cf. Schweitzer 1992:287), but it is certainly relevant to that 
struggle. Schweitzer considered reverence for life a foundation 
for all dimensions of ethics, a foundation that allows individual 
freedom of conscience in making personal decisions and 
establishing social policies and law. Although Schweitzer 
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believed that social transformation had to begin with spiritual 
change within individuals, he was convinced of the 
transformative power of this philosophy (Schweitzer 1959):
The ethics of reverence for life put in our hands weapons for fighting 
false ethics and false ideals, but we have strength to use them only so far 
as we – each one in one’s own life – preserve our humanity. Only when 
those … are numerous who in thought and in action bring humanity to 
terms with reality, will humanity cease to be current as a mere 
sentimental idea and become what it ought to be, a leaven in the minds 
of individuals and in the spirit of society. (p. 329)
Schweitzer felt one ‘must give something in return’ for 
one’s good fortune (Schweitzer 1998:82). In Schweitzer’s 
philosophy ‘good fortune’ means being well-off compared to 
disadvantaged individuals (Schweitzer 1965a:40), and the 
‘must’ indicates that giving is a moral requirement rather 
than an optional good. Acting on the good fortune principle 
helps restore justice through individual initiatives to promote 
equality.
Schweitzer does highlight a role for justice in generating the 
obligation to help, but he has in mind compensatory rather than 
distributive justice. Compensatory justice requires making 
reparations for past and present wrongdoing. In particular, 
Europeans should ‘atone’ for their collective guilt for atrocities 
against Africans in slave trading, thefts of land and exploitation 
of resources, and the spread of disease and alcoholism whilst 
withholding essential medical care (Schweitzer 1974b:55). More 
than the fair allocation of resources, real (compensatory) justice 
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concerns making amends for causing harm (Schweitzer 
1956:123–125).
Schweitzer presents reverence for life as a comprehensive 
moral ideal, even when he concedes that it primarily concerns 
personal ethics and spiritual matters rather than social ethics. 
That should not prevent us, however, from appreciating the 
relevance of what he says about gratitude and serial reciprocity, 
about reverence for life entailing compassion, love of peace and 
non-violence. In Schweitzer’s time the problem with colonialism 
was injustice, and today injustices are still rampant. Our times 
are heavily dominated by a discourse concerning ‘rights’ (and 
rightly so), but our appreciation of rights needs to be enlivened 
by caring relationships, by a sense of gratitude (for life which 
can aid life) and by a deep commitment to ethical achievement: 
by reverence for life.
Chapter 2: Summary
The work of Albert Schweitzer contains various contributions 
to the post-colonial debate. He analyses the problems of 
colonialism and his theory of ethics provides a basis for dealing 
with the consequences of colonialism. Schweitzer grounds his 
philosophy of reverence for life on ethical mysticism and it 
encompasses compassion, love of peace and non-violence as 
elements. There are many comments, insights and critical 
remarks concerning politics, colonialism and development in 
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Africa to be found in his work. Schweitzer wants to think about 
the issues of exploitation, oppression and government as 
primarily the individual’s challenge, and how society and politics 
can be transformed so that life can be fully respected and 
facilitated to thrive. Reverence for life should be the individual’s 




From his writings, Albert Schweitzer constantly reveals the 
incompatibility between colonisation and civilisation. The African 
colonies which were already working towards civilisation were 
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crippled by the impact brought by colonisation. The colonial 
worldview and its influence on Africa hampered the civilisation 
which was already taking place. Schweitzer possessed vast academic 
experience from which he tapped his scholarly and philosophical 
observations. Critics have not spared him for being a racist and 
colonialist, as may be depicted from some of his linguistic expressions 
in his description of, and attitude towards, Africans.
Colonisation
According to Oweriebor (2014) colonisation is defined within the 
confines of  ‘European imperialist aggression, diplomatic pressures, 
military invasions, and eventual conquest’. The Europeans were 
only interested in satisfying their economic, political and social 
needs. Oweriebor (2014) further notes that ‘the colonial state was 
the machinery of administrative domination established to 
facilitate effective control and exploitation of the colonised 
societies’. Such observations reveal that the goal of colonisation 
was not to make any positive contributions to the African states.
Assimeng in Musendekwa (2011:43) reveals the impact of 
colonisation on indigenous society. Colonisation brought changes 
which resulted in the marginalisation of the indigenous people. 
Their fertile tribal land was taken over by the white minority elites.30
30. The situation of Zimbabwe can give a good example. Creighton (1972:302–303) 
refers to the ‘Land Tenure Act’ that subdivided the country between the indigenous 
people and British colonialists. 44 952 900 acres of land were allocated to the 250 000 
members of the European population and 44 944 500 acres were reserved for the 
approximately 5 million Africans.
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Colonisation is depicted as the imposition of rule by foreign 
people over the indigenous peoples in order to extract materials 
from their countries. Schweitzer observes that colonisation 
entangled both indigenous Africans and white colonialists. The 
indigenous people who were exposed to white education did not 
become prosperous. Rather, through colonisation they lost their 
freedom. In the same way this was detrimental to their ‘economic 
and social relations’. The weapons and money which were placed 
at their disposal by commerce turned the indigenous people into 
servitude by simply facilitating export, which made few people 
rich. As early as the days of slave trade people became the 
merchandise. They were bought in exchange for gunpowder, 
money, lead, tobacco and brandy (Schweitzer 1935:222).
The seizure of the land through violence and cruelty exposed 
the independent states to neo-colonialism.31 The new 
independent states proceeded to enslave the indigenous people. 
Self-government for the indigenous people in Liberia, for 
example, deteriorated because of their exportation of slaves to 
other countries (Schweitzer 1935:223). The French colonialists 
claimed to be on a mission of civilising the benighted indigenous 
Africans by lifting them from backwardness to the status of 
31. Mutumbuka (1981:xiii) regards neo-colonialism as ‘the transition from colonialism in 
the third world countries’; as ‘the temptation and pitfall’, which involves ‘entry of 
colonialism in a new guise – in the guise of neo-colonialism’; ‘sad truth that African 
countries are often worse off after independence because of the cruel and ruthless 
exploitation of neo-colonialism. Corruption and self-enrichment replace the search for 
freedom and truth; the masses continue to suffer as before’.
Colonisation as an obstacle to Civilisation
84
‘civilised French Africans’. In this way, the French followed the 
policy of French assimilation (Iweriebor 2014). Schweitzer 
disputes the justification of colonisation by colonial governments.
Trade and Commerce
Schweitzer exclaims that, ‘[t]he tragic fact is that the interests 
of olonisation and those of civilisation do not always run 
parallel, but are often in direct opposition to one another’. The 
indigenous people could have developed from semi-nomads to 
agriculturalists and specialists of, for example, carpentry and 
construction. This became impossible because they were 
exposed to financial business through the exporting of locally 
manufactured goods in exchange for imported goods (Schweitzer 
1935:223). Thus, there was no development from colonisation 
into a true civilisation. Whilst the sustainable wealth should 
have consisted of agriculture and handicrafts, it was instead 
based on money which in turn enabled the indigenous people 
to buy manufactured goods and food. This development 
was detrimental to local agricultural production (Schweitzer 
1935:224). The proceeds from their labour were used to buy 
imported foodstuffs such as rice, preserved food, cotton, 
minerals, etc.
Railways and roads offered little development for the 
indigenous people, other than fulfilling the interests of the 
colonialists. Even when they facilitated the transportation of 
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food to places where there was starvation, it was to the benefit 
of the colonialists. More so, they required more labourers than 
were available. Such building construction was commonly 
associated with the loss of lives (Schweitzer 1935:224).
The indigenous people were, and still are, dying because of 
alcohol consumption that was fed by commerce. Forbidding rum 
and brandy, yet allowing wine and beer did no good either. The 
tropical temperatures further fermented wine to pure alcohol 
(Schweitzer 1935:226). The worst scenario was the increase in 
the consumption of wine to make up for the absence of rum and 
brandy. There was a need for the banning of the importation of 
alcohol of any kind because it was contrary to true civilisation.
In Schweitzer’s time, civilisation was based on material 
benefits for the colonies and not for the indigenous people, an 
idea which was taken over by the participants of the liberation 
struggle in African countries. This proves that he was a source 
of inspiration for the indigenous people to engage in fight for 
independence. Having noted that neither trade nor commerce 
had any meaningful contribution to civilisation, let us look at 
what could have been true civilisation for Africa without 
colonial interests.
True civilisation
Schweitzer (1948:79) proposes that the interests of real 
civilisation and those of colonisation do not coincide, but are 
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substantially antagonistic to each other. From this observation, 
it is notable that the interests of colonisation are detrimental to 
real and progressive civilisation. This notion can be further 
developed by noting that the indigenous people were already 
pursuing civilisation, which was interrupted by colonial 
involvement. To Schweitzer (1949), colonisation is a product of 
self-interest whilst civilisation emanates from his philosophy 
of ‘reverence for life’. ‘Reverence for life’ summarised what 
Schweitzer believed should be the elementary and universal 
principle of ethics (Carter 2002). Schweitzer’s definition sounds 
more African than European.
In this regard, Schweitzer precisely defines civilisation as an 
aim to promote the wellness of indigenous people within their 
‘social structures’. In his purpose for education, he considers it as 
promoting industrialisation and agriculture that promote the 
livelihood of the indigenous people. Civilisation should therefore 
have aimed at empowering indigenous people in securing good 
sanitation and accommodation. On the other hand, civilisation 
could have focused on the utilisation of available human resources, 
wherever possible, for local development. The colonialists 
grabbed as many resources as they could without any serious 
consideration of the welfare of the indigenous people. All the 
accrued wealth from the colonies was shipped to their motherland. 
It is critical to understand that there was no serious concern or 
interest for the indigenous people’s livelihood. In Schweitzer’s 
philosophy of ‘reverence for life’ can be traced a selfless 
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commitment to serving those in need (Markel 2016) and 
developing brotherhood with those in need (Renate 2005).
The idea of ‘reverence for life’ is traceable even in Schweitzer’s 
youth when he refused to dress differently from other village 
boys who were poor. He also refused to put on an overcoat and 
shoes different from his school mates and did not want to look 
better than them. Schweitzer’s experiences in his youth inspired 
his understanding that civilisation is selfless. This exposes 
colonialism, which is based on self- interest and bears no mark 
of civilisation at all (Renate 2005).
In reference to Schweitzer, Angelo (2012) claims the essential 
element in civilisation to be the ethical perfecting of the individual 
and society. The will to civilisation is, hence, the ‘universal will to 
progress that is conscious of the ethical as the highest value’.
In consideration, his literary and metaphoric32 use of his 
experience would best be explained by the incompatibility between 
colonisation and civilisation. Schweitzer (1949) says:
Year after year since then work has been carried on with the object of 
producing a Garden of Eden round the hospital. Hundreds of young 
fruit trees, which we have grown from pips, have already been planted. 
Some day there must be so much fruit growing hear that all may take 
32. Schweitzer (1949:173) referred to trees metaphorically. He says: ‘Just as a tree bears 
year after year the same fruit and yet fruit which is each year new, and so must all 
permanently valuable ideas be continually born again in thought. But our age is bent on 
trying to make the barren tree of skepticism fruitful by tying fruits of truth on its 
branches’. This form of expression stimulates an understanding that even his narratives 
cannot be taken entirely at face value.
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what they please, and there will no longer be such a thing like crime. 
(p. 162)
Such literal observation can translate well in the light of 
civilisation, the main purpose of which is to provide a beneficial 
environment for the indigenous people: i.e. an environment 
that is characterised by plenty and prosperity such that none can 
be exposed to the sin of theft. The supplies should be adequate 
for all, including hospital patients and the marginal societies.
Schweitzer (1949) further says:
We have already got to the stage with the fruits of the papaya, the mango 
trees and the palm oil. The papaya we have planted in such numbers are 
already producing more fruit than the hospital needs, while of mango 
trees and oil palms there were so many already growing in the forest 
around that when cut out they had formed regular groves. As soon as 
ever they were delivered from the cripplers which [were] strangling 
them, and from giant trees that overshadowed, they at once began to 
bear. (p. 162)
The cripplers and huge trees illustrate the prohibitive force of 
colonialism. Colonisation, therefore, can be best described as 
the crippling power that deprives the natives of civilisation. 
This crippling power of colonisation becomes the obstacle for 
the natives to continue with uninterrupted civilisation. No fruit 
of civilisation can be realised in the presence of the crippling 
powers and shadowy colonialism. Colonisation has strangled 
the fruitful natives from the civilisation that was supported 
by mission work. Colonialism becomes as prohibitive as the 
crippling trees, as we learn from Schweitzer’s observations 
during his mission work in Africa as a medical doctor.
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Having looked at true civilisation, it is necessary to take note 
of some of the negative influences of colonisation on the African 
indigenous people. Some of the evils have already been 
highlighted in contrast to true civilisation. The term ‘negative’ 
here would relate to how Africans were compelled to behave in 
ways detrimental to good morality.
The negative influence of colonisation on 
African indigenous people
African indigenous people have been portrayed as dishonest. 
This could be because their living and working conditions 
compelled them to steal. Indigenous people followed a legal 
system that was consistent with good morality when dealing 
with issues of theft; hence, dishonesty could not be found. 
However, they were often incited to be dishonest and 
precautionary measures were constituted. Because of the 
living and working conditions, they stole from the colonial 
employer. For them, stealing from a European was not a taboo. 
Africans have good conscience when stealing from the white 
employer. Treatment at work and the resultant unfavourable 
remuneration caused them to steal even the working time. 
Schweitzer also experienced that Africans who were not under 
strict supervision did not work. Negative treatment of 
indigenous people incites behaviour that is not in line with 
good morality (Schweitzer 1948: 88).
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Schweitzer also notes that the use of authority invited 
negative responses and resistance. The situation worsens when 
the product is not beneficial to the indigenous people. He says: 
‘[m]aintenance of such authority of a white man over a black 
man was agreed among colonialists and missionaries’ (Schweitzer 
1948:88). Schweitzer did not have a strong opinion on how 
Africans should be treated at work. Indigenous people were 
exposed to forced labour at mission stations and in concessions. 
The attitude of colonialists towards indigenous people was 
based on their self-interest to acquire wealth for their mother 
countries and not for local civilisation.
Earlier Schweitzer (1948:75–77) stated that the compulsion 
to work resulted in creating essential needs such as clothes, tools 
and other unnecessary needs. Tobacco and alcohol were counted 
amongst unnecessary wants that stimulated the desire for 
money and enjoyment rather than stimulating indigenous 
people to work. Such treatment would never generate conditions 
for civilisation; instead it had the effect of uncivilising people.
Indigenous people were hard workers but could not work 
for more money when they had no need of it. The colonialists 
introduced a poll tax to create in them more needs. At the same 
time, traders created voluntary needs by offering them wares. 
They were induced to work more than they could as they 
became more anxious for money (Schweitzer 1948:76–77). As 
though that was not enough, the forest owners hired labour 
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from other colonies. These labourers had to remain at their 
work location but were released after a year with half their 
wages withheld until the end of the year. In this regard, 
Schweitzer notes that the interests of colonisation and 
civilisation do not coincide but are rather in opposition. Hence 
colonisation and civilisation are incompatible.33
Would forced labour and the establishment of concessions 
have anything to do with the genuine intentions to civilise? 
Forced labour has adverse repercussions even today when the 
African indigenous people leave their families in rural areas to 
be employed in urban areas. They are only able to meet their 
families in rare circumstances.
The establishment of concessions caused the indigenous 
people to become dependent on the owning company. 
Compulsory labour34 became predominant and resulted in a 
secret kind of slavery. Schweitzer noted how villagers were 
abused when they were paid in spirits and tobacco rather than 
cash. This exposed the indigenous people to health hazards 
(Schweitzer 1948:16–17). For Schweitzer, alcoholism is the 
33. Schweitzer (1948:79) eludes that some differences were noted in Zululand where 
natives naturally developed into peasantry, cattle raising and home-industrialists. 
34. To single out the equivalent atrocities of colonisation, Gondongwe (2010:41) notes 
that compulsory forced labour was one of the evils of colonialism which was used during 
colonial Zimbabwe as a product of the Land Apportionment Act, which divided the 
country with the indigenous people being given unproductive weak soils whilst the 
Europeans enjoyed the fertile soils. The indigenous people were then forced to labour on 
the European farms.
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greatest enemy of civilisation. Africans were eventually exposed 
to diabetes, insomnia and toothache, which were rare amongst 
indigenous people. Earlier, the use of alcohol amongst 
indigenous people was limited to traditional festivals (Schweitzer 
1948:84) and was accompanied by a brew from the pine tree 
that was less hazardous when taken in small quantities at rare 
intervals. The preparation of palm wine was rare because it was 
even forbidden amongst them.
In this regard, Schweitzer dismisses as ‘mere talk’ the fact that 
alcoholism would continue even in the absence of cheap rum 
and brandy. With reference to the importation of spirits, a 
trader reiterated to Schweitzer that strong drink brings diseases 
which were unknown to the African. The blessings colonisation 
bring to Africans are really outweighed by the evils that go with 
them (Schweitzer 1948:12). However, any blessings as such 
would never be a source of admiration for a once-oppressed 
African indigenous person. Considerations of the positive 
influence of colonisation would outweigh the significance of 
the liberation struggle for indigenous people.
Some of the miseries of colonisation have continued to the 
present generation. Colonisation brought diseases from Europe 
which caused more misery amongst indigenous people than 
amongst Europeans (Schweitzer 1948:114).
Colonisation intoxicated the indigenous people and reduced 
them to abject poverty, whilst the colonialists became wealthy 
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and enriched their motherlands. Even today, many African 
states are under-developed. The westernisation of Africa did 
not contribute to any form of civilisation. How then, could 
anyone ever justify that the goal was the bringing of civilisation, 
in whatever form? Civilisation should have taken its own course 
in Africa without external intervention.
Schweitzer (1948:84) says that the missionaries and the 
colonial government agreed on the banning of the importation 
of spirits, but this could not take place because it would impact 
on the economy: the cheap spirits attracted high import duty. 
Such failures resulted in the failure of the indigenous people to 
distinguish between missionaries and colonialists.
Schweitzer (1948:84) observes that nicotine poisoning caused 
constipation, nervous disturbances and loosening teeth because 
of tartar. Investigations and observations reveal that these 
diseases were caused by smoking. If such imported substances 
had adverse effects on African indigenous people, how much 
more would be the impact of the colonial presence? Africa 
should have defined its own civilisation and freed itself from 
domination by the minority intruders.
The colonial government and the missionaries abolished 
polygamy without recognising the social effects on the 
natives and, what is more, forgetting that it was rooted in the 
existing economic conditions. Circumstances which permitted 
marital inheritance were suppressed, even by law, without 
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acknowledging the benefit it brought. Schweitzer considered 
marital inheritance to be beneficial because no one was left 
entirely widowed or orphaned as one of the family members 
would always inherit them. It could not be possible to single out 
certain aspects of the society without being detrimental to the 
rest of the social structure. He notes that, once the social 
structure is permeated by civilisation, it diminishes because it is 
no longer compatible with new living conditions. Christian 
teaching is sufficient without enforcing abolition by order.
The impact of colonisation itself worsens the miserable 
conditions of indigenous people because it is coupled with 
injustice and cruelty which was previously unknown. He notes 
the insurmountable misery produced by the fiery drinks and the 
hideous diseases that had been supplied to them (Schweitzer 
1948:115). He alludes to horrible stories from the earlier days of 
European occupation to his present time. The colonial 
governments were truly indebted to the indigenous people that 
no acts of benevolence atoned for the evils of colonisation. The 
debt is so great that even when the acts of benevolence are 
mathematically calculated, ‘it is 1/1000 of their guilt’. Schweitzer’s 
mission to Africa was therefore making a small recompense for 
the evils which were associated with colonisation (Learning-
Living, 2016).
If the magnitude of evil can be observed by a fellow European, 
how much more could that be notable amongst the indigenous 
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people? This definitely stimulates resistance. Although Africa is 
now independent, some such oppressive structures are 
continually being demolished, such as in Zimbabwe where land 
redistribution, which contributed to the fall of the Zimbabwean 
economy, ensures that the once oppressor cannot continue 
capitalising on the indigenous people.
World Heritage Encyclopaedia (2014) quotes Schweitzer 
as saying that mission work entails making atonement for 
the crimes which were reported in the newspapers, including 
the bad crimes which were not recorded but were hidden in the 
jungle world. To him, mission work means seeking to atone for 
the evils that emanated from colonisation. From this perspective, 
one may not hesitate to claim that Schweitzer was a missionary 
for Africa.
Schweitzer refers to one of his lecturers on The Decay of 
Civilisation. What could have been the cause of decay? How 
then, can this decaying civilisation be resurrected? (Schweitzer 
1948:122). He then describes Ogowe region as being in a terrible 
state, which can be the sign of moral decay. He says: ‘[h]ow poor 
the territory is … it is poor because it is so rich in timber’. He 
notes this because he is scornful of, and ashamed for, the 
magnitude of exploitation that enriched Europe and 
impoverished the African natives. Worse still, this was done to 
compromise agricultural production. Even home-grown timber 
could not benefit them in any way (Schweitzer 1948:123–124). 
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Even the timber which was available could not be utilised for 
the welfare of the natives. No food aid programme can atone for 
the evils of western colonialism. Even the imported rice from 
Europe could not benefit many inland dwellers. (Schweitzer 
1948:179). To Schweitzer, civilisation begins not with reading 
and writing but with manual labour. Indigenous people should 
first be apprenticed to a trade of some sort. It was ridiculous for 
Schweitzer to learn that civilisation in Africa is confirmed by 
the construction of railways or roads which are not beneficial 
to the natives. Railways and roads only have meaning to natives 
when they are in industry.
War was also one of the negative effects of colonisation. 
Skillings (1935:190) expresses the oppressive nature of 
colonisation as a thousandfold violent and murderous in as 
much as it brutalised humanity. In a thousand different ways, 
humanity lost reality of life persuaded into ‘economic and social 
witchcraft’. In this way, individuals succumbed to manipulation 
by the ‘materialistic multitude’ which controlled their ‘spiritual 
and social personalities’. Dr Schweitzer, in Skillings (1935), 
alludes to the puzzle of war. He says:
We are all of us conscious that many of the natives are puzzling over 
the questions raised by the war. How can it be possible that the whites, 
who brought them the Gospel of Love, are now murdering each other, 
throwing to the wind the Gospel of the Lord Jesus? When they put the 
question to us we are helpless. If I am questioned on the subject by 
those who think, I make no attempt to explain or to extenuate, but say 
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that we are in Front of something terrible and incomprehensible. How 
far the authority of the white man among these children of nature is 
impaired by this war; we shall only be able to measure later on. I fear 
that the damage done will be very considerable. (n.p.)
Schweitzer (1948:96–98) compared the aggressive growth of 
the African forest with the militancy of European occupation. 
He firstly alluded to termites which, when they infested a chest 
of drawers, damaged drugs and bandages. They managed to 
find a way into the chest of drawers unnoticed. The peculiarity 
of the smell in the room begged him to find out the reason, 
and he realised that they had made an opening in the floor 
from where they attacked the chest. They even managed to 
gain entrance into the next chest when they were attracted by 
the medicine bottles whose corks had been loosened. This 
symbolises the colonial powers that gained entry into Africa 
and whose intentions were not clearly noticed. By the time 
that they were noticed substantial damage had been made. No 
independence in Africa has ever been able to secure the desired 
peace and stability.
The second comparison is with the fight with the creeping 
insects such as weevils which, even after thorough precautions, 
one would always find out that one has been outwitted. Although 
his wife sealed the flour and maize in tins, it was reduced to 
dust. Such events resembled the European penetration into the 
African environment and reduced the ongoing civilisation to 
chaff.
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He further alludes to the traveller ants which have a more 
organised marching order ‘with three or four columns 
marching abreast of each other’. The ‘worriers’ with a couple 
of rows each side to protect the ordinary traveller ants. He 
observed how they could gain entry into a chicken-house and, 
if not attended to, the chickens would be suffocated by the 
ants which crept into their nostrils and mouths before all of 
the flesh was stripped and only bones remained. The warrior 
ants continued to attack even when they were sprayed with 
Lysol. They would bite so severely that, when trying to remove 
them, the jaws would remain stuck in the flesh. This 
comparison alludes to the European occupation, which 
resulted in the Africans suffering an indelible mark in their 
future lives.
The face of Africa had completely changed. Sand fleas and 
Sangunagenta (one of the worst species of ants) were imported 
in wooden crates from South America (1948:58). These insect 
pests can also represent the symbolic infiltration of colonial 
rule on African land. They eventually became uncontrollable 
species. The only way to get rid of them is to wage war on 
them.
World Heritage Encyclopaedia (2014) notes Schweitzer’s 
observation that there were injustices and cruelty which the 
Africans had suffered over centuries at the hands of the 
Europeans. Schweitzer is noted as declaring that, even if the 
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atrocities waged by the Europeans against the Africans are 
recorded, the book would be quite voluminous and yet 
unreadable because of the horrible contents.35 In this regard, the 
World Heritage Encyclopaedia supports the idea that Schweitzer 
was the harshest critique of colonisation during his time. In 
order to substantiate this point it picks a portion of Schweitzer’s 
sermon of 1905 that reads:
I will not enumerate all the crimes that have been committed under the 
pretext of justice. People robbed native inhabitants of their land, made 
slaves of them; let loose the scum of mankind upon them. Think of the 
atrocities that were perpetrated upon people made subservient to us, 
how systematically we have ruined them with our alcoholic ‘gifts’, and 
everything else we have done ... We decimate them, and then, by the 
stroke of a pen, we take their land so they have nothing left at all .... (n.p.)
In most of Schweitzer’s observations and experiences one may 
find it difficult to evaluate his real positioning. From the most 
general outlook, he was not in favour of colonisation. However, 
in analysing his attitude one may find that he was, to a certain 
extent, following the trends of colonisation in his operations. 
Differences in skin colour identified him more with his 
compatriots from Europe than with Africans. His advocacy for 
reverence for life was not sufficient to be truly representative of 
Africans. Africans only needed African representation in a 
world which is free from intruders. In this regard, it is worth to 
explore criticism on Schweitzer’s attitude towards Africans.
35. http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/Albert_Schweitzer.
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Attitude towards Africans
Schweitzer was sometimes accused of being colonialist, 
paternalistic and racist in his attitude towards Africans. 
Sometimes he does not align with views of staunch critics of 
colonialism. One of the greatest criticisms against him concerns 
his understanding of Gabonese independence. He claimed that 
Gabon was given independence prematurely since they had no 
adequate education and decent accommodation (World Heritage 
Encyclopaedia).
An excerpt from Schweitzer’s ‘African Notebook’ (2008) 
reveals that Schweitzer had a negative attitude towards Africans:
There is something that all white men who have lived here like I must 
learn and know: that these individuals are a sub-race. They have neither 
the intellectual, mental, or emotional abilities to equate or to share 
equally with white men in any function of our civilization. I have given 
my life to try to bring them the advantages which our civilization must 
offer, but I have become well aware that we must retain this status: the 
superior and they the inferior. For whenever a white man seeks to live 
among them as their equals they will either destroy him or devour him. 
And they will destroy all of his work. Let white men from anywhere in 
the world, who would come to Africa, remember that you must 
continually retain this status; you the master and they the inferior like 
children that you would help or teach. Never fraternize with them as 
equals. Never accept them as your social equals or they will devour you. 
They will destroy you. (n.p.)
Defenders of Schweitzer do not leave any negative critic 
unchallenged. Angelo (2012 online) implores that Schweitzer’s 
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commitment to Africa resulted in his self-giving to serve in 
Africa for 50 years in a self-established hospital. Being a 
European scholar and musician, he might have found it hard to 
dedicate such time in a forest hospital in the equatorial Africa. 
Angelo also wonders whether the people of the post-colonial 
era can have the potential to develop the true understanding of 
a man who was born in 1875. His understanding of the world 
could have been so different from our time.
Angelo (2012) defends Albert Schweitzer, a European scholar 
and musician, for his personal commitment to serve 50 years of 
his life as a medical doctor. He then blames the era of the present 
interpreters as detrimental to clear appreciation of Schweitzer. 
Schweitzer, in Angelo (2012), has this to say:
The Negro is a Child, and with children nothing can be done without 
use of authority. We must, therefore so arrange the circumstances of 
daily life that my natural authority can find expression. With regard to 
the Negroes I have coined the formula, ‘I am your brother, it is true, but 
your elder brother’. (n.p.)
His fellow white missionaries recognised that the African 
indigenous people must be treated with authority. Angelo is 
aware of the somewhat racist attitude revealed in the above 
quotation. For Angelo, this is questionably racist from the 
perspective that it was made in the French colony of Gabon of 
1913 at a place and time unknown to him. He relied on the 
testimonies of those who lived in the land during that time. The 
question which can arise is how reliable would those sources be 
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since they were equally influenced by colonisation? Angelo is 
determined to understand whether Schweitzer was a racist 
because Schweitzer considered that Africans are children. He 
imagines that this could have been the condition of that time. 
Markel (2006) supports this idea by considering that, although 
this cannot be tolerated today, this was common during his era, 
which was influenced by colonialism, racism and paternalism.
Neuenschwander in Schweitzer (1968) claims that the way 
Schweitzer describes African customs, habits at work and social 
structure sounds uncomfortable to modern readers. Though 
Neuenschwander tries to defend him by arguing that these were 
the early days when Europeans and Africans were beginning to 
interact, Schweitzer had already sounded as if three hundred 
years of colonisation had already elapsed.
Chinua Achebe has been quoted in the World Heritage 
Encyclopaedia as criticising Schweitzer for his claim to be his 
junior brother. He criticised him despite the fact that Achebe is 
seemingly acknowledging Schweitzer’s use of the word ‘young 
brother’, for he used it within the terms known to the 20th 
century reader. He was actually aware of this because he 
eventually indicated that the time of being younger brother had 
elapsed.
Angelo also considers the use of words like ‘black’ or ‘Negro’ 
and ‘white’ instead of ‘African’ and ‘European’ renders the 
colonialists racists. Angelo defends Schweitzer for writing ‘my 
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natural authority’ and ‘elder brother’, and for speaking of himself 
as ‘a representative of civilization among a primitive (or pre-
historic) people’. However, it is not justifiable to consider 
Africans as primitive. Africa was already in a more civilised 
state than that imposed by the European civilisation on African 
people. Angelo’s paraphrase of Schweitzer is as follows:
When before coming to Africa, I heard missionaries and traders say 
again and again that one must be very careful out here to maintain this 
authoritative position of the Whiteman, it seemed to me to be a hard 
and unnatural position to take up. As it does to everyone in Europe 
who reads or hears the same.  [If we abandoned the social interval between 
black and white, we would lose all influence, our word would no longer be 
taken as a white man’s word, but would argue in every point with Africans as 
if we were merely equals.] (n.p., [translation])
The New York Times (2011) refers to Schweitzer as possessing 
a feeling of being at home in Africa. In most cases, Schweitzer 
regarded most Africans as primitive children. Schweitzer is 
further referred to as someone who communicated with 
Africans as children. He is reported to have said that God had 
protected the trees from Africans, who are lazy and not able to 
pick all the fruit.
Despite many criticisms, Schweitzer’s own life served as a 
living testimony for some who encountered him. His zeal for the 
well-being of African indigenous people was demonstrated also 
in his career as a medical doctor who strived to see their recovery 
of health. Although he was not in a position to stop that 
which caused some of the diseases, such as alcohol and tobacco 
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(which continue to be consumed even to this day), he refrained 
from testing new medicines in Africa. Rather, as one of the 
testimonies about him reflects, he preferred medicine to be tested 
for the first time on himself before being tested on other people. 
Dr Ernest Bueding in Skilling (1949:195) relates the interesting 
story of the vaccine which was prepared and to be tested. Someone 
requested for the vaccine to be tested in Africa, but Schweitzer 
declined because a large scale test could only be considered if he 
could be given that test to ‘experience and evaluate the untoward 
results’. He considered that once the vaccine is safe for him, it 
could equally be safe for Africans. After his superior failed to 
convince him otherwise, the vaccine was tried on him, and he 
was hospitalised for two days as a precautionary measure. After 
all of this he wondered why he could be kept idle for the two days.
However, the journalist James Cameron is referred to in the 
online document (Reuters 1965) as having visited Schweitzer in 
1953 and found significant shortcomings in his and his staff’s 
attitude towards Africans. The dominant shortcoming was his 
little contact with the indigenous African people. The same 
website also includes the report of John Gunther, who reported 
on Schweitzer’s attitude of patronising Africans to the extent 
that he did not train Africans as nurses. He only depended on 
nurses who came from Europe.
Schweitzer (1949:132–133) observed that if someone does 
something he or she must do it out of ‘love and care’. Shortly 
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after arrival back home of prisoners of war, another group of 
prisoners arrived and showed dissatisfaction with the way the 
food was being prepared by the professional cooks. The group 
comprised of tailors, hat makers shoemakers and brush 
makers. They had gained experience in cooking large quantities 
of food that taste as good as that cooked in small quantities. 
When they were tasked with the preparation of potatoes they 
proved better cooks than those professionals who were hotel 
trained. When the shoemaker was asked about the secret of 
their success he eluded that, apart from their experience one 
‘need[s] to cook with love and care’. This reveals that the 
experience of colonialists in dealing with African colonies 
could have caused even trained people to act carelessly because 
of their lack of love for the indigenous people, whilst the more 
loving and caring people in Africa who do tasks out of love 
were deported.
Conclusion
Although Schweitzer surpassed his contemporaries in speaking 
against colonization, he is also blamed for living to the colonial 
standards by not properly representing Africans when this was 
needed. In his condemnation of colonisation he managed to point 
out that colonisation is so detrimental to the development of Africa. 
African leaders who are bred under colonial conditions tend to 
manipulate the colonial leaders. This would be deterrent to total 
freedom and freedom to pursue civilisation as indigenous people. 
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Nothing can reverse the impact of colonisation amongst 
indigenous African people. The spiral goes on as the colonial 
baton is handed to indigenous people who potentially become 
oppressive forces because they were brought up under oppressive 
conditions.
Whilst Schweitzer spoke against his contemporary Europeans 
and was more or less a founder of post-colonial criticism, he 
always held himself superior to African indigenous people. 
Although he might have been genuine for the historic moment, 
he would not be counted as a contemporary by Africans. Albert 
Schweitzer’s thought patterns of those distant days may not be 
similar to current thinking, however, despite his attitude 
towards colour divisions; they would compel a particular way of 
understanding him.
Chapter 3: Summary
Albert Schweitzer was a missionary medical doctor to Africa 
who established a Hospital at Lambarene in Gabon. Apart from 
his academic excellence, his experiences and observations reveal 
the tension between colonisation and civilisation. This research 
serves to reveal that colonialism and civilisation are incompatible. 
Schweitzer exposes the evils of colonisation which hinder the 
progression of civilisation. His definition of civilization is based 
on his philosophy of ‘Reverence for Life’ which seeks to consider 
the well-being of the other. He speaks against the colonial 
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governments that have no heart for the lives of the natives but 
promote their own interest. Although, in most cases, he sounds 
to be a post-colonial critic of European settlement in Africa, 
and he is not spared for being racist by some critics for treating 
elderly Africans as children. A critical evaluation of his 
experiences and observations reveals that Schweitzer was 
against colonialism. European activities in Africa were 
detrimental to the progression of civilisation in Africa.

Part 2





This chapter brings three world views – the Biblical (Imago Dei), 
the western (Albert Schweitzer) and the African (humanism) 
into a critical dialogue in an attempt to highlight the commonness 
of concern for the preservation, promotion, protection and 
prosperity of human lives inherent in all of them. It critically 
examines and analyses some extant scholarly literature on the 
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imago and similitudo Dei based on the Genesis creation or cultural 
mandate (Gn 1:26–28) in order to answer the question as to 
what constitutes the imago Dei, or ‘divine nature’, imparted to 
humans by their Maker. Moreover, it aligns this with African 
humanism with its respect for human lives in order to highlight 
the value of Albert Schweitzer’s ‘reverence for life’ as a panacea 
for the socio-political vices, insurgency, terrorism, kidnappings 
and ritual murders, to name a few, that presently haunt various 
nations of the world, particularly Nigeria. In the following 
sections a discussion of the imago and similitudo Dei is followed 
by a résumé of Albert Schweitzer’s views on the worth of the 
human person, and lastly by a perspective on ‘humanism’ 
associated with African scholars and societies with emphasis on 
the brotherhood of all humanity and on the need to save and 
spare the human person.
‘Imago Dei ’
In this chapter, the ‘image of God’ is seen as derived from a royal 
ideology of the ancient Near East and is here made popular by 
the cultural or creation mandate of Genesis 1:26–28 (Von Rad 
1971:144–145). The imago Dei is seen as the person who is a 
representative of God on earth. Von Rad (1971:144–145) built 
his argument on that premise and stressed that there is something 
more than spiritual and intellectual in the image and similitude 
of God which humans portray, even in the splendour of their 
bodily forms. Von Rad made good use of analogy from the 
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ancient Near Eastern world in describing man as God’s 
representative on earth, not in a teleological, but in an ontological 
sense, more to man’s purpose on earth than to his being (Birch 
1991:88). The Babylonian use of images to stand in place of the 
gods leads this school of thought to the conclusion that earthly 
rulers do indeed use their images in places where they otherwise 
could not be physically present. Von Rad is the leading proponent 
of this view. He has been followed by others such as E. Jacob 
and W.H. Schmidt, both of whom have confirmed this 
explanation and given it a new dimension by means of a number 
of Egyptian and Mesopotamian texts which speak of the king as 
the image of God.
The capacity for knowing good and evil as a further reflection 
of the imago Dei, or the image likeness of God, is ascribed to 
humans in Genesis 3:22. This ability to exercise judicial 
discernment is elsewhere noted as a God-like characteristic 
depicted in I Kings 3, verse 9 and 28 – a passage further indexing 
the prominent place of the official-judicial aspect of the Biblical 
concept of the image of God (Kline 1991:28–30). The image of 
God is closely aligned to the concept of sonship in Genesis 5:1ff, 
and in Genesis 9:6 is a clear identification of the image bearing 
and judicial authority inherent in human nature as the image of 
God and corroborated by his being authorised to inflict capital 
punishment upon murderers (Von Rad 1971:144–145). The 
evidence of the book of Genesis will suffice to illustrate the 
point, but a survey of all the Scriptural data would disclose that, 
Imago Dei: Albert Schweitzer’s ‘reverence for Life’
114
consistently, the image of God is identified in terms of a glory 
akin to that of God Himself (Boice 1986:149–150). Humans are 
thus ‘rulers’ of the earth under God. They possess the ethical 
glory of a state of simple righteousness, with the prospect of 
moving on to greater glory of confirmed righteousness. Humans 
were given the hope of an eschatological glorification that 
would change them into a transformed glory image of a radiant 
Glory-Spirit (Boice 1986:149–150).
Be that as it may, the creation or cultural mandate empowers 
humans made in the image of God to become responsible moral 
agents in God’s universe. The creation of the first man shows 
this: the subduing of the earth, that is, the whole of culture, is 
given to him, and can be given to him only because he is created 
after God’s image (Cassuto 1978:58). Humans can be rulers of 
the earth only because, and in so far as, they are servants, sons 
and daughters of God. It is doubtful, however, if humans have 
built on this foundation of sonship. Instead, humankind has 
taken a subservient role and not always followed a normal 
course as evidenced in the numerous wars, revolutions and 
catastrophes all over the world. There has always been a time of 
flourishing followed by a time of decay and ruin for humans – 
the so-called vicissitudes of life on earth!
The imago and similitudo Dei
Scholars have also attempted to interpret the similitudo Dei, which 
is a component of the same cultural or creation mandate 
115
Chapter 4
(Gn1:26–28). Firstly, a distinction made between imago and 
similitudo Dei is based on the different names used in Genesis 1:26. 
Iraneus was the first to point out that distinction, and since the 
4th century the discussion has gone on in both the East and West 
right into the middle ages. Westermann (1984:149–152) 
summarises the views so far on the imago and similitudo Dei as 
follows: There are those who see the imago and similitudo Dei as 
pointing to a natural and supernatural likeness of humans to God. 
Others conceive of it as consisting of spiritual qualities or 
capacities. Still a third view is of an imago and similitudo Dei that 
points more to an external resemblance of humans to God. A 
fourth view insists that the whole person is made in the image of 
God, and that it is not the intention of the author to split one from 
the other. Again, a fifth view interprets the imago and similitudo 
Dei as embodiments of a human counterpart to God with whom 
God can be both in communion and conversation. Finally, a sixth 
view is that humans are the imago and similitudo Dei in the sense 
of a physical representation of God on earth (Blenkinsopp 
1994:305ff). These views are further explained subsequently.
Firstly, it is generally agreed that the imago and similitudo Dei in 
the Genesis text is not speaking about a distinction between the 
natural and the supernatural. However, as Westermann 
(1984:149) has pointed out, this agreement might be true of 
Protestant and Reformed circles, but can hardly be said to be true 
of Catholic theology, which differentiates ‘the person’s natural 
likeness to God expressed in the Old Testament’ from ‘one’s 
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supernatural likeness to God expressed in the New Testament’. 
Thus, imago and similitudo Dei depicted in the Old Testament 
point to humans in their natural, physical abilities, whereas the 
same concept of similitudo (Gk. eikón) in the New Testament 
depicts humans transformed into supernatural, spiritual beings 
with Jesus Christ our Lord as the Prototype!36 Such distinctions 
do not reflect for instance Paul’s theology (2 Cor 4:4; Col 3:10) in 
which Jesus of Nazareth – perfect God perfect human – is pre-
eminently the image of God (Merrill 2003:444–445).
Secondly, there is another view which sees the imago and 
similitudo Dei as consisting of spiritual qualities or capacities in 
humans. This is the most common explanation of this concept 
down through the centuries, namely that the likeness consists 
in human intellect, will and emotions which correspond to the 
tri-Unitarian concept of God. On the other hand, there are 
those who consider the imago and similitudo Dei as consisting in 
the very nature of human beings in totality and in both concrete 
and corporeal terms. P. Bratsiotis and G. Söhngen are 
Westermann’s examples of propagators of this view.37
36. Such distinctions preoccupied the theology of the second to the 5th-century church in 
both Asia and North Africa: the so-called homoiōsis debate which, by the Council of 
Chalcedon in 451 C.E., was resolved that, in the Person of Christ both the natural and the 
supernatural are distinct yet contiguous, inter-dependent and in perfect harmony. See. E. 
Cairns 1995 Christianity through the centuries … p. 69. 
37. See P.N. Bratsiotis 1951–2 ‘Genesis 1:26 in der orthodoxen Theologie’ EvTh. 11, p. 289–
297; and G. Söhnge 1963 ‘Die biblische Lehre von der Gottesebenbildichkeit des 
Menschen’, Festgabe Erzbischof Jäger, Pro Veritate, Bischof Stäln.
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Thirdly, there are interpreters who find the imago [image] 
and similitudo [likeness] in human personality, human 
understanding, human will and its freedom, self-consciousness, 
intelligence and beauty. Those whose views are in alliance with 
this are A. Dillman (1897:3) who insists that imago Dei consists 
of the human’s spiritual endowments which are expressed 
through the bodily form, although not identical with it. In this 
respect, Dillman’s view is as holistic as the views of Theodorus 
Vriezen and Karl Barth. The latter again tilting their views in 
favour of a more spiritual characteristic of the imago Dei. Others, 
like W. Eichrodt and J. Junker (1949:3), do the same.
Fourthly, there is the view that all about the imago and similitudo 
Dei is essentially physical, even though there is an underlying 
inner and spiritual dimension to it. In Brueggemann’s (2001:241ff) 
opinion, this image of God is further affirmed in the prohibition 
of fixed images by God in the Decalogue in favour of the human 
physical image. He stated that ‘there is only one way in which 
God is imaged in the world and only one: humanness’. Humans 
are the only part of creation which discloses to us something 
about the reality, the beauty, the power and the richness of God. 
Humans not only reflect a divine glory, as Kline (1991:28 30; 
Boice 1986:149–150) and others have argued, but also own a body 
shaped with grace, nobility, majesty and perfect beauty with 
which humans are enabled to fulfill the God-given mandate to 
‘subdue’ and ‘dominate’ the earth. Humans were to do this more 
as caregivers and partners rather than as devastators!
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It is the key concept for grasping the biblical understanding of 
image of God as referring to a moral being. By this Adam, who 
was created in the image and likeness of God, (is) God’s own 
special representative, not simply by designation (command) but 
by design (nature or constitution) – i.e. as a representative of God 
(Birch 1991:87). Von Rad (1971), whilst recognising the image as 
physical underlines the essential inseparable nature of both the 
physical and the spiritual in humans, as the loss of one will mean 
the ‘death’ of the other. In both Old and New Testament, physical 
and spiritual life deriving from faith in God and/or Jesus Christ 
are  co-terminous (Ps 51:11–12; Pr 4:23; Ezk 36:25–28, 37:10; Jn 
6:27, 6:63; 2 Cor 4:7; Js 2:26).
Fifthly, there are those who consider the imago Dei as the 
special nature of human existence by virtue of which the person 
can take a stand before God. Thus, the essence of the imago and 
similitudo Dei consists in the ability of humans to form or enter 
into relationships with their Maker with a sense of responsibility 
and accountability for every act of omission or commission 
encountered in the process of that relationship. As so aptly put 
by J.J. Stamm (1959:81–90)38 ‘a human being is regarded as 
God’s counterpart, as the “you” who must listen to God, whom 
God questions and who must answer him’.
It is the considered opinion of the present author that all of 
these views are unanimous in supporting the fact that the 
38. Cited in Westermann, C., 1984, Genesis 1–11: A Commentary, SPCK, London, pp. 150–151.
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human person bears the imprint of the Divine Being – God, and 
so human lives must be placed above the reach of miscreants in 
three interrelated ways.
First of all, human lives must be considered sacred and a 
responsibility for all human governments to preserve, protect, 
promote and prosper through all conceivable natural and 
supernatural means and methods. It means that the post-
colonial identity of every human person on the surface of the 
earth should be one of an integrated personality. The present 
state in which human lives are treated with disrespect and 
disregard as typified by the terrorist attacks, kidnapping, ritual 
murders, insurgency and Boko Haram is nothing short of 
schizophrenia.
Secondly, it means that the hybrid culture of most peoples of 
the developing societies whereby they combine primordial 
sentiments with civic-public goals and end up being neither 
here nor there is problematic. Nothing in the (Gn 1:26–28) text 
smacks of a hybrid personality; instead the text suggests personal 
and corporate integrity that respects every human being’s right 
to life, to liberty and to the pursuit of happiness.
Thirdly, it means that the endemic culture of miming the 
values and ethos of the Western democratic processes hook, 
line and sinker by those aspiring to lead others in the developing 
world should be halted and erased from their thinking, acting 
and speaking (Bhabha 1994:2–6).
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Humans and nature in partnership
On a more auspicious note, the imago and similitudo Dei in 
Genesis 1:26–28 has ancient Near Eastern history behind it. 
Apparently, this also has been brought into an intercontextual 
dialogue with the contemporary Nigerian problem of ‘disdain 
for human lives’ in the terrorist acts of Boko Haram, as well as 
of militants and insurgents. In fact, the pericope has 
intertextual and intercontextual links with Wisdom texts 
such as Psalm 8, as well as with African humanism, which 
places a higher premium on the preservation, protection, 
promotion and prosperity of human lives. This literally 
resonates with the cosmogonies of ancient Near East and 
with Albert Schweitzer’s perspective on ‘reverence for life’. 
In all three perspectives we notice an affirmation of human 
lives preserved in partnership with nature and with the 
entire created order in a proactive, sustainable and humane 
manner.
On the other hand, any hermeneutic which interprets Genesis 
1:26–28 as placing profit above people or which portrays the 
exploitation of natural resources as transcending human 
environmental integrity and cleanliness is defective and in need 
of a rereading. In doing this, we have highlighted a text in which 
is contained God’s decisive dealing with his creation 
(Brueggemann 1995:16), and one in which creation is embodied 
as a creaturely unity (Gn 1:31, 8:22) in both theological and 
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ethical ways. Moreover, as I have pointed out elsewhere 
(Ahiamadu 2010, esp. Ch. 2), scholars like David Clines, Claus 
Westermann, Gerhard von Rad, and Joseph Blenkinsopp have 
each underscored the tension imbedded in creation in the 
‘troubled relation of creator/creation and God’s enduring 
resolve to have creation on its terms’. Others like Karl Barth 
have depicted a relational understanding both of the imago Dei 
and of a partnership of humans with God and with one another 
in the care and nurture of creation – a partnership which is 
captured by our postcolonial indices of transcendence and 
holism (Ahiamadu 2010:155ff; 2011:185; cf. Brueggemann 
2002:28–36).
At present the imago Dei has been grossly misunderstood with 
respect to creation resulting from a humans-above-nature rather 
than a humans-in-partnership-with-nature mindset. This has had 
an unsavoury consequence for the oil-bearing communities of the 
Niger Delta,39 but has also created an environment hazardous to 
human health and survival. It is interesting to note that only to the 
extent that multinational companies are held responsible for the 
negative or positive impact that their industrial and mechanical 
operations are having on their host communities by those who 
truly seek to be the true imago Dei, can such multinational companies 
39. These Niger Delta communities include the Abuas, the Bisenis, the Edos, the Egbemas, 
the Egnis (Ogbas), the Ekpeyes, the Engennis, the Etches, the Ikwerres, the Itshekiris, the 
Izons (Ijaws), the Kalabaris, the Ndokis, the Ndonis, the Nembes, the Ogbas (Igburus), 
the Okirikas, the Ogonis, the Sagbamas and the Urhobos, to name a few. 
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consider themselves accountable for the impacts which they create 
in oil-bearing communities (cf. Geisler 1995:309). The experience 
of Nigeria shows that such a sense of responsibility is lacking both 
on the part of government in not enacting and enforcing the 
implementation of environmental laws, and on the part of 
multinational companies40 in not being able to operate in ways that 
demonstrate a respect of environmental and ecological integrity in 
the oil-bearing communities of Africa (Evuleocha 2005:331).
This chapter therefore uses a post-colonial critical exegesis 
theologically to affirm the creation or cultural mandate in our 
pericope as not necessarily implying a human rule over creation 
in an absolute sense, but rule exercised in a rationale, humane 
and accountable manner. Human destiny is to face the world 
and to live with other creatures, some of which are dangerous, 
but all of which are to be ruled and cared for. The destiny of the 
human creation is to live in God’s world with God’s other 
creatures on God’s terms (Brueggemann 2002:40).
Responsibility in view of human rights and dignity
The redefinition of ‘divine nature’ in human beings implies a 
responsibility to highlight the requirements for human rights 
40. The multinational oil companies include Agip (Italian); Chevron (USA); Esso; Globe; 
Nigeria National Petroleum Company (NNPC); Shell (British-Dutch); Texaco (USA); 
Total (French), to mention the most notorious in environmental pollution and land 
degradation in the areas bordering on the gulf of Guinea and in Angola. In the case of 
Nigeria these companies have been in oil exploration etc. for over a half century.
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and human dignity inherent in the concept of the imago Dei. 
This is true especially when the ongoing struggle for self-
definition and identity within various Niger Delta ethnic 
communities is considered. In the Niger Delta, for instance, 
each human being belongs to a kindred and community 
condensed in a host of social relationships, at the helm of which 
is a gerontocracy. Shorthand references to the various ethnic 
groups within the area are often based on the territory inhabited 
by them, as for example Ogba and Ekpeye. Therefore, group 
identity of local communities is based on kinship in a very 
critical and crucial way. Without this the strategies of inclusion 
or exclusion from the ‘immediate’41 enjoyment of the rights 
inherent in the ‘divine nature’, or ‘imago Dei’  with which humans 
inveterately identify are short-changed. Yet this identity is 
being seriously jeopardised by human rights violations42 and the 
identity crisis inherent in the Nigerian state itself now carried 
41. An immediate benefit includes compensation for cash crops destroyed in land 
excavation and burrowing by the oil companies, and which is usually a meagre payment 
even though the damage done to the crops and land is of a permanent and irreparable 
nature. The Federal Government still claims the bulk of royalty payment on such land 
and minerals derived from it and are not accountable to the people in doing so. 
42. This is being written at a time when a combined force of the Nigerian army, navy, air 
force and police (the so called Joint Task Force) is combing the streets of Nigeria’s main 
oil city of Port Harcourt, shooting and killing in order to halt dissidents and militants 
who are bent on interrupting the entire oil industry in the Niger Delta until the resource 
owners are given a better deal by both the Federal Government and the multinational oil 
companies. Several Nigerian newspapers and the BBC News of 02–29 July are replete 
with reports of this nature. Visit http://www.nigeriaworld.com or http://www.
thisdayonline.com for details.
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over into its constituent parts. The exceptional diversity 
amongst various Nigerian peoples in respect of modes of social 
organisation, coupled with the fluidity and mobility of social 
identities resulting from a centralised and nationalised resource 
pool, betray a post-structuralist imperialistic post-colonial state. 
It has not only undermined the peoples’ dignity but also their 
sense of responsibility and corporate existence by pitching one 
group against the other.
In other words, there is a premeditated and concerted 
effort aimed at undermining the Divine or cultural mandate 
in the Genesis creation story when all the terrorist acts of 
brigandage going on around the world are taken into 
consideration. It literally means that humans no longer 
express the divine character, neither do they care about those 
interested in fulfilling their procreative functions. Both of 
these, once again, are important because dominion can only 
be exercised over the living creatures and nature generally to 
the extent that humans occupy the earth physically in a 
manner that truly reflects the divine image and likeness 
(Cassuto1978:58–59).
This is the point at which the works and writings of Albert 
Schweitzer (1875–1965) come into focus in this paper. 
It resonates with the heart and essence of the divine mandate. 





In the views of Albert Schweitzer, ‘life was too sacred to be 
wasted in battle-fields that do not contribute to the expansion 
of God’s kingdom’. His stance was that humans should enjoy a 
peaceful and tranquil environment at the hands of civil and 
spiritual authorities. The success of his views earned him a 
Nobel Peace Prize in 1952. He actively opposed the acquisition 
and deployment of weapons of mass destruction, resulting on a 
strong position taken by the United Nations on the ban against 
the use of the atomic, the nuclear and the neutron bombs, 
including a ban on the deployment of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles during conventional warfare.
This great theologian, philosopher, musician and physician 
was described as a human dynamo and as several individuals put 
together. He was not only zealous in the acquisition of knowledge 
but also actively engaged in knowledge dissemination and 
application. Beside his many-sided education in Germany – his 
homeland, Albert was also an articulate writer. His theological 
exposition was popularised by his book: The Mystery of the 
Kingdom of God (1901), a few years before another book titled: 
The Quest for the historical Jesus published in 1906 had hit the 
literary market (Pierard 1984:986, 987).
In the latter, he pointed out that all modern reconstructions 
of the life of Jesus simply attributed the liberal theology of their 
authors to Jesus in a much unwarranted style. These liberal 
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theologians simply ignore Jesus’ commitment to an imminent 
apocalypse, which Schweitzer considered so imperative as to 
warrant his separation to a life of absolute righteousness and 
entire sanctification. His hope of entering the Kingdom of God 
was a glowing one throughout his life and in the subsequent life 
of his disciples. In the former, he reflected on several human 
mystical views, including French, Indian and German views, 
depicting a ‘reverence for life’. However, these peaceful attributes 
were lacking in the belligerent posture adopted by both the 
German and French authorities respectively as the events of the 
First World War regrettably unfolded.
During the period of the interwar years during which Albert 
lived, perilous times shrouded the living conditions of 
Europeans. However, his religious stance raised many who 
otherwise would have been despondent and desperate. Simply 
put, his perspective on ‘reverence for life’ captured in his ethical 
theory was contained in his third book: The Philosophy of 
Civilization and is synonymous with human moral devotion to 
God as well as with an affirmation of all human lives. All nature 
shares the will to live, but only humans can recognise this 
common bond. In Schweitzer’s view humans must cherish the 
life of all beings equally and should not be given to the elimination 
or termination of lives – not even those of insects and plants 
because of their importance to human environmental and 
ecological life in general. To Schweitzer this constitutes the 
core theme of Jesus’ ethical teachings. Apparently, some critics 
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say that Schweitzer’s perspective on affirmation of human lives 
has been influenced more by his childhood upbringing and by 
his acquaintance with Hindu and Jainist doctrines of Ahimsa 
(non-harm) than by his missionary experiences in Gabon, 
Africa (Price 1988:623–624).
Of particular interest is Albert Schweitzer’s work in Gabon, 
West Africa, which depicted his love for Jesus and his willingness 
to follow the Spirit of Jesus by showing his hosts what this 
meant – sacrifice for and service to vulnerable humanity! He 
was not nearly as concerned about traditional Christian dogma 
as he was about the ethical aspects of the doctrines of Christ, 
and the high premium this placed on the respect for individual 
rights to life and to self-actualisation (Pierard 1984:986–987). 
Schweitzer has been described as a versatile scholar who devoted 
himself to the service of humanity through his writings and his 
extensive works of charity by which he reached out to the 
homeless and to ex-convicts.
He became a missionary to the East African country of Gabon 
and with the support of his wife and some locals he established 
the first rural hospital in Lambarene, Gabon. His innovative 
approach to the well-being of the locals did not, however, go 
down well with the French colonial authorities and so Albert 
was mandated to leave the area. As far as the authorities of the 
French colonial office were concerned the young German 
missionary was more of an enemy alien.
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African humanism
The continent of Africa often has been referred to by European 
explorers as the ‘dark continent’ during the earlier centuries 
preceding this age of globalisation. Moreover, the 21st century 
has positioned Africa as the ‘cradle of humanism’ where 
primordial sentiments are high, and people do all within their 
powers to promote parochial interests, even at the expense of a 
so-called ‘general good’. Moreover, events on the continent of 
Africa are no longer shrouded in secrecy and ‘cultism’ but can 
now be captured in any part of the globe via satellite. Not only 
does Africa enjoy the fruits of global technological innovations 
in the fields of communication, medical care, education, 
economics and governance, but she also contributes to this 
ongoing process with her God-given natural and human 
resources. According to Ehusani (1991):
Young African intellectuals have started registering their presence in 
the arts and sciences, thus enriching the scientific movement and the 
technological civilization with the African genius. (p. 5, 13ff)
Conversely, however, there has been the resultant danger which 
this technological innovation has posed to humanity, not only 
in Africa, but globally. In the days of Albert Schweitzer, it led to 
the decimation of two Japanese cities – Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
Various categories of weapons of mass destruction today 
threaten with extinction the entire human race. Moreover, 
there is the daily routine of economic, political and social 
insecurity with rampant cases of armed robberies and violation 
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of human rights, insurgency, kidnappings, ritual murders and 
terrorism now witnessed in continental Africa with an attendant 
poisoning of the human environment by multinational oil 
companies. The inhabitants of Nigeria’s Niger Delta live under 
a very polluted and degrading environment resulting from 
chemical wastes and fumes pumped into their natural 
environment from the exploration, exploitation and exportation 
of crude petroleum and other natural mineral resources. This 
pollution hazard has been going on for more than forty years 
and has created various environmental and ecologically related 
diseases.
Worse still, the militarisation of Africa has become worrisome 
not only to the African Union but also to the global community. 
At any given time in the last decade or two there have been at 
least twenty wars in progress in various parts of the world, with 
Africa having its fair share of the same. These do not include 
the intermittent acts of insurgency and terrorism with the use 
of offensive and defensive weapons (Ehusani 1991):
Perpetrated not only by the weak against the strong, but oftentimes by 
the powerful against the weak. Millions of human lives are destroyed in 
these wars and armed clashes and many of them who survive are either 
reduced to the status of refugees, die of starvation and deprivation or 
from the epidemics that result from these wars, or they remain 
physically and psychologically maimed for life. (p. 8)
As we speak a new phenomenon of internally displaced persons 
in Nigeria, which was zero in 1999, has by 2015 risen to nearly 
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one million persons of north-eastern Nigeria origin – the net 
effect of Boko Haram insurgency.
Not only is the traditional African humanism and respect for 
human lives under threat, but also the ‘reverence for life’ once 
preached on the continent by Albert Schweitzer seems now 
forgotten, and the whole doctrine of ‘imago’ and ‘similuto Dei’, 
which is part of the cosmogony of both Judaism, Christianity 
and Islam, is being gravely assaulted. African scholars like Bolaji 
Idowu and John S. Mbiti have in their respective ways pointed 
at the human person as the handiwork of the Supreme Being 
(Idowu 1996), which informs the African primordial 
commitment to religious and spiritual values, though not 
ignoring the mundane and material (Mbiti 1969). A fitting 
summary to this discussion is a paper the present author 
presented to Amnesty International Business Group (AIBG) in 
Stockholm, Sweden in the winter of 2006 and which was 
published as an article in a reputable Nigerian journal in 2009 
(Ahiamadu 2009:87), a quote from a section of which reads 
(Wright 1990):
There is the perspective of African moral religion which is in consonance 
with both Old Testament (OT) and Islamic laws, and which considers 
human rights as pointing to the rights of individuals to share in the 
produce from the land, to a personal pursuit of happiness, to life and 
liberty. These rights and numerous other rights which are in congruity 
with African moral religion are deeply entrenched in African Traditional 
Religion (ATR) and in the Canon of both OT and Islam. For instance, 
in the OT the Decalogue protected individual human rights such as the 
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right to conscience, to recreation, to life, to family, to property, to a 
good association or reputation, and the right to liberty. In this way the 
individual’s relationship to God is protected so that a violation of an 
individual’s rights was considered an interference with that individual’s 
commitment or devotion to God. (p. 136)
Conclusion
In this chapter, humans made in the image of God are considered 
responsible moral agents in God’s universe. The creation of the 
first man shows this: the subduing of the earth, that is, the whole 
of culture, is given to him, and can be given to him only because 
he is created after God’s image (Cassuto 1978:58). Humans can 
be rulers of the earth only because, and in so far as they are 
servants, sons and daughters of God. It is doubtful, however, if 
humans have built on this foundation of sonship. Instead, 
humankind has taken a subservient role and not always followed 
a normal course as evidenced in the numerous wars, revolutions 
and catastrophes all over the world.
At present the ‘imago Dei’ has been grossly assaulted as 
peaceful and unsuspecting inhabitants are sent to their untimely 
graves by the activities of terrorists and insurgents as well as by 
multinational oil companies whose operations in developing 
economies jeopardise environmental health and integrity of 
human lives. The experience of Nigeria shows that the sense of 
responsibility imbued in the ‘imago’ and ‘similitudo Dei’ is lacking: 
both in the public sector – where the enforcement of basic 
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human rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is 
coupled with the implementation of environmental laws – and 
with respect to the ecological integrity of host communities 
(Evuleocha 2005:331).
Neither is the ‘reverence for life’ expounded by Albert 
Schweitzer in his ethical theory anywhere upheld in the private 
sector. Not only is the traditional African humanism and respect 
for human lives under threat, but also the ‘reverence for life’ 
once preached on the continent by Albert Schweitzer seems 
now forgotten, and the whole doctrine of ‘imago’ and ‘similituto 
Dei’ which is part of the cosmogony of both Judaism, Christianity 
and Islam is being gravely assaulted. African scholars like Bolaji 
Idowu and John S. Mbiti have, in their respective ways, pointed 
at the human person as the handiwork of the Supreme Being 
(Idowu 1996), which informs the African primordial 
commitment to human religious and spiritual values as 
essentially complementary to the mundane and material (Mbiti 
1969).
It is therefore our recommendation that human innate 
reverence for life, which is synonymous with the ‘imago Dei’ and 
with human moral devotion to God should be complimented by 
an affirmation of human life by all. All nature shares the will to 
live but only humans can recognise this common bond. We 
must cherish the life of all beings equally and should not be 
given to elimination or termination of lives – not even those of 
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insects and plants because of their importance to human 
environmental and ecological life in general. This is the point of 
view that resonates with African humanism, the Canons of Old 
Testament and Islam as well as with Albert Schweitzer’s concept 
of reverence of, and for, human life.
Chapter 4: Summary
We live in a modern world where military conflict exists in 30 
of the world’s 192 countries and one in which oil exploration, 
exploitation and exportation result in environmental 
degradation and ecological distortions in Africa’s oil-producing 
nations, including Nigeria. Whilst the former has bred various 
levels of violence (viz. rape, abduction, insurgency, terrorism 
and ritual murders, etc.), the latter have, for their part, 
contributed negatively to global warming, environmental 
pollution and ecologically related diseases. This chapter critically 
examines the biblical mandate in which humans are placed to 
care for the earth and, particularly, for the protection of human 
lives. It reflects on Albert Schweitzer’s concept of a ‘reverence 
for life’ in practical resonance with the ‘imago’ and ‘similitudo 
Dei’ enunciated as a common human heritage in Biblical 
narratives. It brings African humanism (with its inherent 
commitment to the preservation, promotion, protection and 
prosperity of human lives) into a critical dialogue with ‘imago 
Dei’ and ‘reverence for life’ against the backdrop of insurgency, 
terrorism, kidnappings and abuse of human rights. These vices 
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today characterise every facet of human social, economic and 
political life in the countries of the world, particularly in oil-
rich Nigeria. It recommends that human innate reverence for 
life, which is synonymous with the ‘imago Dei’ and with human 
moral devotion to God, should be complemented by an 
affirmation of the human life of all in keeping with Albert 
Schweitzer’s philosophy on reverence for life.
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Introduction
Research into Albert Schweitzer’s philosophical work has not 
been in vogue for quite some time. The important writings of 
Oskar Kraus (1950), Henry Clark (1962) and George Seaver 
(1969) are now dated and attest to the lack of research over the 
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last 50 years into Schweitzer’s work. Kraus’s semi-biographical 
works emerged from his close friendship with Schweitzer. 
Schweitzer and Kraus both engaged in life writing, in that they 
reflect on their ideas in relation to their lived experiences – in 
Kraus’s case, his close friendship with Schweitzer. In this chapter 
I will pick up the trend of life writing by focusing on Schweitzer’s 
autobiographical writing.43 This enables us to assess the 
development of Schweitzer’s thinking in relation to his 
experience and his reflection of these experiences through his 
life writing in his major autobiography, My life and thought 
(1956a). I will analyse to what extent Schweitzer integrates his 
experience of reverence for life into his philosophy, culminating 
in an analysis of his Nobel Peace Prize commemorative speech. 
In my analysis, I will refer to Paul Ricoeur’s theory of attestation.
In this chapter, I explore the roots of Schweitzer’s central idea 
of reverence for life in the three genres in which he wrote, namely 
philosophy, autobiography and theological writings. I have 
chosen Civilization and ethics (1955) to represent his philosophical 
writings, My life and thought (1956a) amongst his autobiographical 
writings and the Quest for the historical Jesus (1956b) amongst his 
theological writings. In analysing reverence for life, critics on 
Schweitzer have focused on the literary roots of his writings, 
namely his studies of Western and Eastern thought (1955 and 
1936), but they have not adequately recognised the role of his 
43. James Olney describes life writing as ‘the validation [and] necessity … of writing one’s 
life, of finding the words that signify the self and its history’ (1998:2).
137
Chapter 5
autobiography in providing an understanding of his philosophy. 
I will demonstrate that his autobiographical writings provide a 
crucial lens through which to view the formation of his elemental 
philosophy, which forms the basis for his notion of reverence for 
life. I will also turn to his political-ethical writings in the latter 
part of his life, which focused on the anti-nuclear weapons 
campaign, to show how influential reverence for life was in 
fashioning his political thought (Schweitzer 1954a).
Schweitzer’s philosophical ideas reached their fruition when 
he left Europe. He completed Civilization and ethics (1955:240–264) 
in Africa where he articulated his concept of reverence for life. 
His departure for Africa was in part motivated by his 
dissatisfaction with the presentation of modern concepts in 
cultural and religious spheres (Schweitzer 1956a:173) which 
had, according to him, lost touch with the ideas of the 
Enlightenment. He felt that this problematic view of civilisation 
would lead to a repression of otherness and to a large-scale 
disrespect for life (Schweitzer 1956a:232), which, in many ways, 
presaged World War 1 (Schweitzer 1956a:177). He left for 
Africa in 1913 in order to get away from the dominant narratives 
that informed ‘world views’ in Europe and to explore ways to 
make thought more meaningful to the individual and to lived 
experience (Schweitzer 1956a:173). Schweitzer sought to 
establish life-view as separate from world views and as 
meaningful in itself, an approach that dovetails with my 
approach of exploring life writing in relation to experience and 
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life-view (Schweitzer 1956a:180). Schweitzer’s autobiographical 
writings document the beginnings of his thoughts about 
elemental philosophy. This, in turn, provides a nuanced 
understanding of his concept of reverence for life. Whilst his 
autobiography provides a chronology of events and thoughts in 
his life, an analysis of the sequence and description of these 
events provides a picture of the development of his thinking. 
The main focus of this chapter is Schweitzer’s experience of 
reverence for life on a barge sailing down the Ogooué River in 
Gabon. This moment is central, because it was a resolution at an 
experiential level of the issues and questions Schweitzer had been 
asking about Western civilisation and the Enlightenment, in 
particular. A study of his autobiography reveals that his thinking 
had led him up to the point of experiencing reverence for life. I 
will explore the experiences that led up to this moment in order 
to trace its origin. I will also assess how successfully Schweitzer 
integrated this experience into his philosophy and daily practices. 
Ultimately, I will assess how Schweitzer integrated his experience 
of reverence for life into his political thought in the latter period 
of his life when he engaged with the politics of nuclear 
disarmament. A study of his autobiography My life and thought 
(1956a) reveals that these insights came to him through direct 
sensory experience whilst working as a doctor in Africa 
(Schweitzer 1956a:191). He then channelled these insights into 
answering questions that had plagued him regarding modern 
civilisation’s interpretation of the Enlightenment and the 
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historical Jesus. His resulting philosophy of reverence for life is 
based on a profound critique of received ideas concerning 
Enlightenment philosophy and religion in late 19th-century 
Europe. Schweitzer thus represents a distinctive shift in Western 
thought away from a Western materialistic world view towards 
affirming personal experience and ethical responsibility.
Theoretical framework
Schweitzer’s autobiographical writings offer first-person 
accounts of how his ideas developed in relation to lived 
experience. In order to analyse his autobiographical writing and 
correlate it with his philosophical and theological writings, I 
draw on Paul Ricoeur’s theory of attestation, as described in 
Oneself as another (1994). Attestation is not a purely subjective 
state of consciousness, but rather one that is derived from 
complex relations between the sense of self in relation to the 
other and one’s sense of self in relation to oneself (Ricoeur 
1994:2–3). Attestation affirms the position of the articulator 
within a complex state of identity that implies an indelible 
connection to otherness (Ricoeur 1994:3). Ricoeur makes a 
distinction between two different concepts of identity, ipse and 
idem: idem denotes a sense of a fixed identity in time, whereas 
ipse points to an understanding of identity devoid of an 
‘unchanging core personality’. Ipse identity, for Ricoeur (1994:3), 
‘involves a dialectical complementarity … namely the dialectic 
of self and the other than self’. In this sense the relation between 
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self and otherness is not of two distinct categories set in 
comparison with each other. Instead, the title Oneself as another 
‘implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be 
thought without the other’ (Ricoeur 1994:3). In addition, the 
dynamic relation between idem and ipse identities allows for a 
fluid sense of self in relation to external influences. Together, 
the two identities combine to produce a more stable sense of 
mental or interior life (Ricoeur 1994:118:119). According to 
Ricoeur, a person who attests asserts the position held, 
encompassing its frailty, tentativeness and confidence (Ricoeur 
1994:21). Seen from this perspective, autobiography becomes a 
crucially important source of knowledge because it expresses 
knowledge and experience from sources other than the 
dominant narratives in society, giving voice to complex personal 
narratives that reflect against dominant discourses. It is from 
the vantage point of autobiography that we can appreciate 
alternative views of reality and find a meeting point for 
discussion. This focus allows us to recognise the role personal 
reflexivity plays in the course a life takes and the decisions a 
person makes. I will show that this dynamic is central to the 
relationship between Schweitzer’s autobiographical writing 
and his philosophical writings.
The concept of attestation affords Schweitzer’s spiritual ideas 
and ethical-mystical philosophy a contemporary philosophical 
grounding in that it allows for a subtle consideration of the 
subjective aspect of consciousness, which always, to some 
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degree, remains impregnable. Analysing Schweitzer’s writings 
at the hand of attestation theory allows us to perceive 
contradictions and ambivalences within his life and thought. 
For example, it is possible to analyse Schweitzer’s works as 
exemplars of colonial discourse. Yet a more subtle reading of his 
work through the lens of his autobiography reveals a person 
actively engaged in working through a life experience within 
his own context, attempting to understand the mystical 
experience of reverence for life intellectually, throughout a 
lifetime of reflection. The idem aspects of Schweitzer’s thoughts 
are revealed in the paternalistic aspects of his African writings. 
Nevertheless, where he offers critique of the colonialism 
observed in Gabon he displays ipse characteristics in that he 
takes the plight of black Africans into his own identity 
(Schweitzer 1956a:227).
Ricoeur argues that the articulating self should be understood 
as encompassing a totality of awareness, including the sense of 
affirmation, doubt, subjectivity and the encroachment of the 
object into the subject’s consciousness (Ricoeur 1994:3, 21). 
Combining Ricoeur with Schweitzer’s terminology, the 
theoretical apparatus of attestation enables the elucidation of 
the complexities of life-view through autobiography. Whilst 
Schweitzer’s terminology of the ‘other’ for example in his use of 
racist terms ‘savage’ and ‘primitives’ in My life and thought 
(1956a:167) is distinctly colonial, a study of his thinking reveals 
an intention to move beyond the conceptual strictures of 
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Western colonial discourse coupled with increasing doubt of 
the dominant Enlightenment project (Schweitzer 1955:202). 
Schweitzer’s life-view, which emerges in his autobiography, 
proposes a complete rethinking of civilisation along lines aimed 
at world peace and compassion.
The philosophical context of Schweitzer’s 
thought
It is apparent in Schweitzer’s autobiography that he writes 
within the philosophical framework of the Enlightenment 
with particular reference to German idealism, for example 
Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Whilst 
critical of Enlightenment thinkers in general for their inability 
to secure clearly defined concepts (as I will explore later), he is 
most sympathetic to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Schweitzer 
argues that it is impossible to discount or ignore the importance 
of Enlightenment thought, but it is imperative for the peaceful 
coexistence of all life on earth that human thought becomes 
‘elemental’ or authentically related to being as it is immediately 
experienced (Schweitzer 1956a:185). Schweitzer maintains in 
his autobiography that the plethora of life-forms on Earth 
embody will-to-live, which one encounters immediately in 
one’s own experience. Such a philosophical framework is 
important because it is based on a life-view and not on a 
world view (1956a:262). For Schweitzer, the fundamental 
error of the majority of Western philosophy, including 
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Christianity, is the attempt to establish a world view that is 
not founded on lived experience (Schweitzer 1956a:185). This 
error results in an over-reaching life-view masquerading as a 
world view, as exemplified most comprehensively in Hegel’s 
philosophy (Schweitzer 1955:141). Schweitzer’s voice is 
complex revealing a fluid identity with contradictory 
discourses, echoing both Ricoeur’s conflicting idem and ipse 
identities. At times he is downright derogatory (Schweitzer 
1956a:167), at other times he wants to find a position of dignity 
for black Africans in colonial narrative (Schweitzer 1954b:86). 
To a degree his aim to establish, via mystical ethics, a mode of 
existence which gives dignity to all life amidst the plethora of 
life forms competing for survival is partly achieved. This can 
be seen in his commemorative address on winning the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1952 (Schweitzer 1954a). I will return to this 
point later.
My argument is that the route to understanding Schweitzer’s 
formulation of reverence for life is through exploring 
Schweitzer’s autobiography. It provides unique, integrated 
insights into his philosophy that are not available via the singular 
routes of theological or philosophical analysis. Such an 
autobiographical reading leads to an approach which connects 
humans as thinking beings to others, whilst accepting the 
complexity of such a relation. His approach found the 
Enlightenment project unclear. He questions whether it can 
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provide the epistemological clarity that it claims to do. He 
therefore sought insight through different routes.
According to Schweitzer (1956a:32), this conceptual 
obscurity, particularly in Kant’s thought, leads to the unfounded 
notion of civilisation that informs Western culture and gives 
licence to colonialism and imperialism (Schweitzer 1955:109). 
By contrast, awareness of the intricacies of shared lived 
experiences, which forms the basis of Schweitzer’s understanding 
of ethical civilisation, provides an ethical foundation for 
civilisation to which colonial exploitation and subjugation 
would be anathema. Nevertheless, as I will argue later, 
Schweitzer was unable fully to integrate his views on colonialism 
into his ethical philosophy. He still retained colonial racial 
categories in his discourse, also in his later life.
Discontent with the Enlightenment
In this section I will discuss Schweitzer’s comments in his 
autobiography about Enlightenment thought. Schweitzer’s 
autobiography, My life and thought (1956a), documents his 
growing dissatisfaction with the Enlightenment. In his 
autobiography he laments that, despite a great Western 
heritage in the form of the Enlightenment, Western civilisation 
was indifferent to inhumane ideas and this inhumanity was 
perpetuated by governments’ lack of zeal for justice. At a 
dinner party when he was a student he heard the assertion, 
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‘Why, we are all of us nothing but “Epigoni”!’ He continues: ‘It 
struck home with me, like a flash of lightning, because it put 
into words what I myself felt (about Western civilization)’ 
(Schweitzer 1956a:173, 2005:15). Schweitzer believed his 
generation found the standards of values set by preceding 
generations too high and, in response, they had settled for 
external material progress and the pragmatic politics of 
Realpolitik (Schweitzer 1956a:173).
My life and thought is written from a temporal perspective 
which affords the reader the opportunity to proceed apace with 
the development of Schweitzer’s thought, from his youth as a 
student of philosophy and theology, into his maturity as an 
itinerant lecturer and medical doctor in Africa. For Schweitzer, 
Western civilisation is founded on the notion of abstract 
reasoning, derived from Descartes’ concept of an abstract 
thinking subject as the ultimate touchstone for action (Descartes 
1968:54). Schweitzer, however, wishes to embrace different 
criteria for making decisions which assert the primacy of 
personal experience as the basis of ethics in place of the abstract 
concepts of subjectivity that outlined the idea of the individual 
in Descartes’ and later Kant’s thought (Kant 2007:80; Scruton 
1982:24). In Schweitzer’s autobiography, he calls for the practice 
of civilisation to be revisited. The consequences, he observes, of 
the empty thought that undergirds modern civilisation are 
brutal colonialism and the devastation of the First World War 
(Schweitzer 1956a:189).
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In My life and thought, Schweitzer draws attention to elusive 
ideas that parade as foundational concepts in Western 
civilisation. There is evidence, even in his early theological and 
philosophical texts, The quest for the historical Jesus (first published 
in 1910) and his doctorate on Kant (written in 1899) of this 
masking of indeterminate ideas behind an artifice of metaphysical 
clarity. Schweitzer identifies this trend in Enlightenment 
thinking and critiques it (Schweitzer 1955:29, 35, 106). It is 
significant that Schweitzer focuses on Jesus and Kant in his 
early research because in Jesus lie the roots of Western morality 
and in Kant lies the root of Enlightenment thought. Indeed, in 
critiquing Kant, Schweitzer is effectively critiquing the 
foundation of Enlightenment philosophy. Writing about his 
doctorate on Kant in My life and thought, Schweitzer argues that 
Kant feigns continuity between pure reason and practical reason 
(Schweitzer 1955:112, 1956a:33). On close interrogation, 
however, the formative ideas in pure reason become more 
intuitive and more spiritual in practical reason. Schweitzer 
argues that the religious declarations in Critique of practical 
reason are raised beyond those inferred in the Critique of pure 
reason and, therefore, the ethics contained in the two books are 
inconsistent. Schweitzer declares in My life and thought that, in 
the Critique of practical reason, moral law is religiously ‘deeper’ 
than in the Critique of pure reason. Critique of practical reason 
asserts the three cornerstone ideas: of God, freedom and 
immortality. These concepts, however, are not so firmly 
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established in the Critique of pure reason’s insistence on the 
categorical imperative which shapes the perception and 
knowledge of the world. Kant’s suggestion that there is a 
seamless logic between the two books is ill-founded (Schweitzer 
1956a:33) and his philosophy of religion is not consistent. His 
philosophy in Critique of pure reason cannot match the more 
intuitive claim for moral action in Critique of practical reason 
and, therefore, his ethical ideas are inconsistently applied. 
Schweitzer explains in his autobiography that Kant’s early 
religious writings, whilst they form part of the introduction to 
Critique of pure reason, are never explored in the text. His use 
of the term ‘transcendental’ in Critique of pure reason is never 
explored. The problem is further exacerbated in Critique of 
practical reason when Kant explores spiritual notions of God, 
freedom and immortality which are at odds with his philosophy 
in Critique of pure reason (Körner 1964:152; Schweitzer 
1956a:32).
In The quest for the historical Jesus (1956b), Schweitzer 
continues to interrogate the Enlightenment project by looking 
at 19th- and twentieth-century studies of Jesus. He applies a 
historical method to show how 19th-century theologians tried 
to depict Jesus as speaking directly to their age’s liberal and 
rational world view. Schweitzer shows that Paul was right in 
placing Jesus’ life and ministry in a late-Rabbinic world view, 
infused with messianic and eschatological ideas – a world view 
that was foreign to the Enlightenment (Schweitzer 1953: 83 84). 
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Schweitzer’s solution to this problem is that we must read Jesus’ 
teachings with an awareness of his world view and then delve 
into the spiritual teaching of love that lies hidden in his message. 
Schweitzer writes in My life and thought that the theologians 
Wrede, Strauss and Bauer cast Jesus as a modern thinker 
embracing rationalism and liberalism (Schweitzer 1956a: 
168–175). As views of Jesus are historically constructed, 
he avers that it is impossible to discover the actual historical 
Jesus.
In My life and thought, Schweitzer begins to notice the 
consequences of the thought world established by abstract and 
unsubstantiated Enlightenment ideas of Western civilisation. He 
writes of labour becoming specialised and functionary because 
people are being seen in an alienated and mechanised way. He 
starts to recognise that labour should be to the benefit of humanity 
and should express the spirit of humanity beyond circumscribed 
market-related labour. It seems probable that Schweitzer’s 
positive reflections on social action against social distress were 
influenced by Marx (Schweitzer 1955:160). He began to see the 
flaws in the idea of progress in Western civilisation. The more 
human progress was not realised, the more there was a 
concomitant movement to Realpolitik based on maintaining 
power and material factors. Schweitzer’s concerns were realised 
in the outbreak of the brutal World War in 1914. His belief that 
the values of his generation were inhumane was borne out by 
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history. For him, the First World War was a consequence of 
civilisation inheriting an empty set of values from the world 
views and philosophy of the past. Progress had become an empty 
phrase which had lost its spirituality and had become an empty 
and materialistic external expression (Schweitzer 1956a:173). 
Later in his autobiography Schweitzer mentions the idea of 
elemental thought as the route to world and life-affirmation 
when he writes (Schweitzer 1956a):
Elemental thinking is that which starts from fundamental questions 
about the relations of man to the universe, about the meaning of life, 
and about the nature of goodness. (p. 260)
We can glean from this quotation that what Schweitzer means 
by ‘elemental’ is an idea that is fundamental to the survival of 
life that will reach into perpetuity. Later, in his Nobel Prize 
address, he makes the same connection between spirituality and 
elemental thought which, by then, he understood as synonymous 
with reverence for life.
The core of this idea is already apparent in his writings on 
the historical Jesus, rooted in the sense of the mystery and 
riddle of life encapsulated in Jesus’ teachings. If ‘world view’ is 
a riddle and mystery, then thought should settle on life-view 
as its foundation for being. Life-view should therefore be 
founded on itself or be derived from immediate experience of 
life. Elemental thought takes the world as it is and reflects on 
the individual’s own experience. In this way thought shifts 
away from epistemology and towards the ethical. This, for 
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Schweitzer, is the essence of religion and it is what Jesus 
exhorts his followers to do (1956a:250). In My life and thought 
Schweitzer explains that elemental thought begins with 
inwardness. One recognises one’s experience as will. He 
identifies the early exploration of these ideas in Stoicism, ‘that 
man must bring himself into a spiritual relation with the 
world, and become one with it. In essence Stoicism is a nature 
philosophy which ends in mysticism’ (Schweitzer 1956a:261). 
From this, we can infer that life-view implies finding meaning 
in the immediate experience and acceptance of the broader 
inexpressible secret of existence. Written into this position 
is the passive acceptance of existence, one’s own existence 
and the other existences met in immediate experience. Herein 
lies the root of Schweitzer’s ethical mysticism – to live with 
a humane attitude of sincere reflection on all existences 
(Schweitzer 1956a:235:269).
In philosophy he sees this similar thought in Socrates and in 
a combined reading of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (Nietzsche 
1983:174; Plato 1956:340; Schopenhauer 1909: loc. 345). In 
religion, he sees this same attitude in Chinese Taoism. He finds 
Buddhism and Hinduism too focused on a withdrawal from 
worldliness and modern Christianity too focused on optimism 
(Schweitzer 1956a:262). He finds in Jesus’ early teachings, 
however, the forgotten call to reflect on being (Schweitzer 
1956a:185). There is in Schweitzer’s latter point the echo of 
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reflecting on being in Ricoeur’s concept of attestation in the 
articulation of personal meaning, based on personal reflexivity.
Will and representation
In this section, I will explore Schweitzer’s preference for 
reflexive and introspective thought. The introspective tradition 
has its roots in the Christian tradition of Pauline and Augustinian 
writings (Olney 1998:80). The idea is that one has an inner 
‘space’ where thoughts and actions complement each other as 
the individual progresses towards God’s love. Schweitzer 
prioritises the dimension of interiority, which is found in many 
writings. His emphasis on interiority overlaps with Ricoeur’s 
notion of attestation where the expression of personal meaning 
of the subject is based on reflection and experience. He also finds 
resonances of introspection in the Western philosophical 
tradition in Socrates (particularly in connection with the idea of 
the inner voice or daimon), Schopenhauer and Nietzsche 
(Schweitzer 1955:32).
The psychological idea of representation in Western thought 
has many sources, but the route that Schweitzer follows is via 
German idealism as propounded by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche 
and Fichte. Schopenhauer criticised Kant’s idea of the thing-in-
itself, which is the essence (noumenon) of something which 
cannot be known by the senses. In its place, Schopenhauer 
argued for the existence of a universal will that fashions the 
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world according to its own representations (Schopenhauer 
1909:location 356). Representations are therefore not physically 
stable, but equivocal in nature and subject to interpretation 
(Schweitzer 1955:73–79). The individual remains trapped in 
the particularity of his or her representation. The resonances 
between Ricoeur and Schweitzer become apparent in that 
attestation and Schweitzer’s understanding of will both assume 
that understanding arises from reflecting on immediate 
experience rather than on abstract or metaphysical categories.
Although Schweitzer recognises the fashioning power of 
context, as witnessed in his writings on the historical Jesus, he 
is not deterministic in his thinking. More accurately, Schweitzer 
emphasises the primacy of subjective experience and the ability 
of the mind to reflect ethically within its context and arrive at 
mystical ethical principles in specific contexts. In this sense, 
Schweitzer breaks from Descartes’ thought wherein recognition 
of thinking as a precondition for being is not primarily based on 
an ontological condition, but is rather a method to disprove 
scepticism and affirm life (Scruton 1984:31). His dictum, ‘I am 
life which wills to live, in the midst of life which wills to live’ 
(Schweitzer 1956a:186) does not suggest an abstract conscious 
entity such as in Descartes’ assertion of ‘I think; so I must exist’ 
(Schweitzer 1956a:186). Rather, in Schweitzer’s case, identity is 




This matrix of ideas in Schweitzer’s writings is focused on the 
term life-view in his main philosophical text, Civilization and 
ethics (Schweitzer 1955:205). Life-view is grounded in individual 
experience within a particular context. Life-view is formulated 
from the process of reflecting on experience in relation to one’s 
understanding of spirituality or the inner relation to an idea of 
the divine. From this reflection, ethical action is established in a 
person’s life (Schweitzer 1955:205). Life-view is set against world 
view in Schweitzer’s writings. World view is a philosophical or 
religious system external to individual experience. Schweitzer 
argues that the vast majority of Western thought is written from 
the perspective of world view rather than life-view, with the 
exception of a few thinkers such as Socrates, the Earl of 
Shaftesbury (Schweitzer 1955:86), Schopenhauer and Nietzsche 
(Schweitzer 1955:163–178). Schweitzer’s attraction to 
Schopenhauer’s and Nietzsche’s thoughts means that he opposes 
the grand metaphysical architecture in the German idealist 
tradition exemplified by Hegel’s philosophy (Schweitzer 
1955:141). For Schweitzer there is no meaning in nature 
(Schweitzer 1955:204), whereas Hegel wrote of an extensive 
meaning developing in nature through the dialectical process of 
Spirit and History (Hegel 1990:30). For Schweitzer, therefore, 
meaning is established in the core of the individual’s lived 
experience (Schweitzer 1955:237), whilst for Hegel meaning 
becomes clearer in the external world as time unfolds (Hegel 
1974:252). Schweitzer, by contrast, always maintains a disjuncture 
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between natural events and a person’s desire for peace. Nature, 
argues Schweitzer, ‘knows only a blind affirmation of life’ 
(Schweitzer 1955:222). Nevertheless, Schweitzer asserts that in 
humanity life-affirmation becomes prone to inner reflection or a 
turning away from outer phenomena (life-negating in Schweitzer’s 
terms) to arrive at a commitment to the protection of all life 
(Schweitzer 1955:222). Indeed, therefore, it is this very 
disconnection between nature and the human desire for peace 
that forms the basis of ethics (Schweitzer 1955:222–223).
Ethics in Schweitzer’s thought is derived from a combination 
of ethics and mysticism. He argues that ethics without mysticism 
leads to conventional thought, whilst mysticism without ethics 
leads to abstract thought (Schweitzer 1955:235). Ethical 
mysticism requires an ethical effort to raise ethics up from the 
brute ethics of convention and law to the spiritualised ethics of 
thought and ‘resignation’ or ‘inward self-liberation from the 
world’ (Schweitzer 1955:226). According to Schweitzer, this 
process sees the finite notes of convention transformed into 
awareness of infinite will (Schweitzer 1955:226). Herein lies the 
mysterious paradox in Schweitzer’s thought – negating life, in 
the form of denying convention, through an inward turn 
becomes life-affirmation through the elevation of ethics.
The ethical effort that Schweitzer (1955:164, 219) refers to 
requires personal agency. Schweitzer turns to the German 
idealists Fichte, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in reaction to 
the totalising abstract framework of Hegel. For Fichte, 
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Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, in different ways, the individual 
transforms basic will by forcing individual reflection inwards. 
Schweitzer’s concept of self-perfection refers to a mental 
process where reflection on the multitude of wills is raised to 
a point where conflict between wills is transcended to 
experience the unity of will. In this sense, reflecting on will 
brings about a mystical realisation of the union of will. It is 
important to note that inner reflection on will in the process 
of self-perfection does not lead to an abstract understanding 
of will, but rather a practical ethic that extends to all life forms. 
One therefore develops reverence for life in all its forms 
through the immediate elemental thought on will in one’s 
midst (Schweitzer 1955:239). Schweitzer argues that such 
elemental reflection leads to the development of a personal 
ethical life-view and not an imposed world view.  For 
Schweitzer, ethics must operate at the level of the individual’s 
relation to his or her sense of the divine (Schweitzer 1955:224). 
Such knowledge is indelibly connected to well-being. 
Schweitzer’s search for a life-view not founded on a world 
view was begun, according to him, by Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche. Schopenhauer’s entire philosophy, it could be 
argued, was an attack on the Hegelian flavour of the day which 
subverted personal meaning to the abstract of total meaning 
of Hegel’s thought. Schopenhauer’s recognition of will as 
being the driving force of life is clearly fundamental to 
Schweitzer’s thought.
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Schweitzer’s concept of reverence for life as 
attested statement
Ricoeur’s concept of attestation describes the condition of a 
subject rooted in a contextual milieu, using the experiential 
footholds of that context in the meaning-making process. This 
framework resonates with Schweitzer’s mystical ethics which is 
embedded in a direct mystical experience of one’s immediate 
surroundings (Schweitzer 1956a:186). Attestation, argues 
Ricoeur, is different from the Platonic metacategories of Same 
and Other, or idea and appearance. Instead, the other is drawn 
into the identity of the subject. (Ricoeur 1994:298; Russell 
1947:141–153). Ricoeur developed this idea initially on a 
theological footing in his book The rule of metaphor, first 
published in 1977 (Ricoeur 2003), where he avers that Aristotle, 
and later Aquinas, railed against Plato in terms of his categorical 
‘discourse of being’ (Ricoeur 2003:324–326). Through the use 
of metaphors for God, for example a lion, the multiplicity of 
beings shares in the unity of God (Ricoeur 2003:328). In doing 
so Ricoeur allows for the possibility of ontology in the present 
(Ricoeur 1994:298). In his later book, Oneself as Another (first 
published in 1990), Ricoeur draws from his earlier ideas on 
metaphoricity (Ricoeur 1994:299) and asserts that the idea of 
attestation ‘accounts for human action actually happening in the 
world’ … ‘on the very level of the mode of being of the self ’ 
(Ricoeur 1994:301). It is, therefore, important to reiterate that 
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attestation is a subjective response to the actual context in which 
the subject finds him- or herself.
Here it is useful to return to Schweitzer’s profoundly 
transforming experience on the barge of reverence of life. He 
writes that he had been attempting, unsuccessfully, to understand 
the modern world view for a prolonged period of time which 
had rendered him depleted and ‘disheartened’ (Schweitzer 
1955:184). Schweitzer writes evocatively that (Schweitzer 
1956a):
While in this mental condition I had to undertake a longish journey 
on the river … in September 1915 – when I was summoned to visit 
Madame Pelot, the ailing wife of a missionary, at N'Gômô, about 
160 miles upstream. The only means of conveyance I could find was 
a small steamer, towing an overladen barge … Except for myself, 
there were only natives on board, but among them was Emil 
Ogouma, my friend from Lambaréné. Since I had been in too much 
of a hurry to provide myself with enough food for the journey, they 
let me share the content of their cooking-pot. Slowly we crept 
upstream … Lost in thought I sat on the deck of the barge, struggling 
to find the elementary and the universal conception of the ethical 
which I had not discovered in any philosophy … Late on the third 
day, at the very moment when, at sunset, we were making our way 
through a herd of hippopotamuses, there flashed upon my mind, 
unforeseen and unsought, the phrase, ‘Reverence for Life’. The iron 
door had yielded: the path in the thicket had become visible. Now I 
had found my way to the idea in which world- and life-affirmation 
and ethics are contained side by side! Now I knew that the world-
view of ethical world- and life-affirmation, together with its ideals 
of civilization, is founded on thought. (p. 185)
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Whilst Schweitzer’s autobiography delineates his rootedness in 
Western culture and thought, he gives voice to an emerging 
critique of Enlightenment values and philosophy that externalise 
progress and concepts (Schweitzer 1955:201). His critique is 
based on a deep reading of the roots of modern thought, harking 
back to Socrates’ fundamental questioning of epistemology. It 
was, however, only in his retreat to the colonial outpost of 
Gabon that he was able to develop his critique of Western 
enlightenment thought, beginning in 1915 with his barge 
journey experience of reverence for life (Schweitzer 1956a:185). 
Schweitzer began writing his two-volume critique of Western 
civilisation in 1915, during his first visit to Gabon. It was 
interrupted by his incarceration as a war prisoner in 1917 in 
Garaison in France. He safeguarded his writings with Mr Ford, 
an American missionary friend in Gabon. His thoughts about 
the degradation of Western thought deepened during his 
imprisonment. After his return to Africa, he was able to resume 
his writings on the collapse of Western spiritual values. 
I therefore contend that the culturally liminal context of Africa 
is vital in understanding Schweitzer’s situatedness as an attesting 
subject (Schweitzer 1956a:193–204).
Schweitzer recounts in his autobiography, My life and thought, 
his first mystical experience of reverence for life whilst on the 
Ogooué River, sharing meals with his voyage companions and 
surrounded by the jungle (the plethora of wills to live). Via, 
I argue, an articulation process akin to Ricoeur’s concept of 
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attestation, Schweitzer raises his reflection on the processes of 
nature to the level of compassion, which he expresses as ethical 
world- and life-affirmation (Schweitzer 1956a).
There are resonances here with Ricoeur’s concept of ipse- 
identity, where identity draws the otherness that surrounds it 
into its own identity. The complex attesting identity speaks to 
the fluid immediacy of experience in combination with a more 
fixed sense of identity. Reflecting on Descartes’ Cogito, ergo sum, 
Schweitzer (Schweitzer 1955:186) concludes that such ‘thought 
is artificial and disconnected from human beings’ relation to 
themselves and to the universe. Schweitzer argues against 
Descartes in that ‘to think is to think something’ (Schweitzer 
1956a:186). Schweitzer asserts that (Schweitzer 1956a):
it is as will-to-live in the midst of other wills-to-live that man conceives 
himself [sic] during every moment that he spends in meditating on 
himself and the world around of. (p. 186)
The process of turning experience into a life-view overlaps with 
Ricoeur’s idea of attestation, which is a personal account of the 
reflection of life’s actual experience in its simultaneous fragility 
and assertiveness. To this end, Schweitzer observes in My life 
and thought (1956a):
The world-view of reverence for life follows from taking the world as 
it is. And the world means the horrible in the glorious, the meaningless 
in the full meaning, the sorrowful in the joyful. However it is looked at 
it remains to many a riddle … reverence for life brings us into a spiritual 
relation with the world which is independent of all knowledge of the 
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universe … In the disposition to reverence for life we possess a 
life-view founded on itself, in which there stands, firm and ready for us, 
the ethical world-view we are in search of. (p. 235)
Schweitzer’s thought after 1915
Schweitzer lived in Lambaréné for many years after 1915. By 
1949 he was 74 years old and his health had begun to deteriorate. 
He spent time recuperating in the Black Forest. In his later life 
he travelled between the United States, Europe and Africa. 
Schweitzer’s later writings call for a return to the humanitarianism 
that could rescue Western thought from the religious 
superstition of the Middle Ages and the humanism that was lost 
in the modern age when the ethics of humanism could not find 
purchase in the impulse towards scientific development. 
Schweitzer’s Nobel Peace Prize commemorative speech explains 
how scientific discoveries which harness nature’s power are 
soon put to the task of killing at a distance – separating the 
victor from the vanquished so that no lasting peace accord is 
necessary: the destruction of cities and large populations of 
people by war at a distance enable the view that wars are not 
ended due to violation of life, but rather that power alliances are 
maintained (Schweitzer 1954a:12). Schweitzer, along with his 
friend Albert Einstein, wrote to world leaders, including D.D. 
Eisenhower and J.F. Kennedy, to plead with them to desist from 
experimentations with atomic and hydrogen bombs and 
warning of the dangers of their use to resolve international 
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crises such as the Cuban nuclear crisis (AISL n.d.:n.p.). Schweitzer 
writes on the anniversary of his Nobel Prize acceptance that 
peace requires respect for the dignity of people’s lives, cultural 
and ancestral homes and the maintenance of the integrity of 
natural life. The significance of his concept of reverence for life 
becomes most apparent in his writing in favour of peace and 
against abusive world powers bent on oppression and world 
control (Schweitzer 1954a:9). Reverence for life becomes an 
ethical statement against imperialism and for compassion for all 
of life. Schweitzer follows his inwardly discovered 
humanitarianism and criticises the Lasting Peace proposed by 
Kant. Kant stipulated a peace maintained by international rules 
in his essay on ‘Perpetual peace’ (Schweitzer 1954a:17), such as 
in the framework for the League of Nations and the United 
Nations (Schweitzer 1954a:15). Schweitzer does not criticise 
the attempts to establish world peace by such organisations, but 
he calls for a change of heart amongst world leaders to consider 
the safety of the planet when deciding on global threatening 
weaponry. His approach to world peace is therefore based on a 
common recognition of the human spirit and a return to 
humanitarian values – the cornerstone of reverence for life 
(Schweitzer 1954a:15). I would propose that such globally 
inclusive thinking was significantly influenced by his African 
experiences, where he witnessed the devastation of colonialism 
and the dominance of Western values aimed at wealth 
accumulation (Schweitzer 1955:222–223).
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Reading Schweitzer at the hand of Ricoeur’s concept of 
attestation and the idem-ipse identity dynamic reveals that his 
unique concept of reverence for life derives from his life experience 
of studying European philosophy, culture and science, coupled 
with his first-hand experience of Africa. In intellectual studies he 
developed the groundwork for a critique of Western thought. It 
is significant that he only formulated that critique in the midst of 
a first-hand experience of Africa and the exploitative processes of 
colonisation (Schweitzer 1955:222–228). Attestation, therefore, 
must take into account the fluidity of the ipse-idem dynamic in 
actual interactions with other humans and nature wherein a fixed 
sense of self interacts with a more fluid sense of self, which 
incorporates the other into its identity. It is also noteworthy in 
his later writings that the persistence of racial prejudicial categories 
in his writing, ‘all men, even the half-civilised, even the savages 
…’ (Schweitzer 1954a:18), reveals the incomplete project of 
realising reverence for life his thinking.
In his later writings on peace and in opposition to atom bomb 
testing, Schweitzer can be seen to be culminating his life’s work 
to ‘search for the knowledge and convictions to which we must 
refer the will to civilization and the power to realize’ (Schweitzer 
1956a:176). His philosophy is, therefore, extreme in two regards: 
first, it calls for a radical shift in values from those externally-
based thought systems that are imposed on individuals towards 
those developed from the immediacy of experience of the 
individual and grounded in universal compassion and 
163
Chapter 5
humanitarian values. Second, Schweitzer’s philosophy emerges 
as a critique of Western thought, grounded in geographical 
regions distinct from the influence of dominant, materialistically 
fashioned philosophical narratives of the day. Indeed, Schweitzer 
argues for world peace based, not on abstract concepts, but 
rather on the shared immediate experience of the will to live.
In my view, Schweitzer was mostly successful in integrating 
his philosophy of reverence for life into his life’s work and 
writing. He left his hospital in Lambaréné as a legacy and his 
work was recognised by the Nobel Prize committee, who 
awarded him the Peace Prize in 1952. In entering into the global 
fight against nuclear testing he was able to translate his 
philosophy into global relevance, although still unable to 
expunge colonial perceptions of race.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that a close reading of Schweitzer’s 
biographical writings is critical to discerning the roots of his 
concept of reverence for life. Whilst framed in philosophical 
discourse, reverence for life is primarily a spiritual idea for 
Schweitzer (Schweitzer 1988:36). His approach is academic in 
that he sifts through traditions of ideas, seeking to set them in 
contextual frames of reference. Yet the sub-text in his writings is 
personal and spiritual in that he seeks to establish a truly ethical 
and spiritual relationship with the world (Feschotte 1955:130). 
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In this chapter, I have shown that this sub-text is clearly 
recognisable in his autobiographical writings. Crucially, I have 
proposed that Schweitzer’s autobiographical writings show the 
significance of the role his African experience had in formulating 
his concept of reverence for life, an idea which has not been fully 
appreciated to this point. I advocate that Africa afforded him 
distance from his European context and allowed him to reach the 
immediacy of experience he sought. The distance from 
Enlightenment culture also helped to deepen his criticism of 
Western thought and develop his profound compassion for all 
humanity, indeed all life. This intensified affection for life came 
to the fore in his later life in his public addresses on the threats to 
world peace. In spite of Schweitzer’s at times colonial mindset, 
which is justly criticised for its paternalism, his autobiographical 
writings detail the development of his thought and his African 
experience to offer unique and foundational insights into his 
central ideas, such as reverence for life.
Chapter 5: Summary
In this chapter, I demonstrate that Schweitzer’s autobiographical 
writings provide a crucial lens through which to view the 
formation of his elemental philosophy which forms the basis 
for his notion of reverence for life. I will also turn to his political-
ethical writings in the latter part of his life which focused on the 
anti-nuclear weapons campaign. Schweitzer’s ideas reached 
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their fruition when he left Europe. His departure for Africa was 
in part motivated by his dissatisfaction with the presentation of 
Enlightenment concepts in both cultural and religious spheres. 
He felt that this problematic view of civilisation would lead to a 
repression of otherness and to a large-scale disrespect for life 
which, in many ways, presaged World War 1. He left Europe 
for Africa in 1913 in order to get away from the dominant 
narratives that informed what he called ‘world views’ in Europe 
and to explore ways to make thought more meaningful to the 
individual and to lived experience. His autobiographical writing 
reveals that his first profound experience of reverence for life 
occurred on a barge sailing down the Ogooué River in Gabon. 
My chapter explores the integration of this experience into his 
philosophical and ethical writings.

Part 3





Although he wrote a number of books on the New Testament,44 
Albert Schweitzer is greatly remembered in New Testament studies 
44. Other books by Schweitzer on New Testament studies are The Mystery of the Kingdom 
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Interpreters, A Critical History (1912).
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for his 1906 publication, The Quest of the historical Jesus.45 Web searches 
on Albert Schweitzer and the New Testament therefore often 
produce results on the quest of the historical Jesus. As D. Hawkin 
(2011) has noted, it is this publication compared to others that has 
had a major impact in New Testament studies worldwide. In it, 
Schweitzer identified a ‘hermeneutical gap’ between the Jesus of the 
Gospels and the reconstructed Jesus of the 20th century, the time 
when Schweitzer published his book. Schweitzer would describe 
Jesus as ‘a stranger to our time’. He dealt with the subject that had 
preoccupied scholars of his and preceding generations. Living in a 
world dominated by rationalism, these scholars attempted to 
reconstruct the Jesus of history noting that the Jesus of faith seems 
to have been dressed differently from the historical Jesus. Schweitzer 
paid attention to the works of Herman Samuel Reimarus, David 
Friedrich Strauss and Johannes Weiss before he attempted his own 
reconstruction of the historical Jesus. From the works produced 
before him, Schweitzer concluded that the task was a failure. He 
stressed (Schweitzer 1954):
… each successive epoch of theology found its own thoughts in Jesus; that 
was, indeed, the only way in which it could make Him live. But it was not 
only each epoch that found its reflection in Jesus; each individual created 
Him in accordance with his own character. There is no historical task 
which so reveals a man’s true self as the writing of a Life of Jesus. No vital 
force comes into the figure unless a man breathes into it all the hate or all 
the love of which he is capable. The stronger the love, or the stronger the 
hate, the more life-like is the figure which is produced. They were eager 
45. So popular is the book that Dawes (1999:186) makes the following explanation when 
presenting the theology of Schweitzer, ‘The reader may be surprised that the following 
extract does not come from Schweitzer’s most famous work’, The Quest of the Historical Jesus.
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to picture Him as truly and purely human, to strip from Him the robes of 
splendour with which He had been apparelled, and clothe Him once more 
with the coarse garments in which He had walked in Galilee. (p. 5)
Through this publication, Schweitzer raised a number of 
issues that would prove very important for New Testament 
interpretation. We can make three important observations from 
the issues that he raised. First, is the existence of the hermeneutical 
gap between the time of Jesus and the times of the modern readers 
and users of the Bible. Second, but related to the first, is the 
observation that in trying to reconstruct the historical Jesus, 
scholars wrote their own stories.46 Third, with his observations 
and arguments, Schweitzer proved that rationalism’s objective of 
trying to present an objective picture of Jesus and early Christianity 
was impossible, thereby opening new ways of interpreting the 
life of Jesus. This observation led to the end of liberal theology. 
As a result, Hawkin (2011) is correct that Schweitzer’s The Quest 
of the Historical Jesus opened up new, creative possibilities for the 
interpretation of the New Testament. In this chapter, I pay 
particular attention to Schweitzer’s influence on New Testament 
interpretation in light of the first observation that there is a 
hermeneutical gap between the time of Jesus and the contemporary 
times. Closing the hermeneutical gap that Schweitzer identified 
has methodological and/or hermeneutical implications. 
Schweitzer’s generation did their scholarship with limited 
46. As recent as 1992, an Australian scholar (Thiering) argued that Jesus was married 
twice and fathered three children. Interestingly, Thiering herself was married twice and 
had three children, experiences that probably influenced her reconstruction of Jesus’ life.
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methodologies. Today, the study of Jesus and the New Testament 
in general is guided by several methodologies. I argue that 
Schweitzer made a contribution in opening up several 
methodologies for studying the New Testament and the Bible in 
general. As D. Hawkin (2011) correctly notes:
… although the full flowering of Biblical methodology is relatively 
recent, the seeds for such flowering were sown over a century ago by a 
man whose own study of the New Testament was quite limited in terms 
of method. That man was Albert Schweitzer. (p. 303)
This is because almost all biblical methodologies attempt to 
close the hermeneutical gap originally articulated by Schweitzer. 
All methodologies attempt to show what the present Christian 
communities can learn from Jesus and the early Christian 
community. Amongst these many methodologies is African 
Biblical Interpretation (ABI ). The birth of this method can be 
traced back to the past 30 to 40 years (Holter 2000; Ukpong 
2000; West 2000). Some prefer to call it African Biblical 
Hermeneutics (ABH ).47 I am not interested here in the 
appropriateness, or not, of each rendering but in how the 
practitioners of this methodology, whatever name they give it, 
deal with the observations made by Albert Schweitzer in his 
original 1906 publication, The Quest of the historical Jesus.
Specifically, the paper attempts to answer the question: How 
does ABI address the hermeneutical gap and to what extent is its 
practice a legacy of Schweitzer? It is in answering this question 
47. For example, Nyiawung (2013).
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that we can identify the legacies of Albert Schweitzer in African 
Biblical Interpretation. To answer this question, I divide the 
paper into four sections. In the first section I discuss biblical 
interpretation in general and how it deals with the hermeneutical 
gap to direct Christian practice. What role should biblical 
interpretation have in directing Christian practice? Schweitzer 
provides us with the right lenses for discussing biblical 
interpretation and Christian practice in his identification of the 
hermeneutical gap. In the second section, I discuss how Schweitzer 
himself addressed the hermeneutical gap. Having established 
Schweitzer’s position, I will then move on to discuss how ABI has 
addressed the same gap for Christian practice and to what extent 
the practice compares with Schweitzer’s approach. I do this in 
sections three and four. Section three defines and provides a brief 
history of ABI, whilst section four then considers how ABI 
addresses the hermeneutical gap, in the process identifying 
Schweitzer’s legacy in African Biblical Interpretation.
Biblical interpretation and the hermeneutical 
gap
The Bible remains the foundation document of the Christian 
church, having a great influence in its beliefs and practices. 
However, for the church to appropriate the message of the 
Bible, there is need to interpret its message because the modern 
users of the Bible are separated from the original audience of 
the biblical texts by a vast time, cultural, linguistic, historical 
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and even theological gap. D. Morgan and J. Barton (1988:1) 
define interpretation as, ‘an intermediary task performed by 
rational human beings to make human communication possible 
in difficult cases’. They (Morgan & Barton 1988:2) go further to 
note that interpretation is often reserved for difficult cases of 
communication where some form of intermediary activity is 
necessary. The hermeneutical gap identified by Albert 
Schweitzer in the case of the historical Jesus indeed makes 
communication of the message of Jesus today difficult and 
therefore calls for an intermediary. This is true of all the 
messages of the Bible as it contains written texts from the distant 
past. The cultural, historical and linguistic gap between biblical 
time and contemporary times makes the risks of misunderstanding 
even greater. We do not need to overemphasise the fact that 
there have been extensive cultural changes (in language, custom, 
social organisation, education, patterns of family relationships, 
music, art, enter tainment) since the times of Jesus, let alone of 
Abraham and other OT characters.
Biblical interpretation, therefore, seeks to close this gap. This 
is done in different ways. Morgan and Barton (1988:6) mention 
one such approach when they say, ‘For written texts, interpreters 
seek authorial intention’. This is an approach that dominated 
biblical interpretation from the period of the Enlightenment 
until the late 1960s, early 1970s.48 It is an approach that was 
48. Seeds of change had, however, begun to be sown in the 1940s with the advent of New 
Criticism (Randolph Tate 2008:2).
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influenced by the rationalist spirit of the day, a spirit that 
influenced Albert Schweitzer’s predecessors and contemporaries. 
As Morgan and Barton (1988:9) continue to say, the aim of 
biblical interpretation then was ‘to understand and write 
history’. The historian was to set the human record contained 
in the scriptures straight, accurately, illuminately and objectively. 
With the prominence of the historical critical method, biblical 
interpretation actually endeavoured to write history, and it can 
be argued that no attempt was made to close the hermeneutical 
gap. This will become more apparent when we consider the 
work of Albert Schweitzer below.
The interpretation of the Bible to seek authorial intent was 
emphasised by the global north (European and North American 
biblical scholarship). For this scholarship, the task of a biblical 
scholar was simply to say what the Bible means with the task of 
deciding how to use the Bible today (closing the hermeneutical 
gap) left to the theologian. Biblical scholarship was to be guided 
by non-religious aims but by historical reconstruction and 
literary appreciation. It was underlined that all this was to be 
done objectively. Thus, Maretha M. Jacobs (1999) speaks of 
New Testament scholars (and this is true of biblical scholars in 
general) saying their work would probably seldom have endings 
or, if they happen to have endings, they have ‘open’ endings. 
She says;
New Testament scholars, especially those with an historical approach, 
usually do not spell out the theological implications of what they do, say 
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and suggest. It is left to those who read and hear what they have to say 
to make sense of the results of their research. The most obvious reason 
for this is that New Testament scholars do not regard it as part of their 
job to spell out the implications of their work. Much of the work done 
in the field does not lend itself to this. Their work is, more-over, of 
such a nature and so specialized that it is hardly of any relevance to 
people outside the field. To spell out the implications of their work, 
some would add, is not only not part of their job, but would also be a 
violation of the boundaries of historical research. (p. 103)
This approach surely left the hermeneutical gap unclosed by the 
work of biblical scholars. It is for this reason that for almost two 
centuries there was warfare between traditional Christianity and 
modern Western rationalism that influenced biblical interpretation 
(Morgan & Barton 1988:21). Schweitzer would call for a different 
approach, a call which was, however, heeded later.
Schweitzer and the hermeneutical gap
Schweitzer was the first NT (biblical) scholar to challenge the claim 
for objectivity in biblical interpretation. He observed this in the 
project of the quest of the historical Jesus when he concluded that 
each writer was producing a Jesus after their own image. He 
therefore noted that although the aim of biblical interpretation (in 
his case, the reconstruction of the historical Jesus) is to do so 
objectively, the subjectivity of the historian is operative in various 
ways. Having observed this, Schweitzer’s interpretation of the Bible 
mainly aimed to close the hermeneutical gap. As Dawes (1999:204) 
says, Schweitzer opened the door to a contemporary reappropriation 
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of the message of Jesus by distinguishing between Jesus’ ‘religion of 
love’ and the ‘world view’ in which that message was expressed. In 
interpreting the message of Jesus, Schweitzer argued that the 
obligation of modern believers is to separate that message from 
the world view in which it is clothed, so that they can reclothe it 
in the garb of modern ideas. Schweitzer actually called for a 
paradigm shift in the way biblical interpretation was done by his 
contemporaries. He insisted, ‘we now need to boldly admit that 
religious truth varies from age to age, at least with regard to its 
outward form’ (Dawes 1999:204). The question Schweitzer wanted 
to address was what the eschatological Jesus, who lives expecting 
the end of the world and a supernatural kingdom of God, can be to 
us (Dawes 1999:205). He, ‘sought to restore the otherness of the 
Jesus of the Gospels, to distinguish sharply between Jesus’ first-
century Jewish context and that of nineteenth-century German 
theology’ (Gathercole 2000:266). It can therefore be argued that 
Schweitzer’s interpretation sought to close the hermeneutical gap 
by interpreting the first century message of Jesus for 20th century 
Germany. He felt that the regeneration of the German people could 
not take place on the basis of historical error: that would merely 
result in violence to both religion and history.
Schweitzer also made another important argument that 
should guide biblical interpretation for the closure of the 
hermeneutical gap. He said the ideal thing would be that Jesus 
should have preached religious truth in a form independent of 
any connection with any particular period (Dawes 1999:207). 
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This way, succeeding generations would simply take over and 
easily apply the message. But Jesus did not do that. How then 
should we use his message today? Schweitzer’s solution, as we 
have already noted, was that we therefore need to reclothe the 
message dressed in a particular world view so that it fits into 
our modern world view.
He said (Dawes 1999):
We of today not, like those who were able to hear the preaching of 
Jesus, expect to see a kingdom of God realizing itself in natural events. 
Our conviction is that it can only come into existence by the power of 
the spirit of Jesus working in our hearts and in the world. (p. 207) 
Schweitzer then continued to identify love as the hallmark of 
Jesus’ teaching. According to him, Jesus’ moral authority resided 
in the quality of his teaching and religious personality rather 
than in the unacceptable orthodox suggestion that he was God 
incarnate (MacGrath 2001:387). Thus Hawkin (2011:301) 
describes Schweitzer as a devout Christian with a passionate 
allegiance to Jesus. He proceeds to describe Schweitzer as follows 
(Hawkin 2011):
He also believed that the will was primary. That is, his faith was voluntaristic. 
This explains why, when he could have had a career in academia, he chose 
to go to Lambaréné in Gabon to establish a hospital there. He thought that 
Christians were called to transform the world – which was essentially 
hostile – into a world where love prevailed. For Schweitzer, a metaphysical 
agnostic who, in the tradition of Kant, saw religion primarily in terms of 
ethics and the will, Jesus was a great heroic figure who gave complete 
expression to what it meant to be religious. (p. 301)
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Schweitzer’s dealing with the hermeneutical gap called for a 
distinction between exegesis and hermeneutics.49 Thus, after 
Schweitzer, exegesis, the drawing out of the meaning of Biblical 
texts, is seen more clearly as a branch of the history of ideas. 
Hawkin (2011) elucidates on this and it is important to quote 
him at length:
Exegesis itself cannot adequately bridge the gap between then and now. It can 
contextualize the message of Jesus and thus we can recapture what it 
meant for the people of the time. But to bring that meaning into the present 
requires more than exegesis. It requires hermeneutical creativity. That 
is, we must transpose the message of Jesus into categories that are 
meaningful to the present. Before Schweitzer it was assumed that 
exegesis was hermeneutics. It was assumed that once we had recovered 
the original meaning of the Biblical text its message would have a clear 
meaning for us. But Schweitzer showed that the world which Jesus 
inhabited was not like our world, and Jesus’ apocalyptic message was 
not readily appropriated by people in the modern world. In so doing 
Schweitzer set Biblical studies on a new course, one in which, in the 
famous designation of Krister Stendahl, it was acknowledged that what 
a text meant should be distinguished from what it means. (p. 301)
Thus, guided by this methodology, Schweitzer interpreted the 
original context of Jesus’ message as apocalyptic eschatology. But 
from this message he drew meaning for his age in what he called, 
‘a will to will understanding of Jesus’ (Weaver 1999:41). Explaining 
the ‘will to will understanding of Jesus’, Weaver (1999:41) says, 
‘There was, for Schweitzer, a kind of automatic translation of 
Jesus’ word to us, a bridging of the hermeneutical gap that seems 
49. This distinction is discussed at length by, for example, Randolph Tate (2008:1–4).
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to occur somewhat mystically’. Thus, for Schweitzer, the 
hermeneutical gap between Jesus and us can only be closed 
through our ethics. He would therefore consider Christianity as a 
fellowship of all those humans whose wills are united to the will 
of Jesus. Using contemporary academic parlance, Schweitzer can 
be described as a socially engaged New Testament (biblical) 
scholar.50 I see continuity between Schweitzer’s dealings with the 
hermeneutical gap and African biblical interpretation, as I discuss 
further below. But first, a word on ABI and its history.
Defining and historicising ABI
Although the history of ABI has received considerable attention 
by scholars (Nyiawung 2013; Ukpong 2000; Van Eck 2006), it 
still needs to continue being told. This history should be 
understood in the light of global reactions to the historical 
critical method dominated by white middle class biblical 
scholars, especially from the West. In critique of this approach, 
C.B. Anderson (2009) writes:
Now, however, there is a sense that the few cannot arrogate to 
themselves the power to speak for all of humanity – and for God. The 
particularity of one small segment of humanity – the privileged white, 
Western, heterosexual male – can no longer masquerade as representing 
the diversity and fullness of God’s creation. Through the tidal wave of 
50. Socially engaged scholarship entails scholarship that makes the scholar an activist. 
J. L. Cox (2005:23) describes it as the way a religious (in this case, biblical) scholar relates 




publications for ‘the Other’ – those who are different by virtue of race/
ethnicity, gender identity, sexual orientation, religion, and hemisphere – 
God is indeed ‘troubling the waters’. (p. 28)
In the above citation, Anderson speaks for all the formerly 
marginalised groups and methodologies. In the case of ABI, that 
history goes back to the 1970s when, following the independence 
of many African states, an attempt was made to read the Bible 
for the African context. Although many of the African biblical 
scholars had been trained in the West and specialised  in teaching 
the Western biblical interpretation, these scholars began 
realising the emptiness of their teaching and research as long as 
it did not speak to the context of their people. It was clear to 
them that the hermeneutical gap remained glaring. From an 
African point of view, ‘traditional’ exegetical approaches have 
seemed abstract because they do not appear to address the 
African people in their very context (Nyiawung 2013:2).
Globally, ABI falls within the 1990s attempt to debate issues 
of culture, power and identity in biblical interpretation. R. S. 
Sugirtharajah’s edited volume, Voices from the Margin: Interpreting 
the Bible in the Third World (1991) is one amongst many 
publications that introduced ‘other ways of reading the Bible’51 
amongst which African Biblical Interpretation falls. A number 
of African biblical scholars contributed articles in this volume. 
All these publications emphasised  social location as a major 
51. Other ways of reading: African women and the Bible is a title of a book edited by 
Musa W. Dube (2001). 
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factor in biblical interpretation. As Barton and Morgan (1988:9) 
said, '[b]ut interpreters are never mindless servants of the text … 
They are human agents with their own aims, interests and rights’. 
In the same vein, Carey (2013:4) states these observations and 
developments, ‘set the path for an outburst of publications related 
to global, liberationist, postcolonial, minority, feminist, womanist 
and queer interpretation that has continued for decades’.
ABI should also be understood in the light of ideological 
decolonisation in all academic disciplines in Africa. For long, 
due to the effects of colonisation, knowledge has been defined 
by the West. Thus E. Chitando (n.d.) says:
… almost all disciplines in universities have been dominated by 
ideologies, perspectives, interests and approaches from the global 
North. What has been deemed ‘standard scholarship’ has invariably 
consisted of rehashing formulae developed in western contexts. 
African scholars (and other scholars in the global South) in 
various disciplines, including literature, history, philosophy and 
others, have challenged this hegemony of western scholars in 
academia. (n.p.)
The same has happened with ABI. It has questioned the hegemony 
of the historical critical method in biblical interpretation. But how 
has it dealt with the hermeneutical gap?
ABI and the hermeneutical gap
Although it came several decades after Schweitzer’s observation of 
the subjectivity of biblical interpretation and therefore the need for 
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contextual relevance, ABI in its dealing with the hermeneutical gap 
follows in the footsteps of Albert Schweitzer. ABI is typically 
contextual, taking seriously the acceptance of Christianity in Africa. 
ABI therefore focuses on the context of the audience, making use of 
the results from other methods of exegesis and applying them to 
the realities of the African context (Nyiawung & Van Eck 2013 3). 
Like Schweitzer, African scholars have grappled with an African 
response to the question of Jesus’ identity: ‘Who do you say I am’ 
(Lk 9:20) (Appiah-Kubi 1997; Nyiawung 2010; Stinton 2004).
ABI takes seriously the post-structuralist argument that the 
reader is the king. It rejects the view that the meaning of a text 
is centred on the figure of the author and therefore the need to 
interpret texts in terms of authorial circumstance and intention. 
It also rejects the 1920s and 1930s ‘New Criticism’ in which 
authorial intention was bracketed as unknowable, and the text 
seen as the only source of meaning (Longhurst 2008:745). ABI, 
as also understood by Schweitzer, proposes that the message of 
the Bible has to be interpreted for application in contemporary 
communities. In this process, world views become very 
important. Indeed, hermeneutics concerns world views (Van 
Eck 2006:692). As Du Toit (1998:378) says, ‘The way we try to 
find meaning in our lives, it concerns our understanding of 
God, our relationships with other humans, it concerns our 
present difficulties and challenges’. ABI thus takes the context 
of the African into account in its interpretation of the 
Bible. Jesus, for example, has been understood as ancestor 
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(Kabasele 1997:116), king (Pobee 1979:95), brother (Kabasele 
1997b:116) or friend (Stinton 2004:188).
The ABI Jesus is sufficiently connected to Christian faith and 
practice, hence the emphasis on closing the hermeneutical gap in 
biblical interpretation. The interest of scholars involved in African 
biblical studies has been that of contextualisation, characterised by 
the awareness of the need to relate the results of biblical findings to 
issues of politics, economy, social justice and the environmental 
concerns of the African society. Other challenges that Africa faces, 
such as HIV and AIDS, poverty, ethnic conflicts, gender-based 
violence have been subjects of biblical interpretation. ABI is, 
therefore, socially engaged scholarship. Like Schweitzer, who 
interpreted Jesus for the transformation of the Germany society of 
the 20th century, ABI’s approach aims to explain how Jesus is, and 
can be, involved in the process of the transformation of Africa; 
‘transforming the meaning of Africa as a “dark continent” to a new 
Africa which has become an important and unavoidable source for 
theological reflection in the world’ (Nyiawung 2013:9).
African biblical scholars interpret the Bible in contexts where 
the Bible has social and religious authority over many people. 
Their interpretation therefore often affects the actual lived 
experiences of their people. ABI scholars therefore do not have 
the luxury of doing scholarship just for its  sake. They interpret 
the text in contexts where people are hungry and need food, 
where people are ill and need healing, where people are thirsty 
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and need a drink, etc. Thus, in filling the hermeneutical gap, 
they have had to interpret the Bible with these realities in mind. 
L. Alonso Schockel (cited by Sugitharajah 1991) succinctly 
captures the idea that drives ABI scholarship:
People ask us for bread and we offer them a handful of theories about 
each verse of John 6. They ask questions about God and we offer them 
three theories about the literary form of one Psalm. They thirst for 
justice and we offer the discussions about the root word sedaqa (justice 
in Hebrew). I am examining my conscience out loud, and the reply I 
hear is: the one must be done without neglecting the other. (p. 7)
ABI is therefore guided by the agendas of both the scholars and 
their envisaged reading communities. This is the reality experienced 
by African scholars of the Bible. They live in contexts of poverty, 
disease, conflict, injustice and so on. It is only natural then that their 
work, if it is to be relevant, has to address these issues. Like 
Schweitzer, most scholars of ABI are Christians and therefore they 
are socially engaged scholars. No wonder the works of African 
biblical scholars such as Gerald West of the University of KwaZulu-
Natal, Musa Dube of the University of Botswana, Madipoane 
Masenya (ngwan’a Mphahlele) of the University of South Africa, 
David Tuesday Adamo of the Delta State University in Nigeria, just 
to mention a few, have engaged biblical interpretation to address 
the struggles of their people. ABI scholars do not, therefore, 
experience the struggle of which scholars such as G. Fee and D. 
Stuart (2003) had in mind:
who struggle between the concern of the scholar with what the text 
meant ; and the concern of the layperson with what it means. Most of 
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them write from the point of view of the believing scholar who insists 
that we must have both. (n.p.)
This engaged scholarship, however, is not new in the history of 
biblical interpretation. It is a foundation that Schweitzer had laid 
and as M.A. Tolbert (2013) observes:
even the positivist historical critics of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries were often deeply motivated by the desire to reform 
contemporary faith and practice by revealing the pure moment of 
revelation in the historical Jesus. (p. 25)
Perhaps the difference with ABI is that it does not hide behind the 
search for objectivity as it clearly declares its interests and objectives. 
Schweitzer and other historical Jesus questers dealt with the problem 
of Jesus and the Kingdom of God. Is the kingdom present or future? 
This is a topic that scholars like R. Bultmann also addressed. ABI 
seems to lean towards the view that the Kingdom of God is realisable 
here and now through acts of love and charity, a position that 
Schweitzer advocated for both in his writings and in his life and 
work. It can therefore be concluded that ABI follows in the footsteps 
of Schweitzer in its interpretation of the New Testament and indeed 
the whole Bible. Thanks to Albert Schweitzer’s questioning of 
objectivity in biblical interpretation, ABI rightfully claims a place in 
the discipline of biblical methodology today.
Conclusion
ABI, and indeed other ways of reading the Bible, has been 
accused of lacking objectivity as they clearly declare the 
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agendas of the interpreters of biblical texts. This paper has 
shown that the work of Albert Schweitzer on the quest of 
the historical Jesus shows that, in trying to close the 
hermeneutical gap, we cannot avoid putting in our agendas. 
Biblical interpretation is meant to illuminate the texts of the 
Bible for their meaning, understanding and use by the 
interpreters and their communities. Thus Tolbert (2013) 
asks the questions:
want to avoid mentioning the commitments and passions that they, for 
the most part, know motivates their writing of biblical interpretations? 
Why is having an ‘agenda’, which we all have, or partial vision, which 
is simply part of our human condition, seen as a detriment to the 
acceptance of our writings as biblical scholars? (p. 26)
This chapter has shown that Schweitzer’s legacy of bringing Jesus 
to the contemporary believing communities lives within ABI.
Chapter 6: Summary
Albert Schweitzer is well known in New Testament studies 
for his quest for the historical Jesus. This quest led him to the 
identification of a ‘hermeneutical gap’ between the Jesus of the 
Gospels and the Jesus of our own times. Schweitzer would 
describe Jesus as ‘a stranger to our time’. This conclusion had 
serious implications for biblical hermeneutics: how do we 
relate what the Gospels say about Jesus to our practice of 
Christianity today? This is the question that Schweitzer posed 
to biblical interpretation. Whereas David J. Hawkin has looked 
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at the implications of Schweitzer’s work on liberation theology 
and the practice of African Christianity, his work’s implications 
for African academic biblical interpretation calls for attention. 
This paper attempts this. It considers how African biblical 
scholars have dealt with the ‘hermeneutical gap’ in the 
interpretation of the Bible for Christian practice in Africa. 
The paper concludes that African Biblical Interpretation 
follows closely in the footsteps of Schweitzer in the way it 
addresses the hermeneutical gap.
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I have never found another human being, in whom goodness and the 
longing for beauty is so ideally united than in Albert Schweitzer.
- Albert Einstein
Couldn’t theology be a luxurious undertaking, couldn’t we be with it 
fleeing from the living God? Couldn’t such a problematic theologian as 
Albert Schweitzer have chosen the better part by attempting to heal 
wounds, feed the hungry, give water to the thirsty, providing a home to 
parentless children?52
- Karl Barth
52. The German text from Barth’s Basler Abschiedsvorlesung is as follows: ‘Könnte 
Theologie nicht eine Luxusbeschäftigung, können wir mit ihr nicht auf der Flucht vor dem 
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Jesus wanted freedom and true humanity for the whole world.
- Albert Schweitzer
Introduction
In 1906 Schweitzer published the first edition of his classic 
book The quest for the historical Jesus. This book has been 
reprinted many times (the latest English edition in 2001). 
The voluminous book of about 600 pages reports on 19th 
century historical Jesus research and is regarded in New 
Testament scholarship as almost a canon with certain 
passages frequently quoted. However, one wonders how 
many NT scholars have really read the book, as the same 
quotations appear again and again in the literature. In this 
contribution, I want to address some issues which I regard as 
misunderstandings of Schweitzer, or even by Schweitzer 
(footnote 52 Continues...)
lebendigen Gott begriffen sein? Könnte ein so problematischer Theologe wie Albert Schweitzer 
nicht ... das bessere Teil erwählt haben, und mit ihn die ersten Besten, die da und dort ohne 
alle theologische Besinnung versucht haben, Wunden zu heilen, Hungrige zu speisen, Durstige 
zu tränken, elternlosen Kindern die Heimat zu bereiten?’ (quoted in Grässer 1979:6). The 
significance of these remarks by Barth in later life is highlighted by what he wrote to 
his friend Eduard Thurneysen in the 1920’s: ‘Vor 8 Tagen habe ich unsern Zeitgenossen 
Albert Schweitzer hier in meinem Studierzimmer und in seinem Lambarenevortrag erlebt. Ich 
teilte ihm freundlich mit, das sei‚ saftige Werkgerechtigkeit, und er sei ein Mensch des 18. 
Jahrhunderts, und im Übrigen unterhielten und verständigten wir uns dann sehr gut. Es hat 
keinen Sinn, mit ihm zanken zu wollen. Er sieht auch sich selber relativ wie alles und alle, 
und dass man mitleidig sein soll, ist ja sicher wahr und auch für uns immer wieder zu 
bedenken. Ich muss ins Kolleg. Ich rede heute über die Schädlichkeit zeitloser Wahrheiten’ 
(quoted in Grässer 1979:5). To this accusation Schweitzer replied: ‘Wenn ich es als 
meine Lebensaufgabe betrachte, die Sache der Kranken unter fernen Sternen zu verfechten, 




himself, about the Jesus scholars he writes about. They 
pertain to the following:
Firstly, the misunderstanding that Schweitzer through his 
research history brought historical Jesus studies to a close for at 
least 50 years, because he had shown it to be impossible.
Secondly, the misunderstanding that Schweitzer has proven 
through his study that all historical Jesus research is invalid 
because every researcher only reads his own image of Jesus into 
his construction of the latter.
Thirdly, the uncritical assumption amongst many scholars 
that Schweitzer was correct in his analysis and evaluation of the 
18th, 19th, and early 20th century scholars which he discussed.
Fourthly, going along with the first misconception, the 
assumption that Schweitzer had no construction of the historical 
Jesus of his own, or that the one he had was beyond criticism.
Fifthly, that Schweitzer, with his doctoral dissertation in 
medicine, has shown that any psychological understanding of 
Jesus or the Bible should be abandoned.
Sixthly, that the historical Jesus is confined or locked up in 
the first century and has no meaning for today.
In the most recent biography on Schweitzer, Oermann 
(2013:9–12) contends that the admiration which Schweitzer 
has received up to now has caused that biographies tend not to 
be critical of him. His work on the historical Jesus is therefore 
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hardly criticised, because that would be unfair to a man who 
devoted his life to being a doctor in Lambarene. According to 
Oermann, the time has come to give a more balanced view on 
Schweitzer in which even some shortcomings may be 
considered. This I will do with regard to his work on the 
historical Jesus. However, this in no way takes away my 
profound appreciation for his work on Jesus and his following 
of the latter. For Schweitzer, his life circled around Jesus of 
Nazareth, and to my mind, he himself earned the respect of the 
world because he had the courage not only to interpret the 
challenging message of Jesus in the latter’s own world, but in 
an equivalent manner in the 20th century. Thereby he has 
revealed two things: firstly, that our world is in need of Jesus of 
Nazareth and his message, stripped of church dogma, and 
secondly, that one cannot have a high regard for Schweitzer 
without having a regard for the historical Jesus. The two go 
hand in hand.
Therefore, although dealing with misconceptions, my aim is 
to portray the Jesus image which Schweitzer had as positively as 
possible. I will therefore, as far as possible, formulate ‘positive 
headings’ in what follows.
On the (im)possibility of Jesus research
In his influential book on the historical Jesus, Gunther 
Bornkamm (1975) wrote the following dramatic words in 1956:
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Nobody is in the position anymore to write a life of Jesus. This is the 
uncontended and surprising result of a search which for almost 200 
years applied an extraordinary and in no way fruitless labour to recover 
and reconstruct the life of the historical Jesus, liberated from all paint 
over by dogma and doctrine. At the end of this quest for the historical 
Jesus stands the recognition of its own failure. Albert Schweitzer in his 
classic work, The quest of the historical Jesus ([1906] 2001), erected a 
monument for this quest, but also delivered the funeral oration. (p. 11)
This view of Bornkamm that Schweitzer, through his research 
history, brought historical Jesus studies to a halt for at least 50 
years because he has shown it to be impossible, is to my mind a 
misunderstanding, entertained by many NT scholars, especially 
in Germany. It is probably based on some statements which 
Schweitzer made which, if read out of context, may lead to such 
a conclusion. For instance, in the last chapter of his classic book 
([1906] 2001:478) he begins with the following statement: 
‘There is nothing more negative than the result of the critical 
study of the historical Jesus’.
Schweitzer furthermore continues with the following often 
quoted remark, especially by NT scholars who would not want 
to take the trouble to study the historical Jesus (maybe because 
of the latter’s challenging consequences), or because they are 
satisfied with the ‘biblical Christ’ as spelt out by Martin Kähler 
(1964). According to Schweitzer ([1906] 2001):
The study of the Life of Jesus … set out in quest for the historical Jesus, 
believing that when it had found him it could bring him straight to our 
time as a teacher and a saviour. It loosened the bands by which for 
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centuries he had been riveted to the stony rocks of ecclesiastical 
doctrine, and rejoiced to see life and movement coming into the figure 
once more … But he did not stay; he passed by our time and returned to 
his own. What surprised and dismayed the theology of the last forty 
years was that, despite all forced and arbitrary interpretations, it could 
not keep him in our time, but had to let him go. (p. 478–479)
The above statement already suggests that Schweitzer did not 
discredit the study of the historical Jesus per se, but a certain 
kind of study. This becomes clearer if another, seemingly more 
radical, statement is considered ([1906] 2001):
The Jesus of Nazareth who came forward publicly as the Messiah, who 
preached the ethic of the kingdom of God, who founded the kingdom 
of heaven upon the earth, and died to give his work its final consecration, 
never existed. He is a figure designed by rationalism, endowed with life 
by liberalism, and clothed by modern [read late 19th century-EHS] 
theology in a historical garb. (p. 478)
Here and elsewhere it becomes clear that Schweitzer wants to 
oppose 19th century liberal theology (as represented by, amongst 
others, his own teacher H.J. Holtzmann (1863), who wanted to 
domesticate Jesus for the needs of contemporary culture (Theissen 
& Merz 2011:24). By applying his ethic within our political systems 
the world will naturally be improved and the kingdom of God 
will gradually be established here on earth. Schweitzer does not 
deny the positive ideals of this theology, but defends the real Jesus 
of history who, in accordance with contemporary Jewish 
apocalyptic views, denied the continued existence of this world, 
expecting the radical intervention of God to end everything and 
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then establishing the kingdom of God (Mk 9:1; Mt 10:32). 
According to him, we must be true to history and not change 
history for our own sake.
Furthermore, that Schweitzer made his own construction of 
the historical Jesus already in 1901 (Schweitzer [1901] 1929) 
testifies to the fact that he did not believe that every search or 
construction is impossible or invalid. Those scholars who indeed 
made such an interpretation, especially in Germany, indeed 
refrained from such study and some of them still do today, falsely 
thinking that they are following Schweitzer. But even so studies 
did appear in the first half of the 20th century (e.g. Bultmann 
1926; Burney 1926; Manson 1934, 1937). In the second edition of 
his book, which he wrote whilst studying medicine, he reported 
on studies appearing from 1907 to 1912. In 1913 he went to 
Lambarene and worked on his book on the mysticism of Paul, 
which appeared in 1930 (by many regarded as his best book). 
Although he wrote a third forward to the 1950 edition of his Jesus 
book, he did not change much. Being occupied by his work as a 
doctor and the demands of his other studies on cultural philosophy 
and world religions, he remarked that he left it to others to write 
the Leben Jesu Forschung of the 20th century. Such a study (of the 
so-called 50 lost years) was undertaken by Weaver (1999). 
Theissen and Merz (2011:22–29), is therefore correct in 
distinguishing between five phases of the Leben Jesu Forschung 
instead of the traditional three (first, new and third quests).
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As will be seen from other statements made by Schweitzer 
regarding the historical Jesus (side references in other works), it 
is clear that the historical Jesus (even after his research history) 
not only played a prominent role in his thinking and doing but, 
in fact, it played the central role.
Positive appropriation by the researcher or 
negatively creating Jesus in the own image
In stating the problem of Jesus research Schweitzer made the 
following remark ([1906] 2001):
But it was not only each epoch that found its reflection in Jesus; each 
individual created Jesus in accordance with his own character. There is 
no historical task which so reveals a man’s true self as the writing of a 
life of Jesus. No vital force comes into the figure unless a man breathes 
into it all the hate or all the love of which he is capable. The stronger 
the love, or the stronger the hate, the more lifelike is the figure which 
is produced. (p. 6)
Probably, this statement of Schweitzer, taken on its own, led to 
the misconception that Schweitzer had proven through his 
study that all historical Jesus research is dubious and invalid 
because every researcher only reads his own image of Jesus into 
his construction. No wonder that the notion of the end, or 
Scheitern [failure] of Jesus research, was often put forward.
Again, Schweitzer never meant this. He merely underscores 
the fact that, in the research of anything or any aspect of history, 
there is no pure objectivity. And this should be especially kept 
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in mind when studying the historical Jesus, because of the 
special place he may occupy in the researcher’s life. This reminds 
one of Renan’s observation (1863) that, apart from the fact that 
the author should best reside in Palestine when writing his life 
of Jesus (as he was), a study of the historical Jesus is best made 
by a Christian who has lost his ‘absolute’ faith. Losing that faith, 
according to Renan, allows for more objectivity, and having 
been a believer allows for being able to understand Christianity 
from the inside ([1863] 1991:26).
Again, Schweitzer made his statement in order to expose the 
subjective liberal Jesus research of his day in which the historical 
first century Jesus is domesticated and accommodated to serve 
the needs of European culture at the turn of the previous 
century. Schweitzer never claimed that all Jesus research is 
invalid, and in his book, he would evaluate various studies 
differently. In fact, in the same paragraph as his misunderstood 
statement, Schweitzer alleged that Reimarus’s (1788) and 
Strauss’s [1935] (1972) hate of the ‘supernatural nimbus 
surrounding Jesus’ (which he shared) sharpened their historical 
insight. According to him, ‘they advanced the subject more than 
all the others put together’. Schweitzer furthermore had a 
positive evaluation of the work of Wrede (1901), with whom 
he differed on some aspects (Schweitzer [1906] 2001:296–302), 
and the psychological study by Weidel (Schweitzer [1906] 
2001:446–448), a student of Wrede to which I will return below. 
Judging Renan as being influenced too much by his ‘sentimental 
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disposition’, Schweitzer, to my mind, wrongfully discredited 
the former’s work. Besides liberal researchers, he also exposed 
the subjective disposition of those wanting to diagnose Jesus as 
being mad (Schweitzer [1913] 1933), or those who denied that 
Jesus ever existed (see his lengthy discussion of especially Bruno 
Bauer and Drews (1910, see Schweitzer [1906]:124–142 and 
[1906]:422–427; for a recent discussion of the matter see 
Ehrmann 2012).
Interpreting Schweitzer in context, one can therefore 
conclude that creating Jesus in one’s own image is always a 
danger, without denying that one, in any case, always carries 
oneself into any construction, the more so if one wants to 
appropriate Jesus in the end. To this fact even the existence of 
four gospels testifies, (as made clear by redaction criticism since 
the fifties, see Rohde 1969; Perrin 1970), and as the gospels 
should be historical critically scrutinized, so also the ‘Lives of 
Jesus’ being written. This very fact I hope to exemplify even in 
the case of Schweitzer himself.
Schweitzer’s (flawed and) brilliant report on the 
quest of the historical Jesus
Schweitzer called the 19th century quest for the historical Jesus 
‘the greatest achievement of German theology’. In similar words, 
one can laud Schweitzer’s grotesque report of this quest like 
Bornkamm (‘monument’, 1956:11), Perrin (‘famous and 
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brilliant’, 1970:3, Robinson (‘what a research history!’ in 
Schweitzer, [1906] 1984:7) and Borg (‘masterful’ in Schweitzer 
[1906] 2001:vii) did. And, indeed, it is a thoroughgoing critical 
discussion of the main representatives with not only Schweitzer’s 
critical evaluation, but also ample extensive quotations which 
make an empathetic understanding of the Jesus biographers’ 
often lengthy works possible for the present reader. No wonder, 
as Schweitzer reports in his autobiography (1931) how he was 
totally occupied and lost himself in the Strassburg library that 
contained all the works. No English translation can do justice to 
the profound German (often laden with metaphors) which 
Schweitzer artistically employed. Some helpful biographical 
detail for every author is given, and, in cases of outstanding 
figures such as David Friedrich Strauss and Ernest Renan, two 
bibliographies are provided of literature elicited by these authors 
(no less than 60 titles for Strauss and 85 for Renan, see Schweitzer 
[1906] 1983:632–639). Unfortunately, these bibliographies are 
omitted in the so-called ‘first complete [English] edition’ of 2001.
As it happens with all iconic figures, there is usually a 
reluctance to criticise them. Schweitzer’s fame was so much 
enhanced by his philosophical studies (Schweitzer 1899, [1923] 
1960, 1966), his over 800 page book on Bach and his masterful 
interpretation of the latter at the organ (Schweitzer 1912-1914), 
and, above all, his charitable work as a doctor in Lambarene 
(Schweitzer 1959) that ordinary epigonic mortals have been 
Albert Schweitzer and the historical Jesus
200
reluctant to criticise his report of the quest for the historical 
Jesus. Grässer (1979), for one, provides a cursory overview of 
Schweitzer’s book (88–114), and concludes that the significance 
of Schweitzer’s research was that it indicated the importance of 
the basic historical questions regarding the sources and the 
religio-historical rootedness of Jesus (1979:114). For the rest, 
Grässer is more interested in Schweitzer’s own ‘theologischer 
Ort in der Geschichte der Jesusforschung’ (126–139). In NT 
scholarship generally, as well as in biographies on Schweitzer, 
the uncritical assumption seems to be often made that Schweitzer 
was correct in his analysis and evaluation of the 18th and 19th 
century historical Jesus scholars (besides Bornkamm 1956:11; 
Grässer 1979; see Betz 1962:159–171; Dunn 2003; Grabs 
1949:81–118; Lind 1955:147–160; Michel 1962:125–134; Müller 
1962:146–158; Picht 1960:43–78; Theissen and Merz 2011; 
Werner 1962:135–145; Wright 1996:4–21).
However, there is some criticism that can be levelled and 
according to Oermann 50 years after Schweitzer’s death it is 
perhaps the proper time to do so. This is done not to degrade 
Schweitzer, but to serve the cause which he himself wanted to 
serve: the authentic and accountable appropriation of the 
historical Jesus in today’s world.
Firstly, it can be mentioned that Schweitzer, with some 
exceptions, mainly considered ‘Lives of Jesus’ written in the 
German world, ignoring English and American contributions. 
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In fact, it can be questioned if the search for the historical 
Jesus, even in the 19th century, can be typified as an exclusive 
German undertaking best to be done by a superior ‘German 
temperament’.53
Secondly, his discussion of most of the authors revolves around 
his own interest, namely his own construction of the historical 
Jesus as a person who was mistaken in seeing himself as the 
Messiah who expected the imminent coming of God’s kingdom 
in terms of Jewish apocalyptic eschatology. Where Strauss 
([1835] 1972) wanted to solve the historical problem of miracles 
by rejecting both the supernatural and rationalistic 
interpretations and opting for the mythical one, Schweitzer 
gives due attention but that is clearly not his main interest. His 
aim was to be as honest to history as possible (as he saw it) and 
in opposition to contemporary liberal theology to keep Jesus in 
the ‘coarse garbs’ in which he walked, pondered and taught in 
first century Galilee.
Thirdly, following from the previous observation, the result 
of Schweitzer’s own interest was that many other important 
53. Schweitzer commences his study dramatically: ‘When, at some future day, our period 
of civilisation lies closed and completed before the eyes of later generations, German 
theology will stand out as a great, a unique phenomenon in the mental and spiritual life 
of our time. For only in the German temperament can there be found in the same 
perfection the living complex and conditions and factors – of philosophical thought, 
critical acumen, historical insight, and religious feeling – without which no deep theology 
is possible. And the greatest achievement of German theology is the critical investigation 
of the life of Jesus’ ([1906] 2001).
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aspects of the historical Jesus, especially his teaching – although 
probably present in the work of the authors – was simply 
ignored by Schweitzer. Amongst others can be mentioned Jesus’ 
mediation (flowing from a disposition of compassion) of the 
nearness of God in aphorisms, parables and common meals, the 
social acceptance of the marginalised, the acceptance of so-
called sinners, the impure, the poor and the down trodden, as 
well as the healing of the sick and demon possessed. Jesus’ 
teaching on forgiveness, humility, love for the enemy, non-
violence and peace making also receives little attention in 
Schweitzer’s classic. Further can be mentioned Jesus’ conflict 
and resistance to Jewish and Roman oppressive authorities (cf. 
Horsely 2014:335–360; Schröter 2014:303). That these aspects 
receive attention in other Schweitzerian literature (e.g. sermons, 
essays and lectures) is hereby not denied (e.g. Schweitzer 1981).
Fourthly, a worthwhile endeavour is to read an author whom 
Schweitzer had discussed and then to judge whether one agrees 
with Schweitzer’s evaluation. This I have done in the case of 
Ernest Renan (Scheffler 1999), whose book La Vie de Jesus 
([1863]) I still regard as one of the best. Schweitzer is frustrated 
with Renan, not so much with regard to matters of content, but 
with what he regarded as sentimentalism. Although he grants 
that Renan’s work was historical and gave to the Latin world ‘in 
a single book the result of the whole process of German criticism’ 
([1906] 2001:159), he continues to criticise it harshly, despite 
further positive remarks. According to Schweitzer ([1906] 2001):
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There is scarcely any other work on the subject which abounds so in 
lapses of taste – and that of the most distressing kind … It is ‘Christian’ 
art in the worst sense of the term – the art of the waxed image. The 
gentle Jesus, the beautiful Mary, the fair Galileans who formed the 
retinue of the ‘amiable carpenter’ might have been taken over from 
the shop-window of an ecclesiastical art emporium in the Place St 
Sulpice. (p. 159–160)
Ironically Strauss, whom Schweitzer admired, was positively 
inclined to Renan’s work and called him ‘a kindred spirit and 
ally, shaking hands with him across the Rhine’ (Schweitzer 
[1906] 2001:167). To my mind, a valid criticism against Renan 
would have been that he used John’s gospel’s basic historical 
outline (which ironically is today again considered, Charlesworth 
2010:3–46). Nevertheless, Renan’s attempt at the construction 
of Jesus’ life provides some glimpses on the life of Jesus which 
could be interpreted (or at least considered) as of sound historical 
value. In view of this, Schweitzer’s remark that the book’s 
weakness is that its author did not, as a child, read the New 
Testament in his mother tongue is unfortunate ([1906] 
2001:167). But perhaps Schweitzer can be forgiven for this 
immature judgement because he made it himself when he was 
merely 30 years old.
Schweitzer’s own construction of Jesus and its 
challenge
Because Schweitzer was perceived as concluding with his 
research that constructing the historical Jesus is impossible, 
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sometimes the fact that Schweitzer indeed had his own peculiar 
view is overlooked. His own construction revolves around the 
issue whether Jesus expected the kingdom of God to break 
through in his own lifetime with himself being the Messiah 
and Son of Man (as in Dn 7) of this new kingdom. On the basis 
of a literal reading of the missionary discourse of Matthew 10, 
done whilst he was merely 19 years old, Schweitzer (in contrast 
to his teacher Holtzmann who regarded Mt 10 as a post-Easter 
literary construction – Schweitzer [1901] 1929:48–54) argued 
that Jesus indeed believed that the kingdom would appear as 
expressed by himself in Mt 10:23: ‘I tell you solemnly, you will 
not have gone the round of the towns of Israel before the Son 
of Man comes’. However, Jesus was mistaken, because the 
disciples returned (Mk 6:30) without any of the predicted 
persecutions having taken place and without the kingdom 
appearing. According to Schweitzer, who found confirmation 
of his theory in the work of Johannes Weiss ([1892] 1971), 
Jesus was disappointed about this and decided to go to Jerusalem 
to force the kingdom to come by sacrificing his own life.
Schweitzer dramatically, and with great artistic rhetoric, 
summarised his position on a very human Jesus in his first 
edition of his Leben Jesu, another often quoted passage (quoted 
in Gunn 2003):
There is silence all around. The Baptist appears and cries: ‘Repent, for 
the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand’. Soon after that comes Jesus, and in 
the knowledge that he is the coming Son of Man lays hold of the wheel 
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of the world to set it moving on that last revolution which is to bring 
all ordinary history to a close. It refuses to turn, and He throws himself 
on it. Then it does turn; and crushes Him. Instead of bringing in 
the eschatological conditions, He has destroyed them. The wheel rolls 
onward, and the mangled body of the one immeasurably great man, 
who was strong enough to think of himself as a spiritual ruler of 
mankind and to bend history to his purpose, is hanging upon it still. 
That is His victory and His reign. (p. 47)
To my mind, unfortunately (since it clearly reflects his view) 
Schweitzer, perhaps in reaction to the shock it elicited, removed 
this beautiful passage from later editions.
Although with this view Schweitzer succeeded to interpret 
Jesus within the context of first century Jewish apocalyptic 
expectation, and thereby countered an optimistic liberal 
theology by putting forward a Jesus radically opposing this 
world with its wrongs (which had pertinent political 
implications), he had to face the problem that his Jesus was 
not popular. For ‘who would follow or take as an example a 
failed eschatological prophet or apocalyptic fanatic?’ (Gunn 
2003:47).
As far as the offence given by his view that Jesus had 
miscalculated his position is concerned, Schweitzer emphasised 
the humanity of Jesus by referring to Mark 10:18 (correctly 
transmitted in Lk 18:18 but euphemised in Mt 19:16–17): ‘Why 
do you call me good? No one is good but God alone’. For 
Schweitzer, Nicean Church doctrine on the divine nature of 
Christ had no place in assessing the historical Jesus. Although 
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he regarded Jesus as ‘eine übermenschliche Persönlichkeit aus 
einem Guss’, he regarded the historical Jesus’ ‘Unterordnung 
unter Gott’ (subjection to God) as paramount (‘ergreifend’, 
quoted in Brüllmann 1986:113–114).
According to Schweitzer, Jesus had a radical ‘interim’ ethic 
(as expressed in the Sermon on the Mount) which he could 
only proclaim in view of the imminent end of the world. 
Because there would be no long haul, hatred for the enemy, 
gathering of possessions, striving for high positions and 
harbouring resentment are senseless.54 Therefore, this ethic 
could entail renouncing power positions, peace-making, love 
for the enemy, abstention from violence, renunciation of 
possessions by almsgiving and mutual human forgiveness 
and humility as well as compassionate action towards the 
marginalised and suffering humanity. Some scholars accepted 
Schweitzer’s theory on consequent eschatology, but because 
history proved that he had been mistaken, Jesus’ interim ethic 
is regarded as impractical and should be adapted for our 
evolutionary concept of history. This view Schweitzer never 
shared. On the contrary, he regarded Jesus’ radical ethic as 
valid and radically confronting our zones of comfort and 
degenerated world. This ethic inspired him, to the amazement 
and critique of friends and family, to devote his life in the 
service of humanity.
54. For a well-put present-day representation of this view, see Ehrmann (1999) who 
shares Schweitzer’s ‘apocalyptic’ perspective.
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Borg (in Schweitzer [1906] 2001:ix) remarks that, although 
Schweitzer’s claim that Jesus’ message within an ‘end-of-the 
world-framework’ became near consensus in mainstream 
scholarship, it has recently shown strong signs of weakening 
(see e.g. Schröter 2014:135). Today no serious NT scholar would 
pretend that Matthew 10 and the other large discourses in his 
gospel are not (although employing authentic material) post-
Easter compilations (e.g. Allison 2001). Today both the 
perspectives regarding the text as expressing a narrated world 
and a narrating world of the author and his addressees 
(transparency) are widely recognised. Nor does it mean that if the 
ethic is de-eschatologized (as in Luke’s Gospel) that it is less 
appealing and radical. In fact, Luke’s Gospel can, precisely because 
of its de-eschatologized perspective, be regarded as the most 
ethicised gospel (Horn 1983; Scheffler 1993). The challenge of 
the notion that ‘the kingdom of God is among you’ (Lk 17:21) and 
that whenever suffering is ameliorated the kingdom appears (Mt 
10:7–8; Lk 7:18–23; 11:20) can be just as challenging as Schweitzer’s 
view, moreover excluding the possibility of regarding the ethic as 
‘unpractical’ or only valid in an eschatological world.
The possibility of psychological research: the 
unique personality of Jesus
Before reflecting on Schweitzer’s view on the relevance of the 
historical Jesus for today, his view on the possibility of employing 
psychology and psychiatry in studying the personality of the 
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historical Jesus demands our attention. On the basis of 
Schweitzer’s repudiation in his 46 page medical doctoral 
dissertation of contemporary psychiatric evaluations that 
regarded Jesus as insane (Schweitzer [1913]1933), subsequent 
researchers (e.g. Bultmann 1926; see overview in Grässer 1979) 
came to the conclusion that psychology should not be employed 
when studying the historical Jesus.
This was never Schweitzer’s intention. His debate was with 
those medical contemporaries who were not versed in historical 
criticism and who regarded Jesus as delusional on the basis of 
his belief in demons and his immanent apocalyptic expectation 
of the kingdom of God (a construction ironically made available 
to them by Schweitzer). Schweitzer argues that if Jesus lived in 
a society where such beliefs were held amongst many people, 
thus being normal to them, Jesus cannot be regarded as 
abnormal. According to him, his medical colleagues lacked 
textual and historical knowledge of first century Palestine. 
According to him, Jesus could only be delusional if that 
conclusion could be drawn on the basis of evidence of the 
contemporary framework.
As said, Schweitzer argued his case so convincingly that 
subsequent New Testament scholarship concluded that Jesus’ 
psychology should be avoided and Jesus’ psychobiography could 
not, and should not, be studied (explicitly expressed by e.g. 
Bultmann 1926). And, of course, there also existed the ‘paranoic’ 
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fear of being exposed by the ‘atheistic’ psychology of Sigmund 
Freud (as expressed in his book Totem und Tabu [1913] 1980; see 
also Scharfenberg 1971).
Corroborating Schweitzer, Donald Capps (2014), for one, 
who wrote a psychobiography of Jesus (1989; cf. also Van Os 
2010) laments this situation and advocates the necessity of 
employing psychology besides sociological and anthropological 
approaches. That Schweitzer appreciated proper psychological 
approaches is clear from his lengthy quotation of Weidel (1908), 
which according to Schweitzer rightfully illustrates how the 
tremendous contradictions in Jesus’ character strive against one 
another, but are ‘nevertheless moulded by the superior might of 
his overwhelming force of will into a real harmony’. Whilst 
Schweitzer’s quoting of Weidel testifies to his positive view of 
the influence of the personality of Jesus up to our present time, 
and surely in his own life, I repeat (also for the sheer beauty of 
it) the quotation (using Montgomery’s translation, in Schweitzer 
[1906] 2001) regarding Jesus’ personality:
A master mind, of incomparable sovereign self-understanding, that is 
Jesus as he stands before us, the born ruler, whose strength of will 
makes all bend involuntarily before him, yet of childlike disposition 
and a friend of children, spreading the light of innocent joyousness 
when he appears. Of supreme piety in his attitude to his ancestral 
customs and law, at the same time he is the greatest revolutionary that 
world history has ever known. Capable of passionate wrath and a 
hard judge, he is a fiery fighter, yet a man full of gentleness and 
goodness, mild and indulgent, and a friend of sinners. He stood in the 
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midst of life, yet it remained strange to him; he participated innocently 
in its events, its joys and sorrows, its social round, yet he cut all bonds 
of possession, occupation, marriage, all that could fetter him to life, 
and loved solitude. Full of bitter irony and asperity when faced with 
people and their weaknesses, yet he was their saviour and redeemer. 
Of sharp, penetrating understanding, he was a match for all versed in 
scholarship and sophistry, beating them all at their own game and at 
the same time so modest and naïve by nature and with such a clear 
mode of expression that a child could understand him. He was clear, 
calm, decisive and purposeful in his actions, then again passionately 
excited, impulsive, as if ‘beside himself’, driven by some higher 
compulsion. Unapproachably proud, of kingly self-confidence, he was 
yet the companion of sinners. Of unparalleled independence and self-
control, in the face of which all authority and all bonds of piety break 
down, at the same time he submitted himself unconditionally to God. 
King and beggar, hero and child, prophet and reformer, fighter and 
prince of peace, ruler and server, revolutionary and sage, man of 
action and poet, he was all these in one person. He could talk as a man 
is rarely able to talk, yet he loved to be silent. He was manliness 
personified, austere to the point of harshness, yet he could acquiesce, 
could give himself, sacrifice himself as only a woman can. He was 
entirely self-sufficient, and absolute individualist in his principles and 
his appearance, yet it was he who issued a call for a social fellowship 
which had to be realised. A quite unusual strength of will is the central 
force of his personality. Only a tremendous self-control could allow 
him to endure such a multiplicity or conflicting talents and forces 
within himself without damage to his personality, and make it possible 
for him to unite them all into complete effectiveness. The bearer of 
such an endless wealth of precious ideas which elevate mankind 
to higher things, of such a tremendous will, with the strength to 
master a world, must by inner necessity also reveal a higher 
consciousness of himself than ordinary people … Jesus declared 
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himself to be the Messiah. In our language this means no more nor 
less than that he had taken himself to be the one to consummate world 
history and to be the absolute lord of all spirits, the one called upon to 
bring God’s plans, as unfolded in history, to their fulfilment. That he 
was mistaken about when this would happen and believed this 
consummation to be near is unimportant. On the contrary, it is merely 
the obvious expression of the energy of his will and self-understanding, 
which dissolved all notion of time. Jesus has shifted religion from the 
sphere of the intellect and the sense to that of the will. This action, 
which, like all he said and did, has had such an effect upon world-
history, directly reflects the nature of his personality. It is precisely 
because he interpreted religion in this way that it became for him not 
a mere eschatological hope for the future but an already present 
experience. It sounds paradoxical, but in the light of his character it is 
quite comprehensible that Jesus, in whom the eschatological hope 
blazed most intensely, in whom it became almost a person, subdued it 
with just this his own interpretation, raising religion from the sphere 
of speculation and hope to the higher level of immediate, active and 
passive experience. A man such as he could not sit back idly and 
yearn for the future consummation to take place. He compels it to 
come …. (p. 447)
Schweitzer’s view on the meaning of the 
historical Jesus for today
The last misconception regarding Schweitzer and the historical 
Jesus is the notion that Schweitzer demonstrated that the 
historical Jesus is confined, or locked up, in the first century 
and has no meaning for today. This assumption is, amongst 
others, based on the following remarks of Schweitzer (quoted 
in Joy 1947):
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In the very moment when we were coming nearer to the historical 
Jesus that men had ever come before and were already stretching our 
hands to draw him into our own time, we have been obliged to give 
up the attempt and acknowledge our failure … And further we must 
be prepared to find that the historical knowledge of the personality 
of Jesus will not be a help, but perhaps even be an offense to religion.
(p. 82)
Schweitzer explains by stating that (quoted in Joy 1947):
it is not Jesus as historically known, but Jesus as spiritually arisen 
within men, who is significant for our time and can help it. Not the 
historical Jesus, but the spirit which goes forth from him and in the 
spirits of men strives for new influence and rule, is that which 
overcomes the world. (p. 82)
As we have already noted with regard to other misconceptions 
based on only limited passages from Schweitzer’s work, Schweitzer’s 
real view can only be constructed if all his statements on a specific 
issue are considered in their contingent contexts. One can even say 
that Schweitzer, because of his desire to formulate sharply, 
sometimes contradicted himself. He definitely did believe that the 
historical Jesus has relevance for today as is perhaps most clear from 
the poetic (and often quoted) passage with which he concluded his 
famous book on Jesus research ([1906] 2001):
He comes to us as one unknown, without a name, as of old, by the 
lakeside, he came to those men who did not know who he was. He says 
the same words, ‘Follow me!’, and sets us to those tasks which he must 
fulfil in our time. He commands. And to those who hearken to him, 
whether wise or unwise, he will reveal himself in the peace, the labours, 
the conflicts and the suffering that they may experience in his fellowship, 
and as an ineffable mystery they will learn who he is ….(p. 487)
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This passage clearly reflects the appeal which the historical Jesus 
has, and should have, on modern humans without domesticating 
and adapting him to our needs. Following Jesus in Schweitzer’s 
case meant for him in the first place to establish a hospital in 
tropical Africa.
Furthermore, in the context of European culture it made him to 
develop, on a highly sophisticated philosophical level, the philosophy 
of ‘reverence for life’ (splendidly appraised by Botha 2015). He 
positioned this philosophy between the life resignation of 
Schöpenhauer (see Russell 1961:725) and the harsh life affirmation 
of Nietzsche (see Russell 1961:731-734), and concluded that '[t]he 
ethic of Reverence for Life is the ethic of Love widened into 
universality. It is the ethic of Jesus, now recognised as a necessity of 
thought’ (1931:270). According to Schweitzer (1966):
Christianity will become a living truth for subsequent generations when 
Christian thinkers would, in the spirit of Jesus, bring the faith in him to 
knowledge in the thoughts of the worldview of their time. (p. 82)
Although his book on Jesus research may make for difficult 
reading, Schweitzer maintained that ‘to acknowledge and to 
grasp Jesus, need no learned making up of peoples’ minds on 
their behalf ('Bevormundung', quoted in Brüllmann 1986:115). 
Starting with the simple sayings of the Sermon on the Mount 
(e.g. the beatitudes and antitheses), he had no difficulty in 
preaching Jesus to the (at that stage) illiterate indigenous people 
of Lambarene. He explicitly stated that the ‘difference between 
whites and blacks, educated and uneducated disappears when 
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we mutually debate the questions that concerns ourselves, the 
world and the Eternal’ (quoted in Brüllmann 1986:8).
According to Schweitzer, Jesus means something to our 
world, ‘because a great spiritual current emanated from him 
and also floods our time’ (in Brüllmann 1986:114). Jesus did 
not only seek to reconcile justice and love, but communicated 
to humans that ‘if they want to live in the spirit of God, they 
may only think and act in terms of love’ (1986:114). According 
to Schweitzer, the gospel is, for him, true religion because 
Jesus was so human, understanding human suffering and 
human yearning so well, whereas everything else which 
usually plays a role in religion (dogmas, cult, ritual and 
doctrines) did not exist for him at all. ‘He [Jesus]is at the same 
time the most profound thinker and the most childlike 
human being. What he says is so self-evident’ (in Brüllmann 
1986:113).
Researching and appropriating Jesus: what the 
Schweitzer story can teach us
Like other great philanthropists of the 20th century, Schweitzer 
was certainly not a perfect man. That he, in his context, was 
paternalistic can be true, but to my mind it can never cancel 
the charitable work he has done in Lambarene. Arm-chair 
middle-class present day theologians (black or white) who 
search for evidence in his personality to discredit his 
achievements must do that at the cost of the manifold witnesses 
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of the black people amongst whom he worked and who 
profited from his charity.
As far as South African contact with Schweitzer is concerned, 
I came across a tribute to Schweitzer written in 1962 by a 
medical doctor from Welkom, South Africa, P. W. Labuschagne, 
who visited Lambarene in 1959. As his remarks testify to 
Schweitzer’s positive influence and example that contributed to 
a positive attitude amongst South Africans, despite apartheid, 
one cannot but wonder if Schweitzer not also eventually 
contributed to the relative peaceful political solution decades 
later.55 I translate from the German (Bähr 1962):
It is logical that in a land like South Africa that is inhabited by many 
races, the land should be prepared to internalise the ethics of love in 
action, and ‘reverence for life’. The meaning of Dr Schweitzer for us in 
South Africa is that we now attempt to understand our mutual problems 
and to respect our feelings, so that we in peace and love in a brotherly 
fashion can live together. In this manner, we want to make known 
which effective influence the personality and way of thinking Dr 
Schweitzer has on the life and thinking of South Africa. (p. 408)
The world is in desperate need for more Ghandis, Hobhouses, 
Kings, (Saint!) Theresas, Schweitzers, Mandelas, Naudes and 
Tutus. Why? Because these exceptional people have shown that 
it is indeed possible to follow Jesus of Nazareth’s teaching and 
deeds in the present-day world, how difficult it may be. The 
increase in secularism and scepticism with an appeal to 
55. Besides Labuschagne’s positive appraisal, Schweitzer was a popular figure amongst 
Afrikaans people, as the Afrikaans translation of Thomas (1960) testifies.
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Darwinism, the so-called accusation regarding the demand of 
crucifying the intellect by Christian doctrine, should be exposed 
by Schweitzerian thought, especially his demand for an ethic of 
‘reverence for life’ which is able to bridge the gap between all 
religions as well as faith and science (see Schweitzer 1966). If 
there would be a better philosophy, religion or world view than 
that of Jesus of Nazareth, such should be put on the table and 
Christianity abandoned. If not, Christians and non-Christians 
alike are challenged to follow Jesus, as Schweitzer said, in their 
peculiar contexts today and in the way unique to every individual 
with an ethic of love that combines word and deed. That such 
concrete following is difficult and almost impossible, our own 
lives may be witnesses to. But that it is not totally impossible is 
confirmed by the above-mentioned names, of which Albert 
Schweitzer’s is prominent.
Chapter 7: Summary
This contribution addresses some issues which can be regarded 
as misunderstandings about Albert Schweitzer, or even by 
Schweitzer himself, regarding the Jesus scholars he wrote about 
in The quest for the historical Jesus. They pertain to the following: 
(1) the misunderstanding that Schweitzer through his research 
history brought historical Jesus studies to a close for at least 50 
years, (2) the notion that Schweitzer has proven through his 
study that all historical Jesus research is invalid because every 
researcher only reads his own image of Jesus into his construction 
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of the latter, (3) the often uncritical assumption amongst many 
scholars that Schweitzer, in his book, correctly analysed and 
evaluated the 18th, 19th and early 20th century scholars which 
he discussed, (4) the assumption that Schweitzer had no 
construction of the historical Jesus of his own, or that the one 
he had was beyond criticism, (5) that Schweitzer, with his 
doctoral dissertation in medicine, has shown that any 
psychological understanding of Jesus or the Bible should be 
abandoned, and (6) that the historical Jesus is confined or locked 
up in the first century and has no meaning for today.
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The ‘myth’ of the ‘no 
quest’: Albert Schweitzer, 
Jesus of Nazareth, and 
Africa56




Introduction: Jesus the unknown? And the 
question is?
According to Albert Schweitzer (1931; cf. Dawes 1999:205–212), 
Jesus of Nazareth did not deem it necessary to disclose the ‘secret’ 
that he was the Messiah whose true identity would one day 
56. Here the term ‘myth’ is used not in the technical sense of the word, but in populist 
terms as a ‘widely believed fiction’ [Smith & O’Loughlin n.d.].
How to cite: Van Aarde, A.G., 2016, ‘The “myth” of the “no quest”: Albert Schweitzer, Jesus of Nazareth, and Africa’, in I.J.J. 
Spangenberg & C. Landman (eds.), The legacies of Albert Schweitzer reconsidered (Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae Book Series 1), 
pp. 218-240, AOSIS, Cape Town. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/aosis.2016.tlasr11.08
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be revealed. This conviction can be seen, amongst others, in the 
conclusion to his famous work on Jesus ([1906] 1913:642).57 For 
Schweitzer (my paraphrase), Jesus could not be known by either 
wise (sincere) or simple (insincere) people. Jesus reveals himself in 
the toils, conflicts and sufferings that his followers will experience. 
Though they cannot know him, he becomes known to them in 
their own experience. This is a mystery. Our constructions of God 
are shaped by our own experience. This is not a weakness.
The question is whether Albert Schweitzer initiated the ‘no 
quest’: the idea that it is not possible to know the historical Jesus. 
Schweitzer’s work, Geschichte der Leben Jesu Forschung, is often 
used to distinguish between the so-called ‘old quest’, the ‘new 
quest’ and the ‘third quest’. The ‘no quest’ is seen to have preceded 
the ‘new quest’. It is contended that the ‘no quest’ was initiated by 
Schweitzer and promoted by Bultmann. With regard to the 
various ‘quests’, Sean Freyne refers to ‘waves’.58 Helen Bond (2011) 
uses the term ‘four approaches’ and summarises them as follows:
57. The original: ‘Als ein Unbekannter und Namenloser kommt er zu uns, wie er am Gestade des 
Sees an jene Männer, die nicht wußten wer er war, herantrat. Er sagt dasselbe Wort: Du aber folge 
mir nach! und stellt uns vor die Aufgaben, die er unserer Zeit lösen muß. Er gebietet. Und 
denjenigen, welche ihm gehorchen, Weisen und Unweisen, wird er sich offenbaren in dem, was sie 
in seiner Gemeinschaft an Frieden, Wirken, Kämpfen und Leiden erleben dürfen, und als ein 
unaussprechliches Geheimnis werden sie erfahren, wer er ist ...’ (Schweitzer [1906] 1913:642).
58. Freyne (1997:91) is ‘convinced that the present ‘third wave’ quest for the historical 
Jesus is no more free of presuppositions than any of the other quests that went before it. 
Nor could it be otherwise, no matter how refined our methodologies. If we are all 
prepared to say at the outset what is at stake for us in our search for Jesus–ideologically, 
academically, personally–then there is some possibility that we can reach an approximation 
to the truth of things, at least for now. Even that would be adequate’.
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The Quest, as any introductory textbook will verify, is usually divided 
into four broad periods: the Old Quest (from Reimarus to Schweitzer, 
1778–1906); the period of No Quest (from Schweitzer to Käsemann, 
1906–1953); the New Quest (from Käsemann, 1953 to roughly 1985); 
and the Third Quest (roughly from 1985 to the present). As an initial 
orientation, this scheme is certainly useful in mapping the broad 
contours of research into the life of Jesus. Yet, it is clearly an over-
simplification, and like all over-simplifications there comes a point 
when the four-fold schema may begin to obscure rather than to 
clarify … . (p. 338) 
One example of an explanation that obscures rather than 
clarifies is the distinction made between ‘new quest’ and ‘no 
quest’. The impression is that the ‘new quest’ was a reaction 
to the ‘no quest’. This idea was attributed to Schweitzer 
because of his criticism of his antagonists, the ‘liberal 
theologians’, who were exponents of the ‘old quest’. The 
misconception is reinforced by the idea that Bultmann and 
Schweitzer agreed that Jesus could not be known.59 This 
would make Bultmann one of the most important exponents 
of the ‘no quest’.
Schweitzer and Kähler
The perception that Schweitzer initiated the so-called ‘no quest’ 
did not originate with Schweitzer himself or with Bultmann. 
59. According to Graig Evans, one of many who regard Bultmann’s form criticism as 
having had a negative impact on the quest for the historical Jesus, ‘[i]n Germany the quest 
all but came to a halt’ (Evans 1993:13). 
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The ‘no quest’ originated with the systematic theologian Martin 
Kähler60 (1835–1912).
Kähler demonstrated more insight into sources behind the 
Gospels than Schweitzer.61 He valued the ‘standards of 
contemporary historical science’ (Kähler [1896] 1969:218), was 
aware of the ‘fragments of various traditions’ (Kähler [1896] 
1969:219) and distinguished between the Synoptics and the 
Gospel of John with regard to the ‘reliability of the records’ on 
Jesus (Kähler [1896] 1969:219 note 3). He acknowledged the 
‘validity of psychology’ if it ‘rests demonstrably upon experience’ 
(Kähler [1896] 1969:222). The ‘criterion of analogy’ (see 
Troeltsch [1898] 1913:729–753), so central to the historical-
critical approach, presupposes that the ‘manifoldness of reality’ 
in earliest Christianity should be acknowledged (Kähler [1896] 
1969:222). Kähler lauds exegetes searching for historical 
analogies between the world of Jesus and that portrayed in the 
60. In this article the English translation, The so-called historical Jesus and the historic, biblical 
Christ, reproduced in G.W. Dawes (1999:216–238) is used for Kähler’s Der sogenannte 
historische Jesus und der geschichtliche, biblische Christus ([1896] 1969). 
61. However, Stanley Porter (2009:25–33) is of the opinion that some ‘criteria of 
authenticity’ used by historical Jesus scholars have been prompted by ‘direct response to 
Schweitzer’s challenge for historical method’ (Porter 2009:25), such as the ‘criterion of 
double dissimilarity, drawing distinctions between contemporary Jewish messianic 
expectations and the way the early Church wished to depict Jesus’ (Porter 2009:26) and 
the ‘criterion of Semitic language and environment’, because of ‘Schweitzer’s concern for 
literary traditions in Judaism, as well as his devotion of an entire chapter in his Quest 
[pp. 269–285] to the study of Aramaic’ (Porter 2009:31).
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contemporary Judaic and Hellenistic literature (Kähler [1896] 
1969:223). On the application of this ‘criterion of analogy’, 
however, Schweitzer and Kähler differed substantially.
Though Schweitzer never referred to Kähler’s distinction 
between historisch [historical] and the geschichtlich [historic] (see 
Meier 1990:10), John Reumann (in Meier 1990:10, note 21) is 
of the opinion that ‘Schweitzer may well have known Kähler’s 
distinction but purposely suppressed Kähler’s work on the 
subject. For Kähler “the historic, biblical Christ” is not “the 
historical Jesus”’. According to Dawes (1999:215) this distinction 
represents a theological reasoning rather than a historical 
reasoning. For Schweitzer, ethics and theology are two sides of 
the same coin. According to him, Jesus’ ‘whole ethical outlook 
[is] ruled by the contrast of “Now and Then”’. As the ‘future 
Messiah’ the historical Jesus (Schweitzer [1914] 1985):
must preach and work that higher morality. The poor in spirit, the 
meek, those that endure suffering, those that hunger and thirst after 
righteousness, the merciful, the pure in heart, the peacemakers, – these 
all are blessed because by this mark they are destined for the Kingdom. 
(p. 161)
According to Kähler, a historical contextual analysis can be done, 
but from a theological perspective it is not possible to draw an 
analogy between Jesus and other historical figures. He formulates 
it as follows:
The distinction between Jesus Christ and ourselves is not one of degree 
but of kind … We cannot … deal with Jesus merely by removing the 
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blemishes from our own nature – that would merely leave us with a 
blank tablet … In the depths of our own being we are different from 
him, so different in fact that we could become like him only through a 
new birth, a new creation. How then can we hope to analyse and explain 
Jesus’ development, its stages and changes, in analogy with the common 
experience of humanity? Indeed, if we look deeper we encounter the 
objection, How could he have been sinless in the midst of a world, a 
family, and a people so full of offense? How could the boy Jesus develop 
in a pure and positive way when in his years of infancy, filial dependence, 
and immaturity he was surrounded by bad influences, and when his 
whole education, however well meant, must have been on the whole 
distorted? All this is a miracle which cannot be explained merely in 
terms of an innocent disposition. It is conceivable only because this 
infant entered upon his earthly existence with a prior endowment quite 
different from our own, because in all the forms and stages of his inner 
life an absolutely independent will was expressing itself, because God’ 
grace and truth became incarnate in him. In view of this fact we would 
all do well to refrain from depicting his inner life by the principle of 
analogy. (pp. 222–223)
However, for Schweitzer, the ‘nature of Jesus’ in the dogmatic 
sense of tension between his godliness and his humanity is not 
the core of the problem. The distinction regarding his ontological 
nature and the distinction that is made between the historical 
Jesus and the Christ of the kerygma is not a matter of either/or. 
Biblical scholars who focus on the latter do not necessarily 
accept only the humanity of Jesus. Kähler, however, did find 
that this would be the consequence. Since he did not want to 
question the godliness and humanity of Jesus, he doubted 
whether it was at all possible, or fitting, to do historical Jesus 
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research. It was not possible, he argued, because the life of the 
historical Jesus could not be reconstructed from literary records 
in the canonical gospels and other first century documents. 
Kähler’s contribution was his distinction between the ‘Jesus of 
history’ and ‘the [sic] historical, biblical Christ’. This distinction 
between the ‘proclaiming Jesus’ and the ‘proclaimed Christ’ is 
based on his dogmatic distinction between Jesus’ godliness and 
his humanity.62 Kähler does not make the distinction between 
historical and biblical and the ontological distinction between 
godly and human because of his interpretation of Schweitzer.
Kähler did not do historical Jesus research a favour by 
equating these respective distinctions. His work rather served 
to reinforce fundamentalist Christians who doubt the value and 
validity of historical criticism and who reject a hermeneutics of 
suspicion.
Schweitzer the medicine-man
However, my argument above does not take away that 
Schweitzer ([1906] 1913:367; cf. Joy 1948:23), like Kähler, was 
indeed critical of the uncritical historical approach of both 
psychologists and theologians. Schweitzer was particularly 
critical of theories about Jesus and mental disorders. In the 
doctoral thesis for his final medical examinations, The psychiatric 
62. According to Otto Michel (1995:352–253), Kähler regarded the notion ‘Jesus as true 
God and true man’ as a ‘predogmatic’ belief (cf. Meier 1990:6 note 9).
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study of Jesus (Schweitzer [1913] 1948), he responded to the 
work of four ‘psychopathologists’ (cf. Capps 2003:621–662) 
who claimed to have built on his view of Jesus as a ‘wild’ 
apocalyptic prophet (Schweitzer [1913] 1948:46–53).
By means of ‘psycho-pathological’ methods (‘the investigation 
of the mental aberrations of significant personalities in relation 
to their works’) (Schweitzer [1913] 1948:33) these (‘insincere’) 
scholars depicted Jesus as suffering from hallucinations and 
paranoia (Schweitzer [1906] 1913:362–367). Similar to the 
‘liberal theologians’ (‘freisinnigen Theologen’) of the 19th 
century, they constructed a ‘liberalized, modernized, unreal, 
never existing Jesus ... to harmonize with [their] own ideals of 
life and conduct’. (Joy 1948:19). Schweitzer puts it as follows 
(Schweitzer [1913] 1948):
[They] busy themselves with the psychopathology of Jesus without 
becoming familiar with the study of the historical life of Jesus. They are 
completely uncritical not only in the choice but also in the use of sources 
... We know nothing about the physical appearance of Jesus or about 
the state of his health. (p. 19)
It is a ‘psychological fallacy’ (Van Aarde 2015) to presume to be 
able to evaluate Jesus’ mental health.
Could it be possible that Schweitzer’s so-called negligence of 
recognising the validity of indigenous African ritual healing 
during his Lambaréné period was influenced by his ‘wisdom’ 
as ‘village psychiatrist’, as Donald Capps (2010) calls Jesus? 
In his work, Capps (2004:89–124) deliberately moves beyond 
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Schweitzer’s understanding of Jesus’ healings. According to 
Capps, the historical Jesus healed somatoform disorders (Capps 
2010). On the one hand Schweitzer did not prohibit his patients 
to go to traditional healers. In her work, The many faces of 
healing, Michelle Mairesse (2006) relays the astonishment of 
‘Western visitors’ who visited Schweitzer in Lambaréné:
A few Western physicians who have practiced alongside healers from 
other traditions are less concerned about the theoretical aspects of 
medicine. When the great Dr. Albert Schweitzer established a medical 
mission in Gabon early in the twentieth century, Western visitors were 
astonished at Schweitzer’s deference to the local witch doctor, whom 
Schweitzer addressed as ‘mon chère collègue’. Schweitzer explained that 
he admired the witch doctor’s ability to deal with mental illness, so he 
sent him patients, just as the witch doctor routinely sent Schweitzer 
patients who would benefit from Western medicine. In neither case did 
the two doctors understand the therapeutic system of the other, but 
both doctors’ respected results. (p. 6 of 7)
Malrese (p. 6 of 6) pleads for recognition by, for example, the 
World Health Organisation of ‘traditions, insights, and skills of 
practitioners from the four corners of the earth … All nations, 
great and small, can make a contribution in the health of 
humanity. Let the healing begin’.
Schweitzer and Bultmann
Bultmann ([1926] 1988:8–10) was critical of both the ‘fallacy 
of misplaced concreteness’ and the ‘fallacy of psychologism’.63 
63. The ‘fallacy of psychologism’ refers to ‘[T]he practice of reducing a biblical figure, word, or 
event to “nothing but” a psychological phenomenon, e.g., a neurosis’ (Rollins 2015:507–514).
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This in no way detracts from his and Schweitzer’s interest in the 
historical Jesus (Bultmann 1988:13). Bultmann was convinced 
that more could be said about the teaching of Jesus than the ‘no 
questers’, such as Kähler would care to admit (see Painter 
1987:102). According to Bultmann ([1926] 1988:13), we have 
sufficient knowledge of Jesus’ teaching to construct a coherent 
portrayal of who he was.64
The context of Bultmann’s remark was the aftermath of the 
First World War. By then Schweitzer’s criticism of the ‘liberal 
theologians’ (‘old questers’) and his description of them as 
‘insincere and uncritical’ in their historical approach was 
already widely known. At that point Walter Schmithals was 
secretary of the ‘Marburg Circle’, the group of Bultmann’s 
students and others who were interested in his hermeneutics. 
He knew that Bultmann did not deem Schweitzer a proponent 
of the ‘no quest’. According to N.T. Wright (1999:83–120), 
the ‘new questers’ (Bultmann’s students) did not take the first-
century ‘Jewish’ context seriously. John Painter (1987:101), on 
the other hand, acknowledges that Bultmann and Schweitzer’s 
view of Jesus was that of ‘a Jew in the context of the diversity 
of Judaism’.
Schweitzer and Bultmann have a strikingly similar view of 
Jesus’ ethics. Bultmann’s ([1928] 1969:220; cf. [1960] 1965) 
64. My paraphrase of Bultmann ([1926] 1988:13): ‘von seiner Verkündigung wissen wir so 
viel, daß wir uns ein zusammenhängendes Bild machen können’.
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reconstruction of the historical Jesus is succinctly summarised 
by him as follows:
Characteristic for [Jesus] are exorcisms, the breech of the Sabbath 
commandment, the abandonment of ritual purifications, polemic 
against Jewish legalism, fellowship with outcasts [deklassierten Personen] 
such as publicans and harlots, sympathy for women and children; it can 
also be seen that Jesus was not an ascetic like John the Baptist, but gladly 
ate and drank a glass of wine. Perhaps we may add that he called disciples 
and assembled about himself a small company of followers – men and 
women. (n.p.)
Bultmann’s students parted ways with him (e.g. Käsemann 
[1964] 1969:36) because he was not sufficiently interested in 
the historical Jesus (Käsemann [1964] 1969:23–65; cf. Bultmann 
1965). According to Schmithals65 ([1926] 1988:149), this was 
based on the ‘greatest misunderstanding’.66 With regard to the 
distinction between historisch and geschichtlich they agreed with 
him. Historisch refers to the historical factualness of an event, 
whereas geschichtlich refers to the existential consequence of such 
65. In Schmithals’ German words: ‘Als Bultmann nach dem ersten Weltkrieg sein Jesusbuch 
schrieb, stand darum für ihn fest, “daß wir vom Leben und von der Persönlichkeit Jesu so gut wie 
nichts mehr wissen können” [Bultmann 1988:10]. Es ist ein groteskes Mißverständnis, wenn man 
diesen Satz gelegentlich in dem Sinne zitiert findet, nach Bultmanns Meinung könne man von 
Jesus nichts mehr wissen. Bultmann hat nie daran gezweifelt, daß wir uns ein hinreichend 
deutliches Bild von der Lehre und also von den Absichten und dem Werk Jesu verschaffen können’.
66. In his response, Bultmann (1965:36) notes: ‘Denn ich bin mit Käsemann ganz darin einig, 
daß die Sache wichtiger ist als die Personen, und daß der Zusammenhalt einer Gemeinschaft, wie 
sie zwischen Käsemann und mir bestand und besteht, Spannungen ertragen muß, unter denen das 
persönliche Verhältnis nicht zu leiden braucht, – Spannungen, deren Diskussion nur zur Klärung 
der Sache, an der uns gelegen ist, beitragen kann’.
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an event (cf. Labron 2011:28; Van Aarde 2014:256). The 
students disagreed with Bultmann’s emphasis on the that (‘Daß’) 
of Jesus being more important to faith than the what (‘Was’) (see 
Bultmann 1965:9).
The departure of the students from their mentor was 
attributed to the influence of Schweitzer’s so-called ‘no quest’ 
(via Kähler67). However, for both Schweitzer and Bultmann 
God’s act of mercy and redemption was affected in and 
through the historical human being, Jesus of Nazareth. 
Neither Schweitzer nor Bultmann rejected historical Jesus 
research. Bultmann, as a dialectical theologian who shares 
Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Heidegger’s views on the 
hermeneutics of historical interpretation (see Pelser & Van 
Aarde 2007:1378–1379),68 made the distinction between 
67. John Meier (1990:10, note 23) speculates ‘that, if it had not been for Bultmann’s recycling 
of Kähler’s distinction [between the Jesus of history and the Jesus of faith], the latter’s work might 
have been lost to large sectors of the theological world outside of German Lutheranism’.
68. Pelser and Van Aarde (2007:1379) describe such a Schleiermacher-Dilthey-Heidegger 
chain as follows: ‘Authentic understanding is the Nach-erleben (after-experience) of an 
original Erlebnis (life experience). But it is always simply a Nach-erleben and is never 
identical to the original experience. Those who ‘understand’ can indeed place themselves 
in the original situation, but they never detach themselves from their own situation, so 
that they always understand from the perspective of the latter. Only in this way can the 
strangeness be overcome and will understanding not be a mere repetition of the original. 
That understanding is possible, is situated in the time-spanning universality of life’s 
movement. It is the same principle of life which found expression then, and now makes 
a re-experience possible. Historical knowledge is therefore possible thanks to the 
similarity of knower and known as revelations of the same maxim of life’.
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historisch and geschichtlich. The former refers to what occurred 
in the past (Sein) and the latter to what from the past was 
relevant to the present and future (Dasein). The former he 
called the what (‘Was’) and the latter the that (‘Daß’). The 
distinction between historisch and geschichtlich therefore 
correlates with the distinction between the what (‘Was’) and 
the that (‘Daß’) of Jesus. It is clear that Bultmann was not 
indifferent to historical Jesus research.
In a dramatic meeting of the ‘Marburg Circle’, Bultmann 
(1965:190–198), in his Antwort an Käsemann, reacts despondently 
to Käsemann who wanted to promote his ‘new quest’ over 
against what he regarded as Bultmann’s ‘no quest’, with the 
words: O Absalom, mein Sohn, mein Sohn! [Oh Absalom, my son, 
my son!] (see Schmithals 1968:262). Walter Schmithals 
(1988:149–158) described Käsemann’s understanding of 
Bultmann as a ein groteskes Mißverständnis [huge misconception] 
(Schmithals 1988:149). This misconception puts a huge 
question mark behind the stereotyped manner of speaking by 
describing Käsemann’s Jesus study as the ‘new quest’ and by 
describing Bultmann as the proponent of a ‘no quest’ (cf. Van 
Aarde 2014:260).
Bultmann did not regard the quest for the historical Jesus of 
Nazareth as irrelevant. He distinguishes between a inhältliche 
Diskontinuität [discontinuity of content] and sachliche Relation 
[continuity of intent] (Bultmann 1965:191). Discontinuity of 
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content refers to the followers of Jesus conceptualising his words 
differently. An example is when Jesus spoke on death and his 
followers construed it as Jesus giving his life for others. In actual 
fact Jesus meant to say that they should not be afraid of death, 
but should live by faith alone. Then nothing would separate 
them from God. An example of continuity of intent is where Paul, 
though using different language, understands and continues 
Jesus’ intent regarding a life by faith alone (cf. Jüngel [1990] 
1995:82–119).
Schweitzer and Wrede
To construe Schweitzer and Bultmann as ‘no questers’ is a 
mistake. In Schweitzer’s history of Jesus, From Reimarus to 
Wrede, written in narrative form,69 he distinguishes between 
‘wise’ and ‘simple’ people. ‘Simple’ is, for instance, to take 
supernaturalism or anti-supernaturalism to the extreme. ‘Wise’ 
is to achieve a balance between what is mysterious and spiritual 
and what is rational. The work of William Wrede (1859–1906) 
attests to such a balance. Schweitzer differs from Wrede on 
certain points, such as that the Messianic secret is not the 
theology of Jesus but rather Markan theology (Wrede [1901] 
1971). Schweitzer appreciates that Wrede is open to the mystery 
of the Messiah’s message. N.T. Wright (see Stein 2001:207) 
69. C.K. Barrett (1975:5–6) points out that in this ‘narrative’ on ‘A sketch of the life of 
Jesus’, Schweitzer ‘smuggled’ inside his ‘analysis of Wrede’s work’ seventy five pages of his 
own sketch of Jesus.
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describes the difference between them as the Wredebahn [the 
broad way] and Schweitzerstraße [the narrow path].
According to Wright (1999:83–120), the Jesus Seminar is on 
the ‘broad way’.70 Schweitzer appreciated but also differed from 
Wrede. I appreciate but differ from Schweitzer. Wrede’s 
historical criticism led to a different theology than Schweitzer’s. 
Though I follow Wrede’s historical criticism and differ especially 
from Schweitzer’s understanding of the ‘mystery of the kingdom 
of God’ and his rationalisation of ‘Jesus’ eschatology’, I do agree 
with Schweitzer on the ethics of Jesus.
My interpretation of the Gospel tradition of Jesus’ ‘messiahship’ 
differs from that of Schweitzer. Jesus did not ever call himself 
the ‘Messiah’. The earliest Jesus-followers were ‘messianists’ and 
venerated him as such after his death. They were the ones 
responsible for ‘Christianising Jesus’. I understand the 
‘Christianising of Jesus’ as a process of transformation: Jesus of 
Nazareth was transformed from a human being to an apocalyptic 
Son of Man (Van Aarde 2004:423–438). When attributing this 
role to the earliest Christian followers, I do not question the 
belief that Jesus is the symbol of God’s presence, both fully 
human and fully divine. However, Jesus’ ‘two natures’ is a post-
New Testament confession, only traces of which can be found 
in the New Testament itself (see Van Aarde 1999:437–470). 
70. Does the term ‘Wredebahn’ imply an Autobahn, the ‘broad way’ of ‘sinners’ and 
‘heretics’, in other words Schweitzer’s ‘insincere’ (‘simple’) ‘freisinnige’ theologians?
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Yet, both from a biblical theological and a dogmatic perspective, 
Christian ethics should not be seen as an abstract ideology, but 
rather as a concrete matter based on the humanness and 
humaneness of Jesus of Nazareth.
Schweitzer and the kingdom of God
Schweitzer’s interpretation of Jesus as an apocalyptic follows a 
different route than my view on the ‘Christianising of Jesus’. 
His understanding of the apocalypticism of Jesus has been called 
a consistent (‘thoroughgoing’) eschatology. He builds on the work 
of Albrecht Ritschl (1822–1889) (Ritschl [1882] 1972; cf. Dawes 
1999:154–171) and Johannes Weiss (1863–1914) (Weiss 
([1892] 1971; cf. Dawes 1999:173–184) who regard the kingdom 
of God as the core of Jesus’ message. According to Ritschl the 
kingdom is a transcendent supramundane other-worldly 
construct. This has immanent ethical consequences. The 
kingdom of God is the divine governance and administration: 
a) where human rights are subordinate to God’s right; b) where 
there is no correlation between reward and worthiness on the 
one hand and punishment and unworthiness on the other 
hand; c) where there is no congruence between misfortune and 
guilt on the one hand and prosperity and goodness on the other 
hand. According to Weiss, the kingdom of God was not founded 
by Jesus. Jesus prepared the way for the kingdom which was yet 
to come. The opposite of the kingdom of God is the reign of 
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Satan, another kind of basileia. If Jesus delivers people from 
oppressors and enemies, it is about more than political enemies. 
It includes deliverance from afflictions of body and soul caused 
by Satan. The consequence of such affliction is tristia [sadness]. 
According to Weiss, there is a relationship between Jesus’ 
parables and miracles. The parables create an awareness of the 
kingdom of God. The miracles are the manifestation of the 
kingdom, signs of what is yet to come.
Schweitzer’s ‘thoroughgoing eschatology’ does not separate 
parables and miracles in this way. Miracles are already an 
immanent reality. His approach is ‘modern historical’, rather 
than ‘old dogmatic’. Jesus’ death is the example par excellence of 
how the ethics of the kingdom of God functions in this world. 
In the divine administration no distinction is made amongst 
people. At first people accepted his ethics, but when they were 
faced by the consequences they rejected it. At first Jesus was 
disappointed and withdrew to the margins of society. Then he 
realised that this rejection was part of the human condition 
which he had to accept, but also wanted to challenge. He then 
deliberately went to Jerusalem to confront the source of the 
rejection. This led to his death. The human condition is like a 
turning wheel. Jesus of Nazareth intended to put a spoke in the 
wheel.
Bultmann’s version of this radical Entscheidung [de-attachment] 
is that in and through the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth the 
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kairos has come. The time for making history is up in the sense 
that to ‘be reigned by God is to not be subordinate to anything 
of this world’ (Gathercole 2000:281). It is a Entgötterung [de-
idolisation] of the world. Bultmann (1963:338) describes such a 
Entscheidung [de-attachment] dialectically as both a Freiheit von 
der Welt [freedom from the world] and a Verantwortung für die 
Welt [responsibility to the world].71
Schweitzer’s way to internalise such a Jesus-consciousness is, 
as theologian, to resign from the academy and to start anew by 
de-attaching himself from being a New Testament professor in 
Strasbourg, the capital of the Alsace, today’s northeastern 
France, close to Kaysersberg where he was born and to move to 
Günsbach, where he grew up, and where his father was the 
Lutheran pastor. He studied medicine and he settled in Africa.
Schweitzer the ‘African’ – let the healing begin
In his earlier writings on ‘cultural philosophy’ between 1914 
and 1917 Albert Schweitzer described the ethical decline 
of Western culture whilst he himself was im Urwald Afrikas 
71. For Schweitzer and Weiss in God’s kingdom ‘all natural relationships are abolished … 
all is reign’ (Gathercole 2000:281). In his response to John A. Robinson’s (1963) Honest to 
God (Bultmann [1963:335] translated as ‘fair’ rather than ‘ehrlich’) and Gabriel Vahanian’s 
work, The death of God: The culture of our post-Christian era (1961), Bultmann (1963:338) 
concurs with Gerhard Ebeling (1959:97–98) and Friedrich Gogarten (1953:8) in that the 
most decisive factor of the Christian belief is Christianity’s contribution to secularisation. 
See, also Gabriel Vahanian ([1998] 1999). ‘The otherness of time: Secularisation as 
worlding of the Word and the hallowing of time’.
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[in the African jungle] (Schweitzer [1923] [1990] 1996). His 
departure from largely French-speaking Alsace-Lorraine 
(Strasbourg) to French Equatorial Africa (Lambaréné), and the 
establishment of a hospital on the Oguoué River in the Central 
African rainforest in 1913 was not devoid of socio-political 
context. This part of Africa had been influenced by French 
imperial politics and European Christian missionary activity 
since 1885. Libréville, the capital of Gabon, was occupied by 
France in 1839. The population was mostly Mpongwé (cf. 
Thomas 2007:44). This harbour city on the Komo River, close 
to the Gulf of Guinea, is still of great economic importance 
today, especially because of the export of timber. Libréville 
(Freetown) was established in 1846 when 52 people from the 
slave ship Elizia, which was overpowered by the French, were 
settled there (cf. Ansprenger 1989:103). Round about the 
1930’s 84.6% of the world consisted of colonies and former 
colonies of European powers (Fieldhouse 1989:373). When 
the timber industry gained momentum, a quarter of the 
population of Gabon ‘disappeared’, probably due to slave trade 
activities in the area (cf. Rich 2007:21). Ecological problems 
as a result of the timber industry, and the ensuing decline 
of agriculture led to food shortages in the area where 
Schweitzer had settled as doctor and theologian (cf. Fourchard 
2008:159–161).
Albert Schweitzer can be regarded as a pioneer of what became 
known in the 1990’s as postcolonial theology (cf. Moore 2000:182). 
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Today postcolonialism is seen as the phenomenon where previous 
colonial powers still exercise power over their former political 
victims, but now by means of a global economy and military and 
cultural supremacy. According to Fernando Segovia (1998:51 
note 3), postcolonial studies reflect on the discourse and practice 
of imperialism and colonialism from a position where imperialism 
and colonialism have largely and formally, but not totally, come 
to an end. In practice, they still manifest as neo-imperialism and 
neo-colonialism. From the perspective of a hermeneutics of 
suspicion, postcolonial theories question privilege and power, 
refuse to acknowledge the supremacy of Western culture and aim 
to foster a greater equality.
As epilogue, I offer an appraisal of and express my 
appreciation for Schweitzer’s ‘Life of Jesus theology’. Dieter 
Georgi (1992) summarises his journey with Schweitzer’s work 
as follows:
Albert Schweitzer’s The Quest of the Historical Jesus had hinted that 
the scholarly interest in the historical Jesus always had been more 
than a part of the history of ideas. These hints now gained stronger 
meaning for me [Dieter Georgi].72 I became more interested in the 
social environment of the inquirer, my own as well as that of others, 
present and past … In this environment the interest in Jesus as a 
superhuman individual became prominent again. This Jesus was 
touchable as a human but at the same time larger than ordinary life, 
ready again to influence and determine human beings and now in 
72. In my Jesus book, Fatherless in Galilee (Van Aarde 2001) I concur with Georgi’s view. 
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particular those of the new, bourgeois class. Life of Jesus theology 
developed further in close interplay with the socioeconomic and 
ideological evolution of the European bourgeoisie, as one of its 
motors as well as its conscience.(p. 52, 56)
In remote Lambaréné, Gabon, West Africa, Albert Schweitzer 
became the conscience of Europe as the first ‘postcolonial’ 
theologian and medicine-man. For Schweitzer, the 
relationship between parable and miracle in Jesus’ words and 
deeds was akin to the relationship between theology and 
medicine. The combination means a life in God’s presence as 
an instrument of God’s healing. Like Jesus of Nazareth, the 
Israelite who crossed all boundaries, so Albert Schweitzer 
was the European who crossed unimaginable boundaries. 
However, Schweitzer also became the conscience of Africa. 
For him the kingdom of God was the alternative to the hubris 
of both the imperial powers of his day and the neo-colonial 
power of the newly established African elite. They have not 
succeeded in making headway with poverty in postcolonial 
Africa (including South Africa and Gabon), nor have they 
made progress in bridging the gap between the newly rich 
and the marginalised poor.
Let us, as South African theologians, whatever our history, 
whether our forbearers are from Africa or Europe, reclaim 
Africa as our home and embrace the value of healing as promoted 





The chapter argues that Albert Schweitzer’s understanding of 
Jesus as ‘the unknown’ (‘als ein Unbekannter und Namenloser’) 
has resulted in the mistaken idea that the quest for the historical 
Jesus is historically impossible and theologically undesirable. 
This misunderstanding can be traced back to systematic 
theologian Martin Kähler. In light of the ‘principle of analogy’ 
he regarded it as impossible to compare the historical Jesus with 
any other human being in history. Schweitzer, however, did 
not use Kähler’s categories. The chapter compares the ethics of 
Schweitzer with the insights of William Wrede and Rudolf 
Bultmann. The aim of the chapter is to demonstrate a correlation 
between Schweitzer’s understanding of ‘kingdom of God’ in 
light of Jesus’ ethics and Schweitzer’s decision to settle in French 
Equatorial Africa (Gabon). His work in Africa can be described 
as that of ‘village psychiatrist’. As the first ‘post-colonial’ 
theologian, Schweitzer challenges us to also see in Jesus the 
image of healer.
The point of departure of Descartes’ philosophy is: ‘I think, 
therefore I am’. This simplistic and randomly chosen starting 
point reduces it hopelessly to the realm of the abstract. It does 
not open the door to ethics. The philosophy remains captive 
in a lifeless world view. Authentic philosophy should start 
from an immediate and comprehensive awareness. Put another 
way: ‘I am life in search of life in the midst of life that is in 
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search of life’. This is not a well thought-out sentence. I am 
constantly refining it. Whenever I reflect on it, I am constantly 
surprised by something new. Like a root that never withers, it 
sprouts a world view and philosophy of life which are vibrant 
with all facets of being. The mystique of the ethical unity with 
all that is, grows from it. (Albert Schweitzer, Kultur und Ethik 
[1923] [1990] 1996:330; my translation)73
73. Schweitzer’s ([1923] [1990] 1996:330) German: ‘Bei Descartes geht das Philosophieren 
von dem Satze aus: “Ich denke, also bin ich”. Mit diesem armseligen, willkürlich gewählten Anfang 
kommt es unrettbar in die Bahn des Abstrakten. Es findet den Zugang zur Ethik nicht und bleibt 
in toter Welt- und Lebensanschauung gefangen. Wahre Philosophie muß von den der 
unmittelbarsten und umfassendsten Tatsache des bewußtseins ausgehen. Diese lautet: “Ich bin 
Leben, das leben will, inmitten von Leben, das leben will”. Dies ist nicht ein ausgeklügelter Satz. 
Tag für Tag, Stunde für Stunde wandle ich an ihm. In jedem Augenblick der Besinnung steht er 
neu vor mir. Wie aus nie verdorrender Wurzel schlägt fort und fort lebendige, auf alle Tatsachen 
des Seins eingehende Welt- und Lebensanschauung aus ihm aus. Mystik ethischen Einswerdens mit 
dem Sein wächst aus ihm hervor’.
Part 4





In his book Twentieth-Century Theologians, Philip Kennedy 
(2010a:1–16) argues the case for the 1960s being always 
remembered as a decade during which the world changed 
radically.74 A heart pacemaker was devised and the first heart 
transplant was carried out. The astronaut Yuri Gagarin became 
74. One of the theologians whose views Kennedy discusses is Albert Schweitzer 
(cf. Kennedy 2010b).
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the first person to travel in space, and Neil Armstrong and Buzz 
Aldrin were the first to walk on the moon. However, during 
this decade a number of states developed and detonated nuclear 
bombs to impress the rest of the world and to show their military 
muscle. Devastating wars were fought between India and 
Pakistan, between the USA and Vietnam and between Israel 
and its neighbours. And then the Berlin Wall was erected; the 
assassinations of John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. 
took place and Nelson Mandela was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. Kennedy states (2010a): 
Of all the years during the tumultuous 1960s, 1968 stands out as a 
period of dizzyingly rapid cultural change. To this day it is remembered 
as an emblematic signpost of social and political upheaval. (p. 7)
Whilst concurring with Kennedy’s description of the 1960s, 
I want to argue the point that, theologically speaking, 1965 was 
far more important than 1968. I offer four reasons for my 
viewpoint. Firstly, the year 1965 was the closing year of the 
second Vatican Council, which had the task of ‘updating’ the life 
and doctrinal formulations of the Catholic Church (Berkouwer 
1965). Secondly, Albert Schweitzer died in September of that 
year, leaving the Western world his philosophy of ‘reverence 
for life’. Thirdly, James Lovelock formulated his Gaia hypothesis 
in that same month (Gribbin & Gribbin 2009:125) and 
unintentionally gave credence to Schweitzer’s philosophy. 
Fourthly, John A.T. Robinson published his book The New 
Reformation? (1965), suggesting that a possible second 
Reformation may occur in his lifetime. He even called Dietrich 
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Bonhoeffer the ‘John the Baptist of the new Reformation’ 
(Robinson 1965:23). The wisdom of hindsight and the 
publication of works by Don Cupitt, Anne Primavesi and Lloyd 
Geering convinced me of the importance of the year 1965. 
What follows is a short introduction to their viewpoints and 
those of other scholars. This may serve as a warrant for my 
conviction that Albert Schweitzer should be acknowledged as 
the herald of the ‘greening’ of Christianity, which, according to 
Nash (1989:87), took off in all seriousness in the 1980s.
Albert Schweitzer: reverence for life
Albert Schweitzer (1875–1965) became an icon in the 1950s, 
almost as Nelson Mandela (1918–2013) became one in the 
nineties. They did not aspire to have, or to gain iconic status, 
but their lives and actions inspired people to live their lives in 
new ways.75
Schweitzer was already an accomplished philosopher, New 
Testament scholar and musician when he decided to become a 
medical doctor to serve other people. In his autobiography, Out 
of my life and thought, he claims that the historical Jesus preached 
a ‘religion of love’ (Schweitzer 2009:53–60). He thus felt the 
urge to go into the world and to practise this religion of love by 
75. Pieter Botha (2015) recently published an excellent article on Albert Schweitzer’s 
ethics. Another publication which deserves readers’ attention is the book Reverence for 
life: The ethics of Albert Schweitzer for the twenty-first century (Meyer & Bergel 2002).
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serving a group of people who most urgently needed help from 
others if they were to survive and live their lives as well as they 
could. He did not feel obliged to impose the Christian doctrines 
which had been developed centuries after Jesus’ death on people 
who had a totally different understanding of the world. He was 
not interested in ‘cloning’ African people to become mirror 
images of European or American Christians. In his own words 
(Schweitzer 2009):
I wanted to be a doctor so that I might be able to work without having 
to talk. For years I had been giving myself in words, and it was with joy 
that I had followed the calling of theological teacher and preacher. But 
this new form of activity would consist not in preaching the religion of 
love but in practising it. (p. 92)
However, this urge to serve others should also be linked to his 
conviction that civilisation in the Christian world was on the 
decline (Schweitzer 1923). The outbreak of the First World 
War (1914–1918) increased his concern for Western civilisation, 
but he eventually concluded that the world needed people whose 
way of living reflected a clear vision of what life is all about. Life 
is not about material progress or becoming rich and living a 
carefree life. Life is about living in such a way other living beings 
and plants may benefit from it. According to Schweitzer, all our 
thinking and acts are driven by an ethical command (2009:151). 
The nature of that ethical command was not totally clear to 
him, although he studied the philosophies of Immanuel Kant 
(1724–1804) and Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860). However, 
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one day, whilst travelling in a steam boat on the Ogowe River 
in French Equatorial Africa and seeing a herd of hippos, he 
realised that ‘reverence for life’ was the ethical command or 
drive that should guide people’s lives (Schweitzer 2009:155). 
People should come to their senses and realise that they are not 
the only entities on this planet that are alive and would like to 
live. According to Schweitzer, Descartes’ well-known phrase 
‘I think, phrase Cogito, ergo sum [I think, therefore I am], which 
is the catch phrase of his philosophy, does not make complete 
sense and should be elaborated on. People do not just think. 
They usually think about ‘something’. The ‘something’ which 
should be of primary concern and which should be thought 
about is the will to live. The whole planet is full of living beings 
that would like to live, procreate and flourish. He phrased this 
as follows: ‘I am life that wills to live in the midst of life that 
wills to live’ (Schweitzer 2009:156). This phrase became one of 
the catch phrases of his philosophy of reverence for life. He 
extended it by saying (Nash 1989:61; Schweitzer 2009:157–158): 
[a] man is ethical only when life as such is sacred to him – the life of 
plants and animals as well as that of his fellow men – and when he 
devotes himself to helping all life that is in need of help. (n.p.)
It is astonishing that Albert Schweitzer (as a Lutheran) did not 
reflect on the Bible and its authority, nor did he attempt to 
translate the Bible into one of the indigenous languages of 
French Equatorial Africa. He was not interested in imposing 
the orthodox Christian doctrines or the idea of the Trinity on 
non-Christian people living on another continent. Although he 
Albert Schweitzer, herald of the ‘greening’ of Christianity?
248
was of the opinion that Jesus’ message of the Kingdom of God 
was intertwined with an eschatological expectation of the end of 
the world, he was convinced that this translates into acts of loving, 
serving and caring for all living beings. Schweitzer thus translated 
the expectation of the end of the world into what Barsam and 
Linzey (2004:172) call ‘practical eschatology’. He lived as if he was 
living in the end times. Schweitzer was less concerned with 
dogmatics (or Church doctrines) than he was with ethics. He had 
a fervent desire to perform the love preached by Jesus (Schweitzer 
2009:87). He was convinced that humans are embedded in the 
natural world and that they have to live an ethical life by loving, 
serving and caring for all forms of life. According to Roderick 
Nash (1989:62), ‘Schweitzer made it his lifework to think through 
the details of “the ethic of love for all creation”’.
The Afrikaans poet Lina Spies gives excellent expression to 
this ethic of ‘reverence for life’ in her poem ‘Die geloofsbelydenis 
van ’n afvallige’ (‘Credo of a heretic’) (Spies 2004). An extract 
from the poem reads as follows:
Ek glo dat omdat ek lewe
ek aan alle lewendes
sorg en deernis verskuldig is. (p. 23)
[I believe that since I’m alive
I need to show compassion and to care
for all living things.]76
76. This is my translation of the Afrikaans.
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Schweitzer acknowledged that he was a liberal theologian, or at 
least a liberal New Testament scholar and he even feared that 
his convictions might prevent him from travelling to Africa and 
becoming a missionary doctor (2009:92–93). However, it was 
his liberalism that contributed to the development of his ethic 
of reverence for life. He became a legend in his lifetime and 
received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1952 for his work at his 
hospital in Lambaréné (Afulezi & Afulezi 2002:291–308). 
However, he expressed the hope that future generations would 
remember him for his conviction that humans should develop a 
reverence for life on Earth. It is therefore not strange that Rachel 
Carson (1907–1964) dedicated her book Silent Spring (1962), 
which dealt with the devastating effects of DDT on the 
environment, to Schweitzer. Carson warned the authorities 
that the indiscriminate use of DDT was killing more than 
mosquitos. The book launched the environmental movement 
in the USA and became a classic (Carson 2002). Schweitzer’s 
name and philosophy are closely associated with the book and, 
according to Nash (1989:62), ‘When Schweitzer died at the age 
of ninety, in 1965, the environmental movement was starting 
to lengthen its stride along the course he had outlined’.
James Lovelock a marvellously self-regulating 
earth
In the same month that Albert Schweitzer died, James 
Lovelock (1919–) formulated his Gaia hypothesis (Gribbin & 
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Gribbin 2009:125). The hypothesis concerns ‘a self-regulating 
Earth with the community of living organisms in control’ 
(Lovelock 2009:105). Lovelock argued that Earth was a living 
system and that all the subsystems contributed to Earth’s well-
being and to its ability to sustain life. However, after the 
industrial revolution (mid-19th century), human activities 
began to undermine Earth’s ability to sustain life. Lovelock’s 
hypothesis became as influential as Schweitzer’s ethic of 
reverence for life, and both scholars are currently regarded as 
key thinkers on the environment (Allaby 2004; Barsam & 
Lindzey 2004; Palmer 2004).
Lovelock did not take note of Schweitzer’s philosophy. He 
was, after all, neither a theologian nor an ethicist but a 
scientist. Moreover, he did not belong to one of the mainline 
British churches but was associated with the Quakers 
(Lovelock 2009:158). He did not grow up in a family with 
strict religious ideas, but, as a youngster and later as a student, 
he became acquainted with the Quakers and shared some of 
their convictions – inter alia that Christians should be 
peacemakers and should not become involved in wars. He 
held to this conviction until the outbreak of the Second 
World War (1939–1945), when the evils of Nazism brought 
about a change of mind and he was no longer a conscientious 
objector. However, he could not adhere to the Allies’ policy 
on the mass bombing of German cities. Although Lovelock 
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does not mention Albert Schweitzer’s stance on the 
development and use of nuclear weapons, he surely would 
have associated with such a viewpoint. However, he does not 
oppose the use of nuclear power to generate electricity. On 
the contrary, he is a staunch supporter of the building of 
nuclear power stations, seeing that they do not pollute the 
environment in the way coal power stations do (Lovelock 
2009:89–91).
Apart from the fact that we can associate both Schweitzer 
and Lovelock with September 1965, we can also associate them 
with Rachel Carson and her book Silent Spring (1962). As 
previously pointed out, Carson dedicated it to Schweitzer and 
his philosophy of ‘reverence for life’. Lovelock, on the other 
hand, developed the ‘Electron Capture Detector’ (ECD), which 
supported Carson’s argument that the use of lethal chemical 
compounds like DDT was not only killing pests but was also 
harming the environment and thus undermining the living 
conditions of birds and other small animals. Lovelock shared 
Carson’s views on ecology and the web of life, and her message 
in a CBS documentary in 1964 resonated with his. She said 
(Gribbin & Gribbin 2009): 
Man’s attitude towards nature is today critically important simply 
because we have now acquired a fateful power to alter and destroy 
nature. But man is a part of nature, and his war against nature is 
inevitably a war against himself. (p. 110) 
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Through his research, Lovelock became more and more 
convinced that his hypothesis was not a mere pipe dream, and 
Lynn Margulis (1938–2011) played an important role in 
supporting him (Gribbin & Gribbin 2009:130–131). She actually 
convinced him that ‘microorganisms are at the heart of Gaia’ 
(Gribbin & Gribbin 2009:136). Some of these microorganisms 
were responsible for the oxygen in the atmosphere which made 
life, as we know it, possible. Earth’s primordial atmosphere did 
not contain free oxygen. This was only later ‘added’ by 
microorganisms. However, they not only added oxygen but also 
removed carbon dioxide (Skinner & Murck 2011:322–324). A 
number of discoveries by other scientists soon supported his 
conviction that life on Earth is intertwined with its environment. 
If the environment is suddenly and radically changed, life suffers 
and species become extinct. It could also be argued that all the 
subsystems on Earth contribute to the existence of life and, if a 
subsystem is tampered with, or undermined, this has a 
devastating effect on the system as a whole, making life on Earth 
almost unliveable. Researchers also discovered all kinds of 
ecological feedback mechanisms which supported Lovelock’s 
hypothesis.
Although some scholars prefer to talk of ‘Earth System 
Science’ rather than of the ‘Gaia theory’, their understanding of 
how Earth works and how the different subsystems contribute 
to the existence and flourishing of life on Earth, they do not 
substantially differ from Lovelock’s hypothesis. Take, as an 
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example, the book The Blue Planet, whose authors, Skinner and 
Murck (2011), follow a systems approach to the study of Earth. 
In the preface to the book, they define their approach as follows 
(Skinner & Murck 2011): 
Earth system science … is the study of Earth as an assemblage of open 
systems, and the goal of the science is to eventually understand the 
interactions among all parts of the assemblage. (p. iii)
The subsystems they identify and discuss are: (1) the geosphere, 
(2) the hydrosphere, (3) the atmosphere, (4) the biosphere, and 
(5) the anthroposphere or the ‘human sphere’. Of the last-
mentioned, the authors say (Skinner & Murck 2011):
Humans have always changed their local environment, but when the 
human population was small, these changes happened so slowly that 
they did not alter the Earth system. Now the population is large and 
growing even larger (…) There are now so many of us that we are 
changing Earth just by being alive and going about our business. In 
doing so we are taxing the resources of the Earth system and the capacity 
of the system to manage impacts. (p. 16)
They give credit to Lovelock for his conviction ‘that life has 
altered the environment at a global scale throughout life’s 
history on Earth and continues to do so’, but they are reluctant 
to embrace his view that the Earth system is a ‘coherent 
system of life, self-regulating, self-changing, a sort of immense 
organism’ (Skinner & Murck 2011:431). Although some 
Earth scientists regard the Gaia hypothesis as controversial, 
it caught the attention of theologians like Rosemary 
Radford Ruether, Anne Primavesi and Lloyd Geering. 
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These theologians are currently at the forefront of the 
‘greening’ of Christianity. But before we discuss their 
viewpoints, we have to take note of John A.T. Robinson’s 
book The New Reformation? (1965) and Don Cupitt’s Reforming 
Christianity (2001), as the new reformation and the ‘greening’ 
of Christianity are closely related and could be seen as two 
sides of the same coin.
John A.T. Robinson: the new reformation
John A.T. Robinson (1919–1983), an Anglican bishop, attracted 
attention when he published his book Honest to God in 1963. 
The book introduced English-speaking Christians to the 
theological views and reflections of three German theologians: 
(1) Dietrich Bonhoeffer, (2) Rudolf Bultmann and (3) Paul 
Tillich. He claimed that since the three-decker universe of the 
Bible and the Christian creeds has collapsed, people are 
struggling to make sense of the idea that God exists ‘out there’ 
and that he came to earth ‘like some visitor from outer space’ 
(Robinson 1963:15). The three German theologians introduced 
new ways of thinking and talking about God and Robinson 
maintained that English-speaking Christians deserved to be 
introduced to their thoughts. An article published in The Observer, 
under the heading ‘Our image of God must Go’, contributed to 
the furore that erupted after the publication of the book itself 
(Beeson 1999:137). However, he weathered the storm and 
remained a bishop of the Anglican Church.
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In 1965 he published another thought-provoking book titled 
The New Reformation? Although it was not intended to be a 
sequel to Honest to God, it contained statements that accorded 
with those in the previous book. He commences with an analysis 
of the predicament of theology and the mainline Churches in 
the mid-twentieth century, writing (Robinson 1965):
The great classical doctrines of the creation and governance of the 
world, predestination and election, pre-existence and immortality, the 
generation and procession of the Persons of the Trinity, angels and 
the Devil, heaven and hell, the last judgment and the second coming – 
these cannot be painted with the assurance or the detail on the wide 
canvases beloved of our forefathers. (p. 23)
Robinson was able to work speedily through the latest 
theological publications and then shared the information with 
ordinary readers. However, he remained hesitant when it 
came to exploring new answers. In the words of John Bowden 
(1993:81): ‘It’s striking how often his books suggest that things 
may happen (rather than being made to happen), and in the 
end how little did’. In a sense, he remained conservative and 
attached to traditional Church doctrines and so did not explore 
ways of bringing about a new reformation. For this to happen, 
theology in the English-speaking world had to wait until the 
21st century.
Don Cupitt: the religion of life
Don Cupitt (1934–) is a prolific author who publishes a book 
almost every year. One that attracted a great deal of attention 
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was Reforming Christianity (Cupitt 2001). It could almost be said 
that, whilst Robinson expressed some reservations about a 
possible new reformation (take note of the question mark in the 
title of his book), Cupitt went all the way and indicated not only 
which Church doctrines Christians living in the 21st century 
could do without, but also how a new reformation could come 
about and what it might entail.
He opens his book with the declaration that the Bible has lost 
its status as a public standard of religious truth, saying: ‘We no 
longer hear One Voice in the Bible: we hear only a crowd of 
different human voices’ (Cupitt 2001:1). With this statement, 
he supports the convictions of critical biblical scholars who 
argue that the biblical books were written by humans living in 
a world that was totally different from ours and whose 
statements cannot be equated with the voice of God. To 
acknowledge this is to profoundly affect what one believes 
about Jesus. It is evident that the four gospels present four 
different profiles of Jesus, so one cannot equate the Jesus 
character of the gospel of Mark with the Jesus character of the 
gospel of John (Den Heyer 2003:189–203; Vermes 2000:6–21). 
However, later theologians preferred the depiction of Jesus in 
the gospel of John (‘the Father and I are one’) and combined this 
with Paul’s message about a first and a second Adam (Rm 5; 1 
Cor 15) to create a Grand Narrative of a cosmic fall, redemption 
and judgment. Moreover, they equated this narrative with the 
gospel that Jesus preached (Mk 1:14–15). However, critical 
study by New Testament scholars has shown beyond doubt that 
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Jesus never preached the Grand Narrative of orthodox 
Christianity (Kennedy 2006:145–155). In Cupitt’s own words 
(2001): 
The man Nazareth, preached the here and now possibility of immediate 
religion. He whose teaching sparked off the development of Christianity, 
Jesus of called it by a curious and rather new name, 'the Kingdom of 
God' .... (p. 6)
What is the Kingdom of God that Jesus preached? The Kingdom, 
according to Cupitt, has nothing to do with some spiritual kingdom 
established by Jesus during his lifetime, a kingdom which will 
eventually break through triumphantly when he returns to 
vanquish the Devil and his angels. The Kingdom has to do with life 
here and now: ‘... it is a new ethic, and a new way of relating oneself 
to life’ (Cupitt 2001:8). The new reformation thus means 
abandoning the traditional doctrines. Christians should no longer 
set their sights on a new heaven and a new earth but on life in the 
present world. We are not heading towards a second coming but 
towards a scorched earth unless we resolve to take responsibility 
for the world in which we live. We should stop believing in life 
after death and rather focus on life before death. We should ‘get 
ourselves into a stable relationship with our natural environment’ 
(Cupitt 2001:109).
Two of Cupitt’s later books elaborated on the views expressed 
in Reforming Christianity (Cupitt 2001). These are Life, life 
(Cupitt 2003) and Above us only sky: The religion of ordinary life 
(Cupitt 2008). Many living in the 21st century find it nonsensical 
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to address God as if he were a personal being living in the skies 
above. Instead of looking towards the skies (which are empty), 
people should instead embrace life on earth, treating it with 
reverence and respect.
In addition, we should also take note of his book Radical 
Theology (Cupitt 2006), which is dedicated to John A.T. 
Robinson. The book contains an essay focusing on the impact 
of the book Honest to God during its forty-year existence. Cupitt 
(2006:121) acknowledges that he was not deeply affected by the 
book when it first appeared. However, he later realised that 
Robinson was influenced by the philosophy of Martin Buber 
(1878–1965), just as Albert Schweitzer was influenced by the 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant and Arthur Schopenhauer. He 
then makes the following noteworthy comment: ‘Schweitzer, 
following Kant, took a non-realist view of God; for him God 
was just Love, a guiding spiritual ideal. Robinson’s topic was 
Martin Buber’s personalist philosophy of religion ...’ (Cupitt 
2006:122–123).
Buber argued that we, as humans, usually relate ourselves in 
two distinct ways to whatever we are dealing with: ‘... [W]e may 
treat it as impersonal, or we may respond to and address it as 
utterly personal’. He called the two attitudes, the I-It and the 
I-Thou attitudes (Cupitt 2006:123). However, as it is possible to 
relate to every living thing on earth and to the cosmos as a whole 
in an I-Thou relationship, this can be our way of being religious. 
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We feel addressed by something bigger than ourselves and we 
want to respond to this address. However, we could never lay 
claim to that which addresses us. We could never define and 
describe the eternal ‘Thou’. So both Schweitzer and Robinson 
took a non-realist view of God, suggesting that God is a word 
created by humans to assist them in their thinking and response 
to that which lays claim to them. However, Robinson was not 
as consistent as Schweitzer in his reasoning. He sometimes 
writes as though ‘God exists independently of human faith in 
him’, a more realist than non-realist view of God (Cupitt 
2006:124).
Lloyd Geering: the ‘greening’ of Christianity
Lloyd Geering (1918–) is often called ‘the Don Cupitt of New 
Zealand’ (Leaves 2006:41). He is certainly as prolific an author 
as Don Cupitt. He first entered the limelight when he published 
an article for Reformation Sunday (31 October) in September 
1965.77 The article was published in Outlook (the New Zealand 
Presbyterian weekly) and he supported and elaborated on the 
views expressed by John Robinson in his book The New 
Reformation? He argued that the Church and theology were in 
need of a new reformation. However, this was not well-received 
77. The latest number of the periodical The Fourth R (September-October 2015) has been 
dedicated to Lloyd Geering and carries the following captions on the front page: ‘The 
Geering Affair’ and ‘The heresy trial fifty years later’.
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by all the readers of Outlook. In the following year, after he had 
published a second article on the resurrection of Jesus, he found 
himself accused of heresy (Geering 2007:131–146). It is 
interesting that he was an Old Testament scholar at Knox 
College in Dunedin at this stage of his life, and he did not hesitate 
to side with critical Old Testament scholars. Concerning the 
Bible, he wrote (Geering 2002): 
Since the modern revolution in understanding the Bible we are now 
able to go further than the Reformers and declare that the Bible also can 
err, and frequently does, for it was composed by humans. (p. 137)
Apart from being critical of the Bible he is also critical when it 
comes to the traditional Church doctrines. Like Cupitt, he 
expresses the view that numerous people living in the 21st 
century find the doctrines of orthodox Christianity incompatible 
with current knowledge. They find it difficult to believe that 
the Bible is divinely inspired and wholly reliable. They find it 
difficult also to believe that God is a personal being who 
responds to prayer and acts in our world. Moreover, that there 
exists only one true God and that is the Trinity which Christians 
have confessed since the fourth century. If we take into account 
that Christianity is barely 2000 years old and that the human 
species to which all current human beings belong (homo sapiens 
sapiens) existed on earth for almost 200 000 years, then it cannot 
claim to be the only true religion. It does not make sense. What 
about all the religions which existed before Christianity 
appeared on the scene? Are all humans who lived before the 
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formulation of the Nicene Creed (fourth century) and who 
practised their different non-Christian religions, in the wrong 
and are they thus destined for hell? (Geering 1999:13–82).
Geering is fond of claiming that humans are currently 
experiencing a second Axial Period (Geering 1999:153–154, 
2002:45–48, 57–58). The idea of an Axial Period goes back to 
the German philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883–1969), who 
identified such a period in history between 800 and 200 BCE. 
He claimed that during this period a number of key figures lived 
all over the world and that their philosophies and messages 
shaped humanity for the better. He refers, inter alia, to the 
Hebrew prophets, to Confucius, the Buddha and Zoroaster. 
What is currently happening is that our God-talk is radically 
changing because our understanding of the cosmos, our 
environment and ourselves is changing. Moreover, the world is 
becoming increasingly smaller because of globalisation, whilst 
the different religions and philosophies are impacting on each 
other. In the Western world in which Christianity dominated 
the religious scene for more than 1500 years, people are taking 
leave of the Father-Creator God idea. Moreover, a number of 
theologians and neurologists are convinced that humans are the 
creators of their religions and their gods. The Dutch theologian 
Harry Kuitert expresses it succinctly: Eerst waren er mensen en 
toen God [First there were humans and then there were gods/
God] (Brinkman & Vijver 2004:9). The Dutch neurologist and 
neurophysiolologist Dick Swaab (2014:285–312) concurs.
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If humans are the creators of meaning (and their gods), then 
they should be able to revise and adjust their received religious 
traditions. When it comes to Christianity, this should entail a 
move in the direction of becoming more ecologically sensitive. 
In this regard, some Christians promote the idea of ‘stewardship’ 
and emphasise that Christians should become better stewards 
than they have been (Nash 1989:95–96). Geering, on the other 
hand, maintains that Christians should take the views of 
Lovelock more seriously: ‘Simply learning to be better stewards, 
then, is not enough. Christianity must make more radical 
changes in its understanding of our place and role in nature’ 
(Geering 2005:18). This will mean taking leave of the orthodox 
idea of a perfect world which collapsed because of the sin of 
Adam and Eve and of Jesus coming to Earth to save humanity 
from Original Sin and damnation. The Christian doctrine of sin, 
which stresses that humans exist in a tragic state of alienation 
from the God who created them in his own image, should be 
replaced by the reality that humans are currently in a state of 
war with the planet which brought them forth (Geering 
1999:133).
Anne Primavesi: sacred Gaia
An interesting fact which should not go unnoticed is the role 
played by women since the early years of the environmental 
movement and the introduction of the Gaia hypothesis. 
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Next to Albert Schweitzer stands Rachel Carson, and next to 
James Lovelock stands Lynn Margulis. I did not discuss her 
role and that of Carson in detail, as the focus of this chapter 
is the question of whether Schweitzer can be regarded as the 
herald of the ‘greening’ of Christianity. That is, whether 
there is a golden thread which runs from Schweitzer through 
Robinson to Cupitt, Geering and Primavesi, not forgetting 
the role Lovelock’s hypothesis plays in the ‘greening’ of 
Christianity.
Strangely, John Robinson did not pay attention to the 
environmental movement and how the theory of evolution 
impacted on traditional Church doctrines, although he was 
well aware that Christians experience problems with these 
doctrines because of a changed world view. When one 
embraces evolutionary biology, nothing can remain the same, 
as Steve Stewart-Williams argues in his book Darwin, God 
and the meaning of life: How evolutionary theory undermines 
everything you thought you knew (2010). Robinson introduced 
Christians to new ways of thinking about God, but he never 
linked this to the theory of evolution. On the other hand, 
Anne Primavesi, Rosemary Radford Ruether and Lloyd 
Geering are theologians who do not hesitate to embrace 
current scientific knowledge and to use the Gaia hypothesis 
in their theological reflections.
A decade before the publication of Stewart-Williams’ book, 
Primavesi (2000:37–38) had already argued that Christian 
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theologians were still short-circuiting the theory of evolution 
by believing (1) that humans did not evolve from other species, 
(2) that they do not evolve as other species do, (3) that our 
species alone is made in God’s image, (4) that our species has 
been unique since God became a member of it, and (5) that we 
know ‘through divine revelation’ what will happen to our 
species at the end of times.
In her books Sacred Gaia (2000) and Gaia’s gift (2003), 
Primavesi engages these convictions, arguing that Christians 
should revisit the traditional Church doctrines in the light of 
current scientific knowledge. The fact that her views are 
discussed last may leave the impression that she is mere a 
follower of Geering and that she supports (or even repeats) 
what he has written. That is not the case. Her books were 
published almost a decade before Geering published Coming 
back to earth: From gods, to God, to Gaia (2009). Readers may also 
ask why Rosemary Radford Ruether's views are not discussed, 
seeing that she is a feminist theologian who uses the Gaia 
concept in her theological reflections. She published a book, 
Gaia and God: An ecofeminist theology of earth healing (Ruether 
1994), before Primavesi published hers. The reason why I have 
chosen to discuss Primavesi’s views is that she is critical of 
Christians’ reading of Genesis and of the role this book played 
in the development of the Grand Narrative of Christianity. 
She is more critical of the traditional doctrines than Ruether, 
who ‘… tries to keep different aspects of the Christian story 
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intact, even while reinterpreting the concepts in a radical way’ 
(Deane-Drummond 2002:196).78
Primavesi is adamant that Christians should revisit traditional 
Church doctrines, such as Adam and Eve being the first persons 
to bring death into the world with their disobedience (Gn: 2–3). 
Informed people today know that death has been part of life 
since the start of life on Earth. Furthermore, we today know 
that Jesus did not die on the cross to conquer death and to save 
humanity from perdition. Jesus died on the cross ‘as a victim of 
imperial militarism’ (Primavesi 2000:41). She is also critical of 
the principle of ‘hierarchy’ in Christian thinking. According to 
this idea, ‘the Trinity presides above the angels, who are above 
the ecclesiastics, who are above the laity’ (Primavesi 2000:123). 
The principle of ‘hierarchy’ is then carried over to relationships 
in this world: hierarchy endorses ‘the political and military 
authority of royal institutions’ (Primavesi 2000:124) and 
endorses men’s authority over women and nature (Primavesi 
2000:131).
It is evident that the Gaia hypothesis assisted Primavesi in 
arguing that Christianity is at the cross-roads and ought to 
abandon the Grand Narrative, which has been a guiding 
78. Richard Grigg criticises Ruether’s depiction of modern science as well and writes: ‘…, 
while ecology is close to Ruether’s heart, she is much more suspicious about natural 
science in general. It has not, in fact, been value-free, she tells us. It is not purely objective, 
as it claims, but is often subjective’ (2008:46).
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narrative since the fifth century. What Christianity needs, 
according to her, is a new narrative which takes into account 
our current knowledge of the Earth and how life on it evolved 
and where humans fit into this story. Human beings can no 
longer view themselves as stewards of God’s creation, nor can 
they promote the conviction that everything was created for 
their sole use and benefit.
Conclusion
The world has seen major changes in the 50 years since Albert 
Schweitzer died. These changes have impacted on what Christians 
have traditionally believed. More and more theologians are of the 
opinion that Christianity’s grand narrative of ‘Fall–Atonement–
Judgement’ (Kennedy 2006:255) can no longer harmonise with 
our current scientific knowledge. Even natural scientists share 
this viewpoint. To give but one example: James Lovelock wrote 
the following in Gaia: A new look at life on earth (1995): 
Biblical teaching that the Fall was from a state of blissful innocence into 
the sorrowful world of flesh and the devil, through the sin of 
disobedience, is hard to accept in our contemporary culture. (p. 100)
Conservative theologians are reluctant to embrace the new 
knowledge and to develop a new narrative for Christianity. 
Some of them are aware of the ecological crisis that humans are 
facing and try to develop a theological response, but without 
taking note of comments by scientists like Lovelock. They still 
267
Chapter 9
want to adhere to Church doctrines like (1) the Bible is God’s 
authoritative word for time and eternity, (2) humans are created 
in the image of God, (3) humans are God’s stewards on Earth, 
(4) Jesus became a human being to atone for Original Sin and to 
save humanity from perdition, (5) Jesus will eventually return 
to judge humanity and to create a new heaven and a new Earth. 
Modern evolutionary biology has forever undermined these 
doctrines. It has proven beyond doubt that humans have evolved 
from previous life forms – therefore humans carry plant genes 
in their DNA. A large number of modern biblical scholars do 
not regard the Bible as an authoritative document which should 
guide humans in their thinking and acting. Furthermore, 
research has proven that Jesus was a Jewish prophet who lived 
in the first century and practised early Judaism. The kingdom 
he preached had nothing to do with establishing a spiritual 
kingdom where sorrow, poverty, pain and death will no longer 
exist. The kingdom of God that he preached stood in opposition 
to the kingdom of Caesar (Malina 2001). He introduced a 
‘nonviolent, anti-imperial religious reform movement within 
Judaism’, but unfortunately this soon ‘morphed into the official, 
militaristic religion of the very violent Roman Empire’ (Nelson-
Pallmeyer 2005:11). Schweitzer did not share this understanding 
of the kingdom that Jesus preached, although he was correct in 
claiming that Jesus’ eschatological expectation concerned his 
world. However, Schweitzer’s philosophy of ‘reverence for life’ 
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opened up a new avenue for Christians living in the 21st century 
to develop a new narrative with a new ethic which could 
harmonise with our current scientific knowledge and our 
concern for the Earth and her well-being. That avenue runs 
through the research and reflections of Rachel Carson, James 
Lovelock, Lynn Margulis, John A.T. Robinson, Don Cupitt, 
Rosemary Radford Ruether, Anne Primavesi and Lloyd Geering 
as well as other scholars whose publications I have not yet read 
and who are promoting a ‘greening’ of Christianity.
Chapter 9: Summary
Albert Schweitzer died 50 years ago, leaving the world his 
philosophy of ‘reverence for life’. In the month of his death, 
James Lovelock formulated his Gaia hypothesis. These two 
male scholars were hardly aware of each other’s existence and so 
did not engage with each other’s viewpoints. However, a woman 
called Rachel Carson dedicated her book Silent Spring (1962) to 
Schweitzer. Lovelock took cognisance of her opinions, as he too 
had become aware of human interference with the ecology of 
the planet. Lynn Margulis soon came out in support of Lovelock’s 
view that the Earth functions as a self-regulating system, but 
emphasised the role of microorganisms in creating a habitable 
environment for larger forms of life. The year 1965 is important 
for another reason: John A.T. Robinson published his book 
The New Reformation? in that year. Lloyd Geering promoted 
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Robinson’s perspectives, eventually becoming a staunch 
supporter of the ‘greening’ of Christianity. Don Cupitt is well-
known for his conviction that Christianity is in need of reform, 
and he maintains that Church Christianity is being overtaken 
by a ‘religion of Life’. Although his publications do not reflect 
direct influence by Schweitzer or Lovelock, it is evident that his 
theology of Life is in line with the ‘greening’ of Christianity. 
This observation applies also to the feminist theologians Anne 
Primavesi and Rosemary Radford Ruether. They too refrain 
from referring to Schweitzer’s philosophy and do not promote 
a new reformation, but their feminist stance and their embracing 
of the Gaia hypothesis show that they are at home in the 
‘greening’ of Christianity. The chapter argues a case for the shift 
in our religious vocabulary over the past 50 years from God-
centred to Life-centred vocabulary. This can be traced back via 
the above-mentioned scholars to Schweitzer and his philosophy 
of ‘reverence for life’.
270
Orientation
The purpose of this chapter is to highlight salient aspects of the 
educational thought of Albert Schweitzer (1875–1965) and 
to determine the relevancy of his ideas for current educational 
practice.
During the 17th century, Sir Isaac Newton, one of the most 
influential scientists of all time, wrote to his rival, Robert Hooke: 
‘If I have seen a little further it is by standing on the shoulders of 
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Giants’ (Wikipedia Contributors 2015). In this way, he attributed 
his extraordinary foresight in the field of Mathematics to the 
accumulated work and knowledge of his predecessors. Those 
who intend finding solutions to the educational problems 
experienced in South Africa at present would do well to also 
utilise relevant knowledge and understanding that were gained 
by esteemed individuals from the past.
In this regard, there is arguably no better time to stand on the 
shoulders of Dr Albert Schweitzer, the Franco-German theologian, 
organist, philosopher and physician, amongst other things, because 
he emphasised the inculcation in young people of a spirit of ethical 
responsibility and of a reverence for all things – the very attributes 
which, according to the Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy 
(DoE 2001), are missing from the South African educational scene. 
There is a distinct possibility that educationists can benefit from a 
reflection on the myriad pronouncements which Schweitzer has 
made concerning education. Especially his major work, The 
Philosophy of Civilisation (1923), and his autobiographical writings, 
Memoirs of Childhood and Youth (1924) and Out of My Life and 
Thought: An Autobiography (1931) are rich in powerful observations 
about, for example, the schools he attended, his teachers, and about 
teaching and learning in general.
For the author of this chapter, who has a special preoccupation 
with milestone dates, there are also more sentimental reasons 
to re-examine the views of Schweitzer on, for example, the 
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administration, purpose, content and methods of education: this 
year (2015) Albert Schweitzer would have celebrated his 140th 
birthday. It is also exactly 50 years after his death. In addition, for 
many years he was lauded for his philosophical convictions and 
the way he implemented these in practice. However, as a result 
of, amongst other things, the influence of decolonisation and the 
civil rights movement of the 1960s, his idolised status in both 
Europe and Africa suddenly faded and he sank into oblivion 
(Harris 2014:805). Maybe it is now, almost two generations after 
his death, a convenient time to revisit and to subject to historical 
examination the once inspiring ideas of this multitalented giant 
who was previously regarded as a heroic figure, in renown 
second only to Albert Einstein (Harris 2014:804).
A discerning reader would probably have noticed that 
‘educationist’ was not mentioned in the list of characterisations 
of Schweitzer above. In addition, this venerable missionary’s 
relatively long list of publications does not include any works 
that primarily deals with education. Why then, would he be an 
ideal person to authoritatively speak on educational matters? 
The answer can be found in Schweitzer’s unique experiences of 
schooling and teachers, his familiarity and regular contact with 
European institutions of higher education, and the successful 
implementation of his theories in practice.
As Schweitzer explains in his Memoirs of Childhood and Youth, 
many of his views on life and the world, like his respect for 
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silence, the value of contemplation and the need to become 
aware of the pain and suffering that characterises the world, 
originated in his personal experiences at school. He learnt a lot 
regarding the nature of teaching and learning from his father, 
his uncle Louis (with whom he stayed for the duration of his 
school career), Ms Anna Schäfer (teacher at the Girls’ School in 
Münster who stayed with his uncle) and Dr Wehmann (his class 
teacher whom Schweitzer describes as his role model and from 
whom he learnt the immense educative power of a sense of 
duty). In his Memoirs (1957:39, 42) Schweitzer stresses how 
much he valued the examples of sound teaching practice that 
were set by Dr Förster, his Natural Science teacher, and Wilhelm 
Deecke (principal of the Mülhausen School). From them, he 
respectively learnt that the mystery of nature and the force 
which is called ‘life’ can never be uncovered or fully understood 
and that teachers should not merely convey knowledge. Instead, 
teachers should assist learners to become fully human – this is 
the main purpose of teaching and learning. In short, Schweitzer 
can undoubtedly be regarded as someone who possessed ‘much 
schoolmaster blood’ (Schweitzer 1959:26).
From 1893 to 1898, Albert Schweitzer studied at the 
University of Strassburg and, before he reached his thirtieth 
birthday, he obtained doctorates in Theology, Philosophy and 
Music as well as a then much sought after Licenciate in Theology. 
In 1901 he was provisionally appointed as Principal of the 
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Theological Seminary of Saint Thomas from which he had just 
graduated and in 1903 this appointment was made permanent. 
For nine years he also taught theology at the University of 
Strassburg. At the turn of the century he introduced a series of 
lectures on German philosophy and literature which he 
presented to the ‘Foreign Language Society’ in Paris (Schweitzer 
1959:28). In 1905 he decided to serve as a missionary physician 
in Africa and for this purpose returned to the Strassburg 
University as a student to study medicine. In February 1913 he 
qualified as a medical doctor and almost immediately thereafter 
left for Africa where he would eventually stand in the front rank 
in the experience and practice of tropical medicine. During the 
following five decades he regularly returned to Europe for short 
periods to, for example, give lectures on a variety of subjects 
(including aspects of the education of young children) and to 
perform organ recitals. According to Abrell (1981:294), 
Schweitzer was ‘an educator of the deepest dye, speaking to 
education in both his writings and speeches’.
An important reason why Schweitzer went to Africa was to 
make his life an example of his ethical and philosophical 
convictions and, indeed, during the first six decades of his stay 
in Gabon, he succeeded in turning many of his ideas into practice 
in his small village hospital. His educational thought also found 
practical expression in the missionary school at Lambaréné 
(Harris 2014:805). His ideal of reverence for life did not remain 
confined to Africa. It spread to, for example, Germany, Turkey 
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and Korea where, in the 1960s, it was reported that Schweitzer’s 
philosophy was successfully introduced in the schools of those 
countries (Joy 1967:268). There can be little doubt that education 
was a close concern of Schweitzer’s during his entire life and 
that Schweitzer was well qualified to address the subject of 
education.
Albert Schweitzer was convinced that ‘without philosophy 
no education is possible and without education there can be no 
ethics and no religion in a scientific era’ (Schweitzer 1900 in Joy 
1967:305). The philosophy which Schweitzer formulated and 
upon which his whole life and thought were built, is known as 
reverence for life.
Reverence for life
Schweitzer devoted many years of his life in search of a 
philosophy that could provide direction to people’s lives. He 
studied both the Eastern and Western thought of his time, but 
neither provided him with direct answers (Crain 2009:4). 
During the late 19th century, like most critics of his time, 
Schweitzer noticed signs of cultural decline and elements of 
self-destruction in the various societies of the world. He 
became convinced that the world civilisation was following a 
path of decay and degeneration and reached the conclusion 
that the underlying cause for this looming crisis was a lack of 
true ethics.
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In 1915 he found the inspiration required to develop his 
own philosophy, which crystallised into a simple formula: 
reverence for life. From then on he promoted the view that 
civilisation could only be rescued if the ethic of reverence for 
life could be implemented, amongst other things, through 
educational processes (Schweitzer 1960:85–93). Subscribing 
to, and meticulously living according to, this philosophy can 
be regarded as Schweitzer’s overarching purpose of education.
Schweitzer’s reverence for life philosophy involves the notion 
that one can achieve spiritual harmony in life by accepting 
reality, working to the best of one’s ability, and being ethical 
(Levinson 2009:85). He held the opinion that all human beings 
are individuals who ‘will to live’ and who are inevitably 
connected to all other life that also ‘wills to live’ (Schweitzer 
1960:278). An individual’s ethical task is to afford every other 
individual the same admiration and respect that one demands 
for oneself. In essence, respect for life not only compels 
individuals to live in the service of other people and of every 
living creature, but also becomes the highest principle and the 
defining purpose of humanity (Schweitzer 1960:xi–xvi, 9–20), 
and by implication, also of education. According to Schweitzer 
(1936 in Joy 1967:255), having reverence for life deepens the 
spiritual relationship of human beings to something vast and 




In an attempt to more accurately describe the meaning of the 
concept reverence and the spiritual relationship which Schweitzer 
mentioned, Woodruff (2001) explains that reverence is: 
the capacity for a range of feelings and emotions that are linked. It is a 
sense that there is something larger than a human being, accompanied 
by capacities for awe, respect, and shame. (p. 63)
According to Rud and Garrison (2012:55–56) reverence also, 
‘invokes feelings of shared adoration and wonder at the kind of 
higher meanings and values that connect individuals together 
in a community, such as truth, learning, and justice’. Amongst 
other things it involves a recognition of individual limitation, 
of patience, curiosity, silence and infinite possibility.
At this stage, one would certainly be justified to ask what 
bearing Schweitzer’s dictum of reverence for life has on the 
practice of education; how does theory find expression in 
practice? Except for emphasising certain themes to be addressed 
by means of education, Schweitzer did not spell out the 
prescriptive function of his philosophy for educational practice. 
However, in two interesting publications, Albert Schweitzer’s 
Legacy for Education (Rud 2011) and Teaching with Reverence. 
Reviving an Ancient Virtue for Today’s Schools (Rud & Garrison 
2012), the authors attempted to directly apply Schweitzer’s 
philosophy to educational practice and to illustrate what 
educators and learners ought to do to attain reverence for life. 
In order to understand how Schweitzer’s philosophy can 
possibly be practically applied in an educational context, it may 
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be worthwhile to consider a few examples of what Rud (2011:68) 
calls, ‘practical reverence’.
According to Rud and Garrison (2012:1), teaching with 
reverence is the spiritual dimension of classroom teaching. 
Teaching is often conceived exclusively as about imparting 
skills and knowledge that will serve learners well in their careers 
and lives. However, good teaching also involves, for example, 
forming character, creating an enduring passion for learning, 
appreciating beauty, respecting silence and caring for others. 
Teaching is therefore a spiritual (not necessarily a religious) 
activity that paves the way for human sociability and intimacy. 
Reverent teaching allows teachers to find creative self-
expression in the classroom community.
Reverent teachers have a deep respect for their learners, 
whilst they are simultaneously seeking to deserve the latter’s 
respect through their superior wisdom, moral character and/or 
abilities. They exert strong leadership and include learners in 
their deliberations for everyone stands to learn something from 
one another in a truly reverent classroom. Although teachers 
may surpass learners in knowledge and wisdom, everyone 
deserves respect. Teachers must be sensitive to, and acknowledge, 
occasions when learners know more and even display greater 
wisdom than they do (Rud 2011:71).
Reverent teachers are not arrogant but rely on others 
to provide innovative ideas and solutions to problems. 
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They pursue moral and intellectual ideals that reach beyond 
mandated testing. Amongst other things, reverent teachers 
utilise rituals and ceremonies to unite learners and to create 
mutual respect. In the final analysis, teachers teaching with 
reverence seek to ensure that everyone, teachers and learners 
alike, are equally humbled before the might of the mystery of 
life (Martin 2015:248; Rud 2011:69–72, 77).
Reverent teachers also reveal awe and wonder before the 
subject matter they teach. They realise that they have inherited 
the culture and knowledge they work with – it is not solely of 
their own making. They acknowledge the wisdom realised by 
those who preceded them. They exemplify the good of their 
practice, are never arrogant or presumptuous toward their 
students and are humbled by their sense of limitation (Rud 
2011:70).
With regard to knowledge, reverent teachers do not only 
listen carefully to what the subject matter has to say to them, 
but also accept the risk and vulnerability of openness to what 
learners may suggest. This implies that good teachers have the 
moral perception and imagination to connect to both their 
learners and the intellectual command of the subject matter. In 
practice, the philosophy of reverence for life requires that 
teachers act as much more than ‘knowledge workers’ refining 
human resources for the global production function. They have 
to nurture the ‘greater possibility’, the ‘seeds of growth’ in their 
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learners. This means ‘nurturing an unknown’ which requires 
faith, respect and ‘an admiring wonder’ for the unknown as well 
as the unknowable in learners (Rud 2011:70; Rud & Garrison 
2012:10).
Part of the human condition is that all humans feel pain and 
that they suffer and grieve. Reverence for life expresses care and 
compassion for suffering whilst seeking and celebrating joy, 
well-being and peace. Therefore, according to Rud and Garrison 
(2012:7) a teacher’s reverence for life in the classroom will 
‘compassionately ameliorate anguish’ whilst simultaneously 
seeking to bring about joy.
In order to show even more clearly how theory should be 
turned into practice, Rud and Garrison (2012:8) refer to 
classroom discipline. Reverence for life requires that discipline 
should never constitute an ego struggle between teacher and 
learner. Because learners keenly value justice and fair play, 
teachers should take care not to act in a biased manner. They 
should realise that even mischief-makers in the classroom 
deserve a degree of respect when disciplinary measures are 
considered. The severity of the teacher’s judgment should be 
calmed by the teacher’s compassionate caring, but this does not 
imply that teachers should shy away from ‘correcting’ their 
learners. When a reverent teacher believes that a learner is 
moving away from the ‘greater possibility’, he or she must 
‘correct’ as a matter of necessity. In reverent teaching, 
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commonplace correction emerges out of a reverent grasp of 
greater possibilities (Rud & Garrison 2012:8).
A final example of how Schweitzer’s philosophy can find 
practical expression in the classroom concerns the role of 
silence. Reverence in teaching often occurs through silence. 
According to Schweitzer (1939):
we do not have enough inwardness, we are not sufficiently preoccupied 
with our own spiritual life, we lack quietness; and this is … because in 
our exacting, busy existence it is difficult to obtain. (p. 43)
In educational practice, for any relation between student, 
teacher, and subject matter to flourish, teachers must somehow 
find a way to sometimes silence the noise and busyness of work 
and everyday life in order to think and reflect. Thinking, in 
silence, should be the call to action in reverent teaching. Yet, 
the whole ethos of present-day schools and schooling treats 
silence with contempt. Michael Dale (in Rud & Garrison 
2012:51) effectively illustrates this. He explains that everyone 
in the school has become obsessed with ‘getting’; getting 
information, getting the right answer, getting a degree, getting 
through, producing and achieving. Under the influence of the 
spirit of the time (which is characterised by a utilitarian, 
calculative rationality and a narrow instrumentality) both 
teachers and learners are compelled to accept assigned objectives 
unreflectively. Consequently they only think about the means 
of achieving these objectives as quickly as possible. In contrast, 
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silence means turning inward and opening up inner space to be 
receptive to what lies outside. Reverence requires listening with 
attentive love followed by reflective thought and an opportunity 
to be seized by something beyond the realm of man; something 
beyond understanding and control. Reverent teachers do not 
fear silence (Boostrom in Rud and Garrison 2012:22).
As previously indicated, Schweitzer expected his philosophy 
to find practical expression in, and through, education. Although 
he did not elaborate on the practical implications of his 
philosophy in an educational context, he did emphasise a 
number of education-related themes. In the following sections 
six of these themes that have relevance for current education 
are identified and briefly discussed. One of these themes is the 
notion that all individuals have the responsibility to contribute 
to the development of their own communities and also to that 
of a world civilisation. This can be interpreted as education for 
responsible citizenship.
Responsible citizenship
According to Schweitzer, education constitutes not only a form 
of personal development, but also a cultural-political 
undertaking. It enables learners to develop from self-awareness 
to self-knowledge and from self-actualisation to social 
contributiveness (Abrell 1981:294). The ultimate educational 
objective is societal development. The highly individualistic 
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ethics which Schweitzer developed were characterised by a 
strong emphasis on pluralism and personal choice with self-
fulfilment at the heart thereof. But self-fulfilment depends on a 
caring relationships with others (Martin 2015:248).
According to Schweitzer, one does not have to undertake 
exceptional tasks to serve one’s own community and thereby 
also humanity (Levinson 2009:87). He states that (Schweitzer 
1959):
we can all find grace if we seize the chance to act humanly toward those 
who need another human being. In this way we serve both the spiritual 
and the good. Nothing can keep us from the ... job of direct human 
service. So many opportunities are missed because we let them pass by. 
(p. 35)
Schweitzer argued that the focus of education should be on the 
development of critically literate, civic-minded citizens. 
However, he also warned against instilling in learners a rigid 
nationalism which, according to him, can only lead to 
catastrophe. In his opinion nationalism of the worst sort was 
displayed in the two world wars of the 20th century, and he 
regarded parochial nationalism as one of the greatest obstacles 
to mutual understanding between peoples. His view that 
education should take a firm stand in favour of internationalism 
inevitably brings to mind recent reports that, in order to forge 
a national identity and to foster patriotism, the South African 
government plans to spend R34 million on ensuring that the 
South African flag flies at every school and that learners regularly 
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(at least twice a day) sing the national anthem (Fick 2014). It 
also reminds one of calls for an africanisation of the curricula of 
both schools and higher education institutions in South Africa 
and an emphasis on indigenous knowledge. This is neither the 
place nor time to argue the merits of these calls, but it needs to 
be stated that these calls often reflect unbalanced goals and give 
cause for concern, because ‘patriotism too often constitutes an 
euphemism for banal nationalism’ (Fick 2014). Instead, the task 
of education should be to prepare learners to live in both an 
African environment and the world of which it forms a part 
(Msila 2014).
Schweitzer’s view was that, through education, all intellectual 
and aesthetic resources should be harnessed to develop a world 
civilisation, the members of which have to live in peace. 
Education for the promotion of peace amongst all persons and 
nations is a second important theme which Schweitzer stressed 
in his teachings.
Promotion of peace and non-violence
Schweitzer opposed violence with both words and deeds. 
According to Barsam (2002:207), his thought in this regard was 
influenced by Indian religious thought, in particular the Jain 
principle of ‘ahimsa’, or non-violence. Schweitzer’s recognition 
of increasing violence in society during his lifetime, and his 
opposition to counter- violence nurtured a lifelong campaign 
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for the cessation of all violence. He wrote that ‘all ordinary 
violence produces its own violence for it calls forth an answering 
violence which sooner or later becomes its equal or its superior’ 
(Schweitzer 1957:123).
Schweitzer promoted the idea of combating violence and 
striving after peace by means of the development of superior 
reason. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech he, for 
example, declared that (Schweitzer 1954):
man has become superman … because he not only has at his disposal 
innate physical forces, but also commands … the latent forces of 
nature … however, the superman suffers from a fatal flaw. He has failed 
to rise to the level of superhuman reason which should match that of 
his superhuman strength. (p. 4)
He had hoped that superior reason would result in a change in 
spirit which would, in turn, have dissuaded educated persons 
from misusing the power at their disposal. He wrote that 
‘whether peace comes or not depends on the direction in which 
the mentality of individuals develops’ (Schweitzer 1954:6).
Schweitzer’s views in regard to violence and peace served as 
a base from which new orientations toward human interaction 
developed and which turned public attention towards the need 
for improved education.
Within the framework of his overall philosophy, Schweitzer 
also had very specific ideas about the development of the 
intellectual capacity of individuals (of rational thought) through 
education.
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Intellectual development
Schweitzer was a man with the deepest respect for intellectual 
thought because he regarded thought as the medium through 
which answers can be sought to all the questions that plague 
man. Throughout his life, he regarded rational thought and 
scientifically grounded knowledge as the foundation for one of 
the highest responsibilities that can be placed on man, namely 
reverence for truth. From an early age he believed that ‘if we 
renounce thought, we become spiritually bankrupt, for anyone 
who loses faith in man’s ability to discover truth through 
thought drifts into scepticism’ (Schweitzer 1959:122).
He was not blind to the limitations of science, though, because 
from a careful reading of his works one can conclude that 
reverence for truth alerts one to the permanent possibility of 
error. One should recognise how vulnerable one is to the 
shifting contingencies of existence and realise that even the 
most assured position is subject to refutation. One should also 
critically examine one’s traditions and values. Reverence for 
reflection, truth, and inquiry is always higher than reverence 
for a dogmatic assertion of truth (Rud & Garrison 2012:8–9).
Reverence for life demands a proper balance in whatever 
activities humans engage in. In education it is often assumed 
that empirical knowledge reigns supreme, and the aesthetic 
and ethical domains are secondary to experienced knowledge. 
Schweitzer was highly critical of such a stance. He maintained 
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that each of these domains deserves equal attention. In fact, he 
was always concerned with the education of the whole person, 
calling for the development of both the non-rational and 
rational self. To him the aesthetic, moral and emotional self 
were just as important as the intellectual, logical self (Abrell 
1974:32).
One of the reasons why people neglected to realise the power 
of rational thought during Schweitzer’s time was because, 
under the pressures of advertising and consumerism, people 
found it much more convenient to simply follow the latest 
trends (Crain 2009:4). Schweitzer so often expressed views 
pertaining to consumerism (and related concepts such as 
materialism and bureaucratisation) that education for the 
purpose of combatting consumerism and materialism can be 
regarded as a fourth recurring theme in the works and thought 
of Schweitzer.
Influence of materialism and consumerism
Schweitzer held strong opinions on the effects of materialism 
(a ‘way of thinking that gives too much importance to material 
possessions rather than to spiritual or intellectual things’ 
[Merriam-Webster.com]), which was an evolving trend in his 
lifetime. He argued that (Schweitzer 1960):
civilisation which develops itself on the material, and not in a 
corresponding degree on the spiritual side, is like a ship with a defective 
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steering gear, which becomes more unsteerable from moment to 
moment and so rushes on to catastrophe. (p. 86)
He acknowledged that progress, as evidenced by materialism, 
was an essential element in any civilisation, but stressed the 
importance of an ethical foundation for this phenomenon 
(Hudd 2005:31).
According to Schweitzer, an imbalance between materialism 
and spirituality arises when organisations begin to control man’s 
thinking. Consequently, he truly hated the narrowing confines of 
‘organisation’ (Harris 2014:823). He wrote that (Schweitzer 1959):
corporate bodies do not look for their strength in the ideas and values 
of the people for whom they are responsible. Instead they try to achieve 
the greatest possible uniformity … and in this way they hold the greatest 
power. (p. 224)
He was particularly concerned about the fact that, when a 
bureaucratisation of organisations takes place, individuals 
become subservient to organisations to such an extent that they 
inevitably lose their self-confidence and ability to live in 
accordance with their own convictions (Hudd 2005:31). In his 
opinion, individuals should think deeply and independently 
about the nature of their world and about what was happening 
in it. This would support their spiritual development and 
enhance their ability to appreciate the cohesion and mystery of 
man’s existence (Schweitzer 1959:220–224).
Intimately related to materialism is the notion of consumerism. 
According to Hudd (2005:31) consumerism, or having what 
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and when an individual wants it, contributes substantially to 
the idea that personal concerns are paramount. Personal 
achievement and self-fulfilment are over-emphasised. Reward 
systems become oriented primarily to individual accomplishment 
instead of to humanitarianism. In a very practical way Hudd 
explains, by way of example, one of the effects of consumerism 
in the educational sphere: learners, she says, come to think less 
about the educational process. They focus more on the product. 
Consequently they ask: ‘Why must I take Latin (or more often, 
History) if I will in all probability never use it?’ and they insist 
on knowing: ‘How do I benefit from this experience?’ as opposed 
to ‘How can I make a difference to my fellow-man?’ (Hudd 
2005:32). To Schweitzer, the phenomenon of consumerism 
presented a huge barrier in the way of character development.
A theme that also featured strongly in the philosophy of 
Schweitzer is environmental ethics, a precursor of modern 
biocentrism (Yu & Lei 2009:422). He emphasised environmental 
awareness (and by implication also environmental education) at 
least half a century before the emergence of the environmental 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s.
Preservation of natural life and the 
environment
As a child Schweitzer disliked science books that disregarded 
the fundamental mystery of nature, which he felt is too full 
of riddles to ever be fully understood (Schweitzer 1959:52). 
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He was deeply concerned about animals and maintained his love 
of animals throughout his life. Whilst working in Africa, he did 
not only rescue a large number of animals, but also sang to 
them, spoke to them, and made sure that no harm came to 
even the flies and the bees in his immediate environment (Joy 
1967:19). He wrote that man must ensure that he ‘tears no leaf 
from a tree, plucks no flower, and takes care to crush no insect’ 
(Schweitzer 1960:310). It is clear that his philosophy was shaped 
by his experience of nature and of the people he encountered in 
the rainforest (Harris 2014:823).
As part of his philosophy, Schweitzer offered an understanding 
of the environment as more than home and neighbourhood. To 
him, the environment was an organic, living source of all that 
has value (Rud 2009:949). He placed reverence for each living 
creature, plant and animal, at the heart of his moral perspective 
and called it ‘ethical mysticism’ (Schweitzer 1960:79).
To Schweitzer, all life is sacred and interconnected. It creates 
one huge biosphere. No distinction should be made between 
‘high and low’ or ‘valuable and less valuable’ life forms (Yu & Lei 
2009:422). Even the organisms that may appear useless and 
harmful contribute to a delicate balance that, if disturbed, could 
endanger the lives of the beings considered valuable and useful. 
Each life is driven by the same urge, the same will to live, and 
each one of them has an ethical right to life (Cicovacki 2009:19). 
The logical consequence of these views is that human beings 
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will sometimes be faced with the dilemma of having to deny 
other forms of life their will to live, or to destroy life, in order 
to preserve life. Therefore, he suggested that children be taught 
that a person sometimes has to injure other lives, but that this 
should never happen as a result of negligence – only under a 
necessity that cannot be avoided.
Schweitzer practiced what he preached. According to their 
testimonies, many doctors and nurses who worked with him at 
Lambaréné confirm that this well-known little mission station 
was a model of ecological responsibility (Cicovacki 2009:19). 
This also applies to pronouncements he has made concerning 
ethnic relations and the education of colonised people. As an 
early pioneer in working for the improvement of ethnic 
relations, he worked specifically in the interest of black people 
for more than half a century and also attracted people of all 
nationalities to his jungle hospital (Abrell 1974:30).
Ethnic awareness
According to Abrell (1974:30), Schweitzer went to the heart of 
racial problems long before other men even admitted that there 
was a problem. Schweitzer understood the mentality of the 
African people amongst whom he lived and worked. According 
to Jahn (1953:3), he did not judge them according to his own 
social customs and moral codes. He, for example, recognised 
polygamy as a natural consequence of their society. He merely 
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attempted to assist them wherever he could, taking care that 
their existing social systems would not be disrupted. From 
Schweitzer’s own accounts of his life in Africa it appears as 
though he was not a moralising or criticising missionary. 
Instead, he was a realistic man who was well-acquainted with 
every aspect of life in the jungle and who focused on providing 
relief where the suffering was the greatest (Jahn 1953:3).
As early as in 1927, at a time during which the colonial 
peoples were rarely thought of as even worthy of consideration, 
he published a declaration of rights in which he emphasised the 
rights of the African people. He listed and discussed the 
fundamental rights of the people whom he sincerely believed 
were entitled to rights. These rights included the right to 
habitation, free movement over land and waterways, free use of 
soil, freedom of forced labour and exchange, the right to justice 
and to live within a natural national organisation and, last but 
not least, the right to education (Marshall & Poling 2000:228). 
Schweitzer criticised the colonial authorities for not adequately 
providing education (if at all) to the local inhabitants of the 
colonised areas. ‘How many educators have you in fact exported 
to your colony?’, he asked. In contrast, missionary societies 
succeeded in training many artisans, for example, carpenters 
(Schweitzer 1927 in Joy1967:171).
Schweitzer proposed limiting the education of Africans to fit 
what he regarded as ‘their economic level’ without skipping the 
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stages between unsophisticated and professional life, namely 
‘the stages of agriculture and handicraft’ (Cho 2011:81). The 
type of education he proposed for Africans had to be ‘a blend of 
the intellectual and the manual adapted to the needs of citizenship 
in a primitive society’ (Schweitzer 1927 in Joy 1967:172). He 
emphasised vocational education and therefore recommended 
that colonial authorities in Europe provide ‘not only ordinary 
teachers, but artisan educators’, for ‘a central problem of 
education there is how to make a craft loved and practiced 
among primitive [sic] peoples’ (Schweitzer 1927 in Joy 1967:172).
It is important to realise that Schweitzer intended the type of 
education provided to be fit for its purpose: he repeatedly 
stressed that ‘the beginning of civilisation with [the local people] 
is … industry and agriculture, through which alone can be 
secured the economic conditions of higher civilisation’ 
(Schweitzer 1927 in Joy 1967:179). He acknowledged the 
intellectual capacity of various African intellectuals and often 
found their level of education to be ‘astounding’, but he regarded 
higher education for the local people as superfluous mainly 
because it did not correspond with the nature of the local 
economy (Cho 2011:81). He, for example, mentioned that he 
would hardly be able to compete with an educated local 
government clerk that once visited him in essay writing. 
Therefore, Schweitzer held the opinion that schools ‘must set 
their aims higher than is natural’ (Schweitzer 1948 in Joy 
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1967:179), but only once government and trade required 
employable local people with extensive knowledge. He was 
concerned about the effect it would have if people were being 
educated but later found that there was little possibility for them 
to be employed in a position where they could utilise their 
knowledge (Schweitzer 1948 in Joy 1967:189).
The six education-related themes that were identified and 
discussed in broad outline above are certainly not the only ones 
that can be identified. One could, for example, also conduct an 
investigation into Schweitzer’s views on the use of modern 
technology; on the role and status of teachers; on religious 
values and character education respectively; on the relationship 
between politics and education; or the need for a greater 
correlation between life and education. However, the brief 
discussion provided above should be sufficient to substantiate 
the conclusions that can be drawn regarding the educational 
legacy of Albert Schweitzer.
Conclusion
Although Schweitzer believed that it is the school’s task to 
imbue all learners with the idea of reverence for all things, he 
offered few practical guidelines to educators on exactly how to 
do this in practice. In addition, he did not use the modern 
educational nomenclature. It can, nevertheless, be concluded 
that he advocated various aspects of education which are 
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currently stressed by educationists, for example lifelong 
learning, a focus on both pedagogy and andragogy, holistic 
education and problem-based learning.
In effect, Schweitzer’s whole life was an argument for 
lifelong learning. Lifelong learning is the ‘ongoing, voluntary, 
and self-motivated pursuit of knowledge for either personal 
or professional reasons’ (Wikipedia Contributors 2015a). This 
concept indicates that learning occurs throughout life, in 
various situations (formal, informal and non-formal) and 
arises from learners’ daily interactions with both other people 
and the world around them. Schweitzer acquired more than 
one advanced postgraduate qualification, never entirely 
abandoned his musical or scholarly interests, gave lectures and 
organ recitals throughout Europe, made recordings, and was a 
prolific writer of books and articles in addition to his work as 
jungle doctor for almost half a century. Schweitzer not only 
advocated lifelong learning in theory, but set a perfect practical 
example in this regard.
It should also be clear that Schweitzer extended education 
into the field of the andragogic. Andragogy refers to the 
education of adults. In particular, it involves a type of education 
that focuses on academic learning through reflection, critique 
and historical analyses. No better example of pleas for the use 
of these processes can arguably be found than in Schweitzer’s 
work.
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Holistic education comprises a desire that education should 
be geared towards a balanced development of learners. In 
addition to intellectual development, aspects like learners’ 
emotional, social, physical, artistic, creative and spiritual 
potential should also be emphasised. In holistic education the 
cultivation of a learner’s personal emotions, attitudes and 
motivations are particularly important, more so than, for 
example, preparing learners to become productive participants 
in the economic system (Miller 2005). Holistic education is 
based on the premise that individuals find identity, meaning, 
and purpose in life through their connections to the community, 
to the natural world and to humanitarian values such as 
compassion and peace. It calls forth an intrinsic reverence for 
life and a passionate love of learning (Kuriakose 2013:228). 
These pronouncements may well have been taken from the 
writings of Albert Schweitzer who advocated these ideas at least 
seven decades before the concept ‘holistic education’ became 
popular in America in 1979.
From the nature of the various themes that Schweitzer 
emphasised, it can be concluded that he would probably have 
supported a school curriculum based on real-world problems as 
well as a problem-based teaching strategy. It is maintained that 
in traditional, ‘content-based learning’ teachers are expected to 
provide learners with a vast amount of information which 
seems irrelevant to the world as it exists outside of school, and 
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then to test learners’ ability to recall those facts via memorisation. 
In contrast, problem-based learning is characterised by an 
emphasis on challenging, open-ended and context-specific 
problems which do not have simple ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers. 
Teachers act as facilitators of learning and merely guide the 
learning process whilst promoting an environment of inquiry. 
Learners need to act as self-directed, active investigators and 
problem-solvers in small collaborative groups. Advocates of 
problem-based learning believe that this form of learning not 
only develops critical thinking and creative skills, but also helps 
learners to learn how to apply knowledge in new situations 
(Learning-Theories.com 2016).
Albert Schweitzer expressed many ideas on these and other 
problems during his lifetime; ideas that are, to a large extent, 
consonant with present-day educational thinking. The relevancy 
of his pronouncements for current educational theory and 
practice can therefore hardly be questioned. He undoubtedly 
‘deserves a wide hearing and sober consideration’ (Clark 
1962:vii).
However, Schweitzer’s greatest contribution to mankind is 
his philosophy of reverence for life. This philosophy permeated 
all the (education-related) pronouncements he has made. It 
prompted him to devote his whole life in sacrificial service to 
his fellow-men. This philosophy still provides scholars with 
much food for thought. Educationists can benefit considerably 
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more from a study of the philosophy of reverence for life, than 
from seeking short-term answers to the problems of education 
in Schweitzer’s works.
Chapter 10: Summary
Albert Schweitzer did not write any books that primarily deal 
with educational theory or practice. However, his works contain 
powerful observations regarding education-related matters. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to highlight salient aspects 
of what can be regarded as the educational thought of Albert 
Schweitzer. The chapter also intends determining the relevance 
of his ideas for current educational practice. A brief explanation 
of what Schweitzer’s famous philosophy, reverence for life, 
comprises, is provided followed by examples of how this dictum 
can possibly find expression in educational practice. It is asserted 
that reverent teaching is the spiritual dimension of classroom 
practice. It is characterised by mutual respect between educators 
and learners, an approach to the subject matter that reveals 
admiration for inherited wisdom, and a teaching strategy that 
nurtures the seeds of growth in learners within a pleasing class 
atmosphere. A reverent teacher’s management of classroom 
discipline and utilisation of silence to enhance learning are 
stressed. Thereafter, six recurring, education-related themes in 
the works of Schweitzer are identified and briefly discussed, 
namely education for responsible citizenship and the promotion 
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of peace; the nature of sound intellectual development; the 
negative influence of materialism and consumerism; and 
education for environmental and ethnic awareness. It is 
concluded that the relevance of the ideas that Schweitzer has 
articulated lies in the fact that, without employing the modern 
nomenclature of educationists, he advocated aspects of education 
such as lifelong learning, a focus on both pedagogy and 
andragogy, holistic education and a problem-based approach to 
education. More important, though, is that a sound philosophy 




African Christianity offers a variety of religious healing. The so-
called mainline churches79 focus on diaconal healing by supplying 
members with food packages and hospices, whilst Independent 
Churches assist their members to find jobs and start businesses. 
The charismatic and Pentecostal churches excel in faith healing, 
79. Reformed Churches, Roman Catholic Church, Methodist Church, Congregational 
Church, Baptist Church, Presbyterian Church
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using the laying on of hands, prayer and a deep faith commitment 
from the side of the believer to heal emotional and physical 
illnesses. The African Independent Churches complement faith 
healing with ritual healing, employing a variety of cleansing 
rituals that may be closely related to traditional African practices 
to assist their members in combatting ill health and ill fortune 
whilst retaining a strong element of charismatic practices 
(Landman 2008:14–23). At present, newly formed charismatic 
churches offer a mixture of prosperity gospel, miracle guarantees, 
faith and ritual healing that changes the face of Christianity to 
such an extent that charismatic and Pentecostal churches do not 
want to be called ‘charismatic’ anymore, but call for a new name 
that would separate these churches from those understood to be 
charismatic or Pentecostal.
It will be argued in this essay that Albert Schweitzer (1875–
1975), who founded and ran a hospital in Lambarene in the 
north of the Congo, or rather French Equatorial Africa (now 
Gabon) in Western Africa at the beginning of the 20th century, 
practiced a form of diaconal healing, motivating his action from 
religious conviction. It will furthermore be indicated that, in 
spite of little evidence, his relationship with the African 
Traditional Religions which were dominant in his time was 
strained and that he showed relatively restricted sympathy for 
contemporary African beliefs on sickness and health.
Ultimately, it will be argued that Schweitzer did not see 
healing as religious at all. His motivation to come as a healer to 
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Africa was religious, but healing itself was, in his view, a purely 
scientific enterprise.
Healing in Africa, then and today, is big business, which gives 
power to the healer and hope to the believer. Since the National 
Census in South Africa no longer retrieves information on 
religious affiliation, it is difficult to make accurate statistical 
analysis on the movement of believers between churches. 
However, based on information given to the author by the 
Bureau for Market Research at the University of South Africa, 
26% of believers between 2000 and 2005 left mainline churches 
which do not offer faith and ritual healing to join the healing 
churches. This author’s research (Landman 2008:14–23) may 
even indicate that South African Christians are more than 100% 
religious in that they belong to more than one church; the one 
offers traditional diaconal healing and food benefits, whilst the 
other offers faith and ritual healing.
In this regard, and to illustrate this point, a quick reference 
can be made to the story of Petunia (pseudonym). Petunia is a 
church council member of a Reformed Church. When her 
grandchild became sick, she took the child to an independent 
healing church, believing that somebody had placed a curse on 
her for which her grandchild had to suffer. Without knowing 
that Petunia was under the supervision of a healing church, the 
minister of the Reformed Church took the grandchild to a 
medical doctor, paying for the consultation and the medicine. 
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Within two weeks the three month old wound of the grandchild 
was healed. Petunia was outraged and scared, confronting the 
minister. The child was now healed, she said, but what about 
the curse that had not been addressed which would now return 
with extra force?
This short story of Petunia, then, illustrates the difference in 
approach to healing between the Reformed tradition which regards 
secular medical help as a tool in religious practice, whilst a more 
indigenous approach regards healing as the holistic restoration of 
body-in-relationship which, in itself, is a religious approach.
Healing in Africa, past and present, being so important, this 
essay will deal with the healing practices of Albert Schweitzer in 
his African context within the following framework. Firstly, 
the main influences on his childhood will be briefly described. 
Secondly, his attitude towards the traditional African healing 
discourses and practices of his day will be retrieved from 
published sources. Thirdly, the research of the author on 
tradition-modern ways of healing in African Christianity will 
be overviewed, to come to a conclusion on how Africa has 
decided what Christian healing is in comparison with 
Schweitzer’s views more than a century ago.
Childhood influences
‘As far back as I can remember, I was deeply troubled by the 
amount of misery I saw in the world’. In these words, 
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translated from the German and spoken by (Fredric March 
as) Albert Schweitzer in a documentary on his life made in 
1957,80 Schweitzer defined his adulthood from his memory 
as a child.
This narrative captures the first of the main influences on 
Schweitzer’s life, a life that later became well-known for its 
compassion and reverence for life. In the film he refers to a 
prayer he, as a boy, composed for himself to pray after he has 
performed the prescribed prayer before going to bed. The 
prayer was: ‘Dear God, protect and bless all being that breathe, 
keep all evil from them and let them sleep in peace’. 
Complementary to this, he narrates an important visit he 
often made from Mülhausen where he attended secondary 
school:
Until the Second World War there stood on the Champ-de-Mars 
at Colmar a monument of Admiral Bruat. On this monument there 
was the sculpture of an African, carved in stone, with a thoughtful 
and sad expression. Whenever we went to Colmar, I sought an 
opportunity to look at him. His face spoke to me about the misery of 
the ‘dark continent’. It was he who directed my childish thoughts to 
distant lands. (n.p.)
The second major influence which directed his life since 
childhood was one of both exclusion and belonging. As a 
80. The film Albert Schweitzer was directed by Jerome Hill and Erica Anderson, and won 
the Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature for 1957.
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child he was isolated by his peers as being ‘different’, whilst a 
sense of belonging was given to him by his parents, who 
allowed him to think freely and differently: ‘We lived 
harmoniously together because our parents supported us in 
all things, even when we were stupid. Our parents brought 
us up to be free’.
The third prominent feature of his childhood is a strong 
sense of religious calling. He tells how, as a boy, he was forced 
to shoot a bird with a slingshot. The moment he refused to do 
so the church bells started ringing – like a voice from heaven, 
confirming his calling to revere life. Throughout the said film, 
Schweitzer refers to the ringing of church bells as a prophecy 
to his calling to devote his life to pastor-hood, science and 
music. When he and his wife departed from his childhood 
town to Africa, again the occasion was marked by the ringing 
of church bells.
Although the film is a romantic version of his life given by an 
aging Schweitzer and pronounced in hindsight, it confirms the 
thesis of this chapter, namely, that Schweitzer came to Africa as 
a medical doctor in answer to a religious call supported by his 
compassion for life and suffering; however, the execution of 
his healing practice was ‘scientific’ and not viewed by him as 
religious at all, something that might have placed him in conflict 
with the African Traditional Religions of his time as we shall 
examine below.
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Schweitzer’s views on religious healing
Medicine without politics or religion
In a paper, ‘Medical Practices at Albert Schweitzer’s Hospital in 
Lambarene, Gabon, 1913–1965’,81 Tizian Zumthurm82 argues 
that Schweitzer deliberately kept his hospital in Lambaréné free 
both from the religious missionary attitudes of other European 
doctors to Africa that demanded an integration of religion and 
medicine, and the ‘public healing’ sentiments of contemporary 
Europe that requested medicine to be part of the ‘development’ 
of Africa.
Schweitzer’s hospital, Zumthurm points out, was organised 
well within old-fashioned hierarchical power relations. Ironically, 
the power and hierarchy functional in Schweitzer’s hospital were 
in line with the contemporary (albeit slightly later) warnings 
of French philosopher Michel Foucault (1928–1984) against 
hierarchy and control in medical and mental institutions as 
expressed inter alia in his The birth of the clinic (1963/1973):
There was a clear hierarchy, wherein Schweitzer was the clear boss, 
whose short tempered character was feared, but his authority, experience 
and ‘wisdom’ never challenged. The few doctors mainly performed 
surgeries. The European nurses were assisting and/or in charge 
of specific wards and almost half of them worked in the household. 
81. Given at the Postgraduate Medical Humanities Conference in Exeter, Great Britain 
(20 July 2015).
82. From the Institute for the History of Medicine at the University of Bern, Switzerland.
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The African auxiliaries worked for them, which adds a layer of power 
that is very complex, also because these auxiliaries are difficult to trace 
in the sources, but acted as interpreters. The degree of control, especially 
when it comes to auxiliaries, but also patients (at some point some of 
them were put behind bars), was considerable, supervision a constant 
concern. It is a persistent trope in Schweitzer’s writings that is connected 
to his idea of the civilising mission. It was more focussed on manual 
work than on conversion to Christianity. (n.p.)
Zumthurm furthermore indicates that, in the about 100 000 
letters Schweitzer wrote, ‘there is a striking lack of references to 
the outside world. Local politics, beliefs and customs, as well as 
the economy are missing in the sources’. Schweitzer indeed 
distinguished himself from other missionary doctors to break 
the contemporary strong bond between medicine, religion and 
politics (Zumthurm 2015):
This seems especially true for Gabon, where Joseph Tonda, Florence 
Bernault and John Cinnamon all demonstrate how local power 
aspirations, prophetic movements, and fetish therapeutics were and are 
intertwined. Schweitzer seems to have been very good at keeping all 
these things out of the hospital. (n.p.)
In short then, Schweitzer’s hospital was based on hierarchy and 
punishment and rested on a philosophy that medicine must 
remain pure from politics and religion.
Schweitzer on African traditional healing
With this basic insight from Zumthurm, we now move to 
Albert Schweitzer himself who, in his own works, confirmed 
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his intention to keep his healing activities strictly apart from 
both ecclesiastical and secular politics. Schweitzer was not 
permitted by the Paris Missionary Society, who sent him to 
Lambarene, to preach at the missionary station. This was 
because of his ‘liberal’ views expressed in his book The quest for 
the historical Jesus that was published in 1906. Whether 
strategically or out of conviction, he made it clear in his 
autobiographical work, Out of my life and thought (1933/1991:78) 
that his intention in going to Africa was to stay clear of both 
pietistic and orthodox, as well as liberal, ‘Christian inclination’. 
He wanted to work and not to talk.
Staying clear of faith trends was one thing, but practising 
medicine in an environment where healing and religious views 
were closely intertwined should have been quite something 
else. However, in the rare instances when Schweitzer did refer 
to traditional medicine, he described his relationship with 
traditional healers as one of co-operation. Once, and once only, 
in the regular leaflet he sent to his supporters in Europe 
(Mitteilungen aus Lambarene 1928/3) he wrote:
Unsere Politik geht darauf aus, uns mit den Fetischmännem gut zu 
stellen, damit sie selber die Kranken, bei denen ihre Kunst versagt, an 
uns weisen. [Our policy is to be on good terms with the fetish men, so 
they will send us the patients where their art fails.] (p. 33, [translation])
In On the edge of the primeval forest, in which his first stay from 
1913 to 1917 is described, Schweitzer (1949:39) furthermore 
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gave a ‘Stoic’ description of fetishes – with magical power 
believed to reside especially in the human skull – remarking 
drily that ‘I am myself the possessor of a fetish’ with reference to 
the ‘innocent’ skull in his possession.
Under the pretext of being accommodating, Schweitzer 
(1949), on the contrary, showed with the following remarks 
precisely how great the distance between his view of scientific 
medicine and the local religious beliefs on healing was:
My name among the natives in Galoa is ‘Oganga’, that is fetishman. 
They have no other name for a doctor, as those of their own tribesmen 
who practise the healing art are all fetishmen. My patients take it to be 
only logical that the man who can heal disease should also have the 
power of producing it, and that even at a distance. To me it is striking 
that I should have the reputation of being such a good creature and yet, 
at the same time, such a dangerous one! That the diseases have some 
natural cause never occurs to my patients: they attribute them to evil 
spirits, to malicious human magic, or to ‘the worm’, which is their 
imaginary embodiment of pain of every sort. (p. 27)
In short, then, Schweitzer came to Africa not to preach but to 
practice medicine. When confronted with traditional culture-
religious practices and beliefs, he simply accommodated them 
in a patriarchal way to either minimise or use them to his own 
benefit. However, he regarded local practices that were not 
directly related to medicine – such as polygamy and lobolo [the 
paying of a bride-price] – with sympathy (Schweitzer 1949:93). 
In his own eyes, then, Schweitzer’s relationship with the 
black people – including the ‘fetishmen’ – was that not only of 
co-operation, but of brotherhood (1949:95).
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Voices on Schweitzer as healer in Africa
Although Albert Schweitzer himself wrote very little on his 
encounter with African Traditionalists, references to this can 
be found in books written on him in the 1940s through to the 
1990s. These books honour his life work in his old age or 
commemorate his death in 1965. A majority of the books were 
written by professionals who worked with him in Lambarene, 
or friends who paid the hospital a visit and bathed in his fame.
The authors presented Schweitzer either as being in harmony 
with his cultural context, or as the one who came to kill the 
witch doctors, or then, per definition, Satan himself. At the end 
of this section, it will be asked whether Schweitzer would have 
felt at ease with either of these depictions.
Richard Kik, who shared a friendship with Schweitzer for 
30 years, published in 1959 a book on his visit to Lambarene 
entitled With Schweitzer in Lambaréné. He describes an incident 
of doctor-patient-assistant encounter as follows (Kik 1959):
The sick woman is led before the Doctor and he motions her to a 
seat. ‘Oganga’, she moans, ‘here sits the worm’. With trembling hand 
she points to her chest. The Doctor does not understand her dialect 
and gestures to his black assistant, Joseph, who acts as interpreter … 
‘Ha, the worm is the sickness in the chest the pain’ … Schweitzer 
strokes the old woman’s hair. She looks at him with anxious eyes as 
he applies a stethoscope. She is a willing patient. She is given a white 
powder in a small envelope. Joseph explains to her and her two 
daughters slowly and carefully how often she must take it, and how 
much at a time. ‘She must not dust her hair with this valuable powder 
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nor throw any of it away’, says Joseph with a stern look and a warning 
forefinger. (p. 32)
The woman is a willing patient. She does not defy her tradition 
to come to Oganga [fetishman], that is, Schweitzer-as-fetishman. 
He also does not ask her to do so. He is not a missionary. 
Schweitzer shows care and strokes her hair. Joseph, the 
indigenous assistant, gives her medicine and warns her not to 
use it for ritual practices but to drink the powder. Schweitzer’s 
concern is not her conversion and not her ‘development’, but 
that she will take the medicine and be healed, thereby buying 
into his type of healing.
Kik (1959) describes another scene in which Schweitzer’s 
care and efficiency win the fight against ‘the superstition’ of the 
worm. However, here Kik puts Christian missionary words in 
Schweitzer’s mouth to acknowledge that he and his wife came 
to Africa because the Lord has called them:
Doctor Schweitzer begins his day with the rising sun. His first walk 
leads him to the most seriously ill. ‘Have you slept?’ is his first question 
as he moves through long rows of cots in the simple building which he 
has constructed for the patients to shield them from sun and rain. 
Joseph, interpreter and assistant, accompanies the Doctor. Now they 
are beside the patient who is scheduled for his operation. The young 
Negro is moaning with pain and pressing both hands over his abdomen.
There is no time to lose. The Doctor sends Joseph to call Mrs. Schweitzer 
who will administer the anaesthetic. Schweitzer gently strokes the 
forehead of the groaning boy while Mrs. Schweitzer arranges the 
instruments … (the operation is performed and the patient taken to the 
recovery room) … Joseph tiptoes out of the room. Out in the open 
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under a palm tree he sees a cowering figure. She is the mother of the 
patient … Tearfully she grasps Joseph’s hands and asks, ‘Where is he? Is 
he dead?’
Joseph shakes his head slowly. ‘Yes, he is dead but the Doctor will 
awaken him and then he will have not worm …’
Inside the hut the patient moves his head, opens his eyes and looks 
around in surprise as he sees the Doctor seated beside him. His lips 
form the words, ‘I have no more pain!’ With a smile of calming assurance 
the Doctor strokes the dark kinky head. The Negro’s hand seeks that of 
the Doctor and holds it.
Led by Joseph the mother enters the sickroom. Joy and thankfulness 
transform her face. Albert Schweitzer tells them that he and his wife 
have been chosen by our Lord to help people in Africa: ‘All of us, black 
people and white people, are brothers!’ (p. 100–101)
We do not know whether Schweitzer indeed said that ‘he and 
his wife have been chosen by our Lord to help people in Africa’, 
which would not only have been missionary language but also 
the language of those who wanted to ‘develop’ Africa through 
Christianity. We also do not know whether Schweitzer indeed 
described the hold that ‘witchcraft’ had on the indigenous people 
in the following words, attributed to him by his visitors Charles 
R. Joy and Melvin Arnold, who published a book on their visit 
to Lambaréné in 1948, entitled The Africa of Albert Schweitzer, 
with him in his forest hospital in Lambarene as told in text and 
pictures by two recent visitors:
Europeans will never be able to understand how terrible is the life of 
the poor creatures who pass their days in continual fear of the fetishes 
which can be used against them. Only those who have seen this misery 
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at close quarters will understand that it is a simple human duty to bring 
to these primitive peoples a new view of the world which can free them 
from these torturing superstitions. (n.p.)
Are these ‘developmental’ words the words of Schweitzer 
himself, or were they placed in his mouth by visitors who carried 
with them the European ideals of development through 
missionary practice?
The same visitors, Joy and Arnold (1948:43), commended 
the medical assistant Joseph (who will ever know what his real 
name was?) for becoming immune from witchcraft in spite of 
the fact that he was ‘indigenous’: ‘He is not afraid of caring for 
the most violently ill patients and does not fear the Evil Spirits 
if death should come’. They acknowledged (Joy & Arnold 1948) 
that he had to attend to his cultural duties but that he did not do 
so out of free will:
Even those who are liberated from superstition, like this medical 
assistant, must compromise in their native villages. For example, during 
a death festival, the enlightened ones usually go through the motions of 
‘making tom-tom’, putting food on the grave, and otherwise ‘doing as 
the Romans do’ so that the more orthodox of their fellow villagers will 
not feel that the Spirits are outraged. (p. 44)
A decade or two later, in the early 1960’s, Louise Jilek-Aall came 
from Europe as a psychiatry student to work at Lambarene. In 
her book, Working with Dr Schweitzer; sharing his Reverence for 
Life, she makes an observation contrary to that of the 
‘developmental’ visitors just cited. She relates how she ‘escaped’ 
one night, against the wishes of Albert Schweitzer, to attend a 
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traditional feast – where she saw Gustav, the then medical 
assistant, participating ‘with maddened eyes’. The medical 
assistant, then, was not somebody participating in a traditional 
feast as one converted away from ‘heathenism’, but as one forced 
by his job at the hospital to lead a double life.
Dr Edgar Berman, an American who worked since 1960 with 
Schweitzer in Lambarene as chief surgeon, also remembered 
Schweitzer in a way quite differently from that of a man who 
took the African Traditionalists in his stride. Working with the 
aged Schweitzer in the five years before his death, Berman 
expressed great admiration for Schweitzer in his memoirs, 
which were published in 1986 as In Africa with Schweitzer: A 
remarkable memoir of the US Surgeon who worked with Schweitzer. 
Yet, he related an incident of intense confrontation between 
Schweitzer and a fetishman. The latter came into the hospital in 
Lambarene and gave the patients traditional medicine which 
were of course alternative to that of Schweitzer. The fetishman 
furthermore treated Schweitzer with disrespect by calling him 
(in French) ‘you’ in the singular, not using the required royal 
plural. Berman (1986:94ff) related at length the anger of 
Schweitzer against the fetishman, calling him a murderer and 
forcefully removing him from the hospital.
In South Africa, a country of puritan religious beliefs, Albert 
Schweitzer was constantly depicted as the one whose Christianity 
triumphed over the practices of the heathen. One example is 
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MZ Thomas’ Albert Schweitzer: Van kind tot man [Albert 
Schweitzer: From child to man] that was published in 1960 by 
HAUM. The very first page opens dramatically with Schweitzer 
saving a baby from being sacrificed by the toordokter [witch 
doctor], an incident never related by Schweitzer himself. This is 
a book translated from German into Afrikaans and reflects the 
sentiments of both religious communities that saw Schweitzer 
primarily as a missionary who came to save Africans from a life-
defying heathenism. Even the film Schweitzer, made in 1990 by 
the South African producer Gray Hofmeyr, depicts Albert 
Schweitzer’s life as primarily, and continuously, a dramatic fight 
between a caring missionary and an evil fetishman. This 
presentation of Schweitzer is far removed from that of the 
documentary by Anderson and Hill referred to in the above, in 
which Schweitzer is depicted in a reverent fight for the healing 
of misery and pain.
In Schweitzer’s own works and words, then, he presented 
himself as a medical doctor who wished to sail clear of political 
and missionary agendas in his healing practices. However, those 
retelling and dramatising him placed words and gestures in his 
mouth that turned him into a raving missionary with the 
primary focus of combatting African heathenism.
This author concurs with Barbara Maier and Warren Schibles 
who, in their book, The philosophy and practice of medicine and 
bioethics: A naturalistic-humanistic approach study Schweitzer’s 
concept of reverence for life and conclude (2011) as follows:
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Schweitzer is basically a humanistic pragmatist who is coerced to 
action and involvement to preserve life and health on the basis of his 
critical and rational understanding and emotions in his concrete 
situation. (p. 269)
African expressions of religious healing
African ways of integrating healing with missionary 
and traditionalist practices
In the last part of this essay, the contribution of Albert 
Schweitzer to Africa and African views on religious healing is 
(re)considered. If Schweitzer was a naturalist and a humanistic 
pragmatist as Maier and Schibles (2011:264) have argued – an 
insight to which this author subscribes – could Schweitzer 
have made any contribution to contemporary religious views 
on healing?
Schweitzer might have chosen a position for himself as a 
healer in Africa that we today call ‘humanist’ and ‘pragmatist’, 
but he still had to survive in a milieu which was, on the one 
hand, pronouncedly missionary Christian at Lambarene and, 
on the other, hugely African Traditionalist outside. Schweitzer 
as medical doctor might even have lived in harmony with both 
missionary Christianity and Africa Traditionalism. Now, more 
than a century after Schweitzer started his hospital in Lambarene 
in 1913, the relationship between healing as a religious act, 




Vhumani Magezi, in an article entitled ‘Reflection on pastoral 
care on ministry frontlines in Africa: towards discerning 
emerging pragmatic pastoral ministerial responses’ (2016), 
describes the present faces of this relationship. What Magezi 
describes here, are three types of relationship between Christian 
and Traditionalists which he presents as ‘pastoral approaches’. 
Of his seven approaches, only three will be quoted here as 
relevant to our topic on the relationship between Christian and 
Traditionalists in acts of physical healing (Magezi 2016):
The first approach entails mixing African traditional practices and 
Christian pastoral care practices. When problems arise, the leaders, 
who are the prophets, perform rituals to exorcise and cast away the 
misfortune. They perform healing functions using substances such as 
water and oil. These prophets operate just like traditional diviners. In 
fact, there is very little difference between the way diviners and these 
prophets conduct their care to the people. These practices are prevalent 
in churches that are commonly called African Independent Churches 
(AIC), white garment churches or Zionists in South Africa …
The second approach is one that draws a dichotomy between Christian 
values and practical life. This approach is not verbalized but rather 
acted upon by individuals in church communities. In this approach, 
people tend to hold and adhere to Christian values and virtues when 
there are no problems or threats to their lives. But in times of problems, 
in addition to prayers and Bible reading, people seek extra help from 
diviners and magicians. The people revert to traditional healing 
practices. This is done in secret (usually at night) in order to maintain 
one’s position in the church community …
The sixth [here: third] approach is exorcism and healing. Problems and 
any other of life’s challenges are attributed to curses and evil attacks. 
Pastoral care entails conducting healing sessions and exorcism. The 
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pastors pray over protective items such as water, oils, pieces of cloth and 
arm bands to ensure protection at all times. This approach is prevalent 
among new emerging Pentecostal and Charismatic churches. (n.p.)
This author (Landman 2008:15ff) acknowledges the following 
practices in partial agreement with Magezi: (1) African churches 
openly integrating missionary and traditionalist practices, 
(2) Christians who belong to mainline (‘missionary’) churches 
secretly attending churches that integrate traditionalist practices 
into traditionally Christian practices, and (3) Christians secretly 
visiting traditional healers.
This relationship between missionary and traditional is, of 
course, far removed from Schweitzer’s thinking and practice a 
century earlier, who had to consider only two options, that of 
‘purely missionary’ and ‘purely traditionalist’ – and rejected both 
for a humanistic, ‘science only’ approach, albeit practiced from 
an hierarchical and patriarchal perspective, as Schweitzer 
apparently did – which, in a sense, is also very missionary.
This author finds the 2004 categorisation of the healing 
practices of African churches given by Othusitse Morekwa in a 
Master’s dissertation entitled – appropriately to our topic under 
discussion – ‘The interchange, exchange and appropriation of 
traditional healing, modern medicine and Christian healing in 
Africa today’, helpful. Here, three types of healing are distinguished:
1. Diaconal healing as practiced by the so-called mainline, or 
missionary, churches who distribute food packages to people 
and build hospices and hospitals for the ill.
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2. Faith healing as practiced by the charismatic churches when 
people are believed to be healed through prayer and the laying 
on of hands.
3. Ritual healing as practiced by the African Independent 
Churches where ritual cleansing practices as a combination 
of faith healing and cultural-ritual healing.
This author agrees with these categories except for the fact that 
they often overlap, and that many of the ‘prosperity churches’ 
cannot be categorised under these headings.
However, as far as Albert Schweitzer is concerned, this author 
categorises him and his hospital under ‘diaconal healing’, since 
he viewed his calling to be from God and he had chosen a 
missionary context to situate his work.
Local views on religious healing
Albert Schweitzer’s approach that acknowledges the value of both 
religion and medicine but keeps them apart, probably won the 
day in hospitals in Africa, but not in present day healing practices 
in African communities and churches. This final subsection aims 
to take a glimpse at the integration of healing into religious 
practices as researched by this author in South African contexts.
During 2003 and 2004, this author interviewed 102 churches 
in Atteridgeville, South Africa. The latter is a (previously black) 
township and part of the City of Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality. It is situated to the west of Pretoria, the 
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administrative capital of South Africa. Of the 102 churches, 
54 were mainline churches that practice diaconal healing only, 
with special reference to the Roman Catholic Church that has 
built a hospice for people affected by HIV and AIDS in the 
township, and distribute a large number of food packages 
weekly. The other 48 churches were healing churches that 
offered a variety of religious rituals that were claimed to lead to 
physical and emotional healing and give protection against bad 
luck and accidents. Many members of the mainline churches 
visited the prophet-healers of these churches. Every church has 
its own trademark in healing rituals, but they usually include 
the cleansing of the inner and outer body through vomiting that 
is induced by drinking coffee or tea with little stones, and by 
bathing in ashes that have been blessed by the prophet-healer. 
A variety of herbs are used as well as praying, the laying on of 
hands and a sincere call to believe in the healing powers of God 
and Jesus the Redeemer. Christian sangomas will throw the 
bones on the ‘carpet x-rays’ to read the future of the believers, 
with the additional use of bird nests, mirrors, flags or whatever 
marks the uniqueness of the healer. Other healers inject the sick 
with detergents to wash their blood clean of HIV and AIDS, or 
promise believers if they join their specific church they will 
never be infected by HIV.
In the period 2000 to 2008, this author worked part-time as a 
therapeutic counsellor at Kalafong, the state hospital in 
Atteridgeville. Here she met with the religious discourses that 
321
Chapter 11
feed these healing practices. The patient population were 75% 
black, 74% female, and 52% unemployed. Of them 97% were 
Christian, of which more than half belonged to a church that 
practiced ritual healing (Landman 2008:12ff.).
The problems that kept patients from developing their 
potential are – popularly referred to as the three L’s:
1. Losses, that is, the loss of relationships through death or 
divorce, the loss of health through HIV and AIDS, the loss of 
employment; the loss of youth, etc.
2. Loneliness, which led to entering harmful and risky 
relationships.
3. Lack of money, and especially a lack of nutritious food.
Some of the religious discourses that convinced patients to visit 
churches of ritual healing are as follows:
• Illness and misfortune are caused by bewitchment, God or 
Satan, and the church can heal this.
• AIDS is not caused by a virus, but by bewitchment, God or 
Satan, and should be healed by the church.
• Medicine alone cannot make you healthy.
In the publication on these findings (Landman 2008), the 
discourses that encourage patients to see both illness and/or 
misfortune and health as related to the faith in a specific 
healer/church, these discourses have been classified as power 
discourses, body discourses, identity discourses and otherness 
discourses.
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In conclusion to this subsection, a few examples of each are 
given here:
Power discourses (‘Religious discourses as power discourses 
feed on the binary oppositions between divine and human 
power, and between divinely instituted hierarchical power and 
social powerlessness’, Landman 2008:103):
• God purifies me through punishment.
• Dreams are divine warnings.
• The pastor said my child died because we do not give enough 
money to the church.
• My pastor said my depression was a bad spirit.
• I am a man and God has made me so, and therefore I may 
beat my wife.
• My mother must listen to me; I am the man in the house.
Body discourses (‘Religious discourses as body discourses are 
constituted by the binary opposition between the body as 
controlled by societal, traditional and divine law versus the body 
as self-controlled’, Landman 2008:103):
• A woman who does not want sex, is a witch.
• Abortion is a sin.
• Masturbation is not for a real man.
• The Lord will condomise me.
Identity discourses (‘Religious discourses as identity discourses 
try to find a place for spiritual identity between the patient’s 
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cultural, sexual, economic, gender and other identities’, 
Landman 2008:103):
• My church does not allow me to use medicine.
• My church only provides for families, and I am single.
• My church says I must accept that God has made me a woman 
and poor.
• My church says I am a bad woman because I was raped.
• A good Christian woman does not speak to other men.
• A good Christian man must have a house and be the 
breadwinner.
• My mother told me to act stupid to get a good husband.
Otherness discourses (‘Religious discourses as otherness discourses 
emphasise the transcendental nature of religion’, Landman 
2008:104):
• My church claims that it is HIV free.
• I think my husband is HIV positive, but God does not want 
me to deny him.
• My son was killed with a cork opener because God is angry 
with me.
• The pastor has prophesied that my child, who committed 
suicide, did not go to heaven.
In short, then, African Christianity today looks much different 
from the context in which Albert Schweitzer practiced medicine. 
Schweitzer’s context was that of a white missionary endeavour 
within a forest of African Traditionalism, with him reacting 
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against, but also accommodating, both. In the century after 
Schweitzer, Africa was invaded by a variety of Western 
Christianity, but eventually took Christianity back from Europe 
to take control over its own faith practices as diaconal and/or 
ritual. A majority of African Christianity, as illustrated in the – 
albeit one – example from Kalafong Hospital in the above, have 
chosen on a combination between faith and healing. In this 
regard, Schweitzer is not acknowledged by them as one of their 
heroes. He was a doctor who assisted Africans, but whose way 
of doing things do not assist in understanding or enhancing 
religious healing practices today.
Conclusion
Albert Schweitzer’s work as doctor in the hospital in Lambarene, 
Gabon, can be described as diaconal healing, only in the sense 
that he came and worked as a medical doctor in Africa as a 
reaction to a calling from God, and has chosen a missionary 
setup as the context for doing this work. He himself tried – 
albeit in a patriarchal way – to keep the focus of the hospital 
away from both European politics and missionary sentiments, 
as well as from African Traditionalism. For this he has recently 
been called a ‘humanistic pragmatist’.
In this essay, the author has argued this statement from the 
works of Schweitzer himself as well as from a critical reading of 
books on Schweitzer written by colleagues and visitors, as well 
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as works by moralists and film makers in the century after his 
death.
Finally, it was argued that Schweitzer’s division of healing 
and religion did not win the day in Africa where Christian 
patients today prefer healing to be in the hands of both the 
doctor and the church healer. Examples from a hospital in 
Atteridgeville, where the author worked as therapeutic 
counsellor, were given, and the discourses that convince patients 
that healing is a religious enterprise were brought to the table of 
the researcher.
Chapter 11: Summary
African Christianity today entertains several forms of healing, 
which include combinations of diaconal healing, faith healing, 
and ritual healing. The latter is also a prime feature of African 
Traditional Religions which existed prominently in the times of 
Albert Schweitzer (1875–1965). Physical healing, for a significant 
number of people in Africa, cannot be obtained by drinking a 
pill only. Healing does not come from a bottle but from restored 
relationships and inner cleansing, the latter being effected by 
appropriate rituals. In Africa, yesterday and today, healing 
always has a religious and cultural side.
This essay will ask the question on how Schweitzer’s views 
on healing fit into – or stand outside – African views on religious 
healing. His description of his relationship to the traditional 
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healers as one of ‘co-operation’, his ‘Stoic’ description of fetishes, 
with magical power residing especially in the human skull (he 
drily remarked that he too has a fetish), and his sympathetic 
references to polygamy and bride-price will be examined as well 
as other expressions of his relationship to black identities.
Ultimately, it will be asked whether he acknowledged religion 
and culture to be aspects of healing, and if not, how he dealt 
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